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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purposes of this manuscript are (1) to examine the system 
of the visual arts in light of its historical development; (2) to pro-
pose an aesthetic theory which is appropriate to such development; and 
(3) to describe the implications of such a theory for art education. 
We now call such diverse objects as prehistoric cave paintings, Maori 
war clubs, Cretan pottery, Greek kouros figures, medieval illuminated 
manuscripts, paintings of the Italian Renaissance, Amish quilts, ab-
stract paintings of the twentieth century, enlarged comicbook figures, 
photographs of space and "earthworks" works of art. When we consider 
the real diversity of such objects, it becomes apparent that for an 
aesthetic theory to deal successfully with such a heterogeneous group 
of objects it must be an open-textured one; it must allow for all of 
these objects yet must not be so inclusive as to allow any object to be 
viewed as a work of art. Such a theory is that of the Artworld, that 
is, a theory of art as a social practice. It is the contention of this 
manuscript that the Artworld originated in the Renaissance period of 
Western history and gradually evolved into the practice of the visual 
arts ·.vith t,.ihich we are now familiar. It is also the contention of 
this manuscript that the practice of art as it now exists is based on 
the autonomy of the work of art, that is, that the work of art is 
created primarily to be viewed and appreciated. 
1 
Chapters II through IV will examine the historical development 
of the Artworld. Chapter II will consider the birth of the Artworld 
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in the Renaissance and the various currents which met at this time to 
originate the concept of the Artworld. The period of the Renaissance 
saw the initial changes of the medieval art product to the art object, 
of the craftsman to artist, and the shift in audience from the general 
population to a smaller group of educated laymen, or connoisseurs. 
These initial changes were intensified during the Mannerist and Baroque 
periods by a self-conscious attitude toward the creation of art, by the 
concept of artistic genius and by the introduction of art theory which 
addressed the aims and nature of the creative act. These developments 
will be examined in Chapter III. Chapter IV will examine developments 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which were witness to the 
formalization of the Artworld. These developments include published 
criticism, museums and galleries, and the installation of critics and 
curators as impor~ant arbiters of taste in the Artworld. This period 
also saw the a~ergence of art history and aesthetics as specific sys-
tems of study. All of these gradual steps leading to a formal practice 
also reflect the emergence of the work of art as autonomous. They also 
lead to what I have termed the "museum context," that is, the subordi-
nation of utilitarian contexts of objects brought into the Artworld 
to the demands of aesthetic interest. 
Chapter V will examine the institutional theory of art of George 
Dickie. In his institutional analysis he describes the artworld as a 
loose coalition of artists, presenters and audience who are governed 
by the prL~arJ and secondary conventions of the artworld. However, in 
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an attempt to keep the theory open-ended, he has permitted his art-
world to be so open-ended that no institutional analysis is possible. 
By applying John Rawls' definition of an institution to the basic con-
cept of the artworld, we may define membership, office holders, pro-
cedures and the conventions which define the work of art. The primary 
convention is th~ agreement of artist and audience that they are en-
gaged in a formal activity, and that activity is the creation and 
viewing of the autonomous work of art. The secondary conventions in-
clude the handling of the plastic elements, the history and theory 
surrounding the artwork. Membership is acquired by acknowledgment of 
the primary convention and some knowledge of t~e secondary conventions. 
Office holders obtain offices by publicly demonstrating their expert 
knowledge of the conventions. Artworks are defined as such in a 
public manner by the office holders in their presentation of the works 
to the members of the Artworld or by the artist in a private sense by 
the act of creation. Chapter VI is an institutional analysis of pho-
tography and is based on the premise that if the theory of the Artworld 
which I will adv~~ce is indeed a good analytical tool, then the con-
fusions which seem to exist about photography will be explicated. 
In light of the elitist nature of the Artworld, its insertion into 
a mass educational system would seem to produce a basic dichotomy. 
Chapter VII will examine this basic dichotomy, that of the exlusive 
nature of the Artworld and the democratization of the art experience 
within the mass education system, and the implications this dichotomy 
has for art education. One implication is the substantial increase in 
the teachL~g of the secondary conventions of the Artworld to students 
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as potential members of the Artworld. Another implication is the 
teaching of a visual education based not solely on the conventions of 
the Artworld but rather on conventions more readily accessible to stu-
dents of mass education, that is, those worlds of the "mass arts." 
Before beginning this study, I would like to comment upon sever-
al points which are germane to the following text. The first concerns 
the view that the Artworld originated in the Renaissance. At this 
point in time, we are accustomed to viewing the visual, musical, theat-
rical and literary works of past cultures as works of art. This at-
titude is so ingrained that we do not consider the utilitarian con-
texts in which these objects were created. Indeed, information about 
these contexts has often been lost in the centuries or has been clouded 
by current perspectives. In an article describing the genesis and de-
velopment of the modern system of the arts, Paul Oskar Kristeller has 
noted: 
If the absence of a scheme of the fine arts before the eighteenth 
century and its fluctuations in that century have escaped the 
attention of most historians, this merely proves how thoroughly 
and irresistibly plausible the scheme has become to modern 
thinkers and writers.l 
I would extend these comments not only to the system of the arts but to 
L~e autonomous nature of tr~ work of art. In other words, I perceive 
a gradual "awakening'' on th.e part of bott~ artist and audience si::tce the 
Renaissance to the creation of a work which was bereft of a utilitarian 
context, which was created to be viewed and appreciated. I have de-
scribed this as a "gradual awakening" because I think it was an evolu-
tion in the way the work of art was perceived; this evolution was begun 
in the Renaissance and was completed by the nineteenth century. We are 
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cognizant to an extent of this change in the perception of the artwork, 
but I think that it must be fully understood to understand in turn the 
nature of the Artworld and the conventions which have accrued since this 
change. As Kristeller has noted, a modern attitude may be so perva-
sive that we do not notice its presence in an analysis of the past. In 
examining the Artworld, I thL~k we must be fully cognizant of the 
changes begun in the Renaissance. 
In connection with this change in the perception of the artwork, 
I will use the terms "art product" and "crafts" to describe artworks 
made before the Renaissance, particularly those made in the medieval 
times. I will do this to delineate their utilitarian nature and their 
quotidian place in life. I in no way intend these terms to connote a 
negative or derogatory meaning. I am in no way suggesting that they 
lack qualities which can be appreciated, nor that a sense of these 
qualities was absent from their making. Rather, I am suggesting that 
the sense of design of their makers was bound to the utilitarian con-
text of the object, whether that context was one of use, religion or · 
magic. 
It should also be noted that L'"l using the term "Artworld" I am 
referring to a social practice. In suggesting that there are perim~ 
eters to the Artworld, I am referring only to actions which are per-
ceivable as either belonging to the practice or to some other practice. 
The "ground" of the Artworld exists in the activities and relationships 
of human beings involved in ~~e arts; it does not reside in the re-
positories of the art·,..,ork. Thus, the term "L'"lstitution" is -:..1sed only 
in a broad sociological meaning, that is, a pattern of behavior by a 
group of people which is organized and is understood by the partici-
pants. 
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I would also like to note the description of the Artworld in 
terms of birth and maturation. If we think of a newborn child, we do 
not expect the child to exhibit all of the traits of an adult nor to 
exhibit even the traits of a more mature child. The newborn, while 
holding these traits in potentiality, is expected to be immature, is 
expected to be an as yet unformed possibility. In the same way, the 
Artworld of the Renaissance cannot be expected to exhibit all of the 
traits of a fully matured Artworld. However, just as we examine the 
newborn infant for future developments and characteristics, so we should 
search for the patterns in the newborn Artworld which may come to 
fruition at a time in the future. In the same way, we must examine 
the centuries following the Renaissance as a maturation period for the 
Artworld. As the child grows, he aecomes less egocentric, more aware 
of the social conventions that surround his behavior and, at the same 
time, more self-aware. For the Artworld, the centuries following the 
Renaissance provided such a period of growth and development, a period 
of self-discovery and formalization of behavior. 
Finally, I would like to note that I will limit my comments to 
the visual arts, simply because this is my area of expertise. I be-
lieve the theory of the Artworld which I will describe is certainly 
applicable to the theatre or to music and probably to the study of 
literature. Each of the arts has evolved into a definable practice 
and during this process has become a formalized entity. Each has fol-
lowed some sequence of growth which has witnessed the acc~~ulation of 
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conventions that govern the practice. However, the evolution of these 
arts will not be addressed in this manuscript, nor will their current 
status be discussed except in passing reference to their intersection 
with the visual arts. 
Notes: 
1 Paul Oskar Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts: A 
Study in the History of Aesthetics (II)," The Journal of the History of 
Ideas 13 (January 1952): 45. 
• 
CHAPTER II 
THE RENAISSANCE: BIRTH OF THE AR'l'WORLD 
Introduction 
The modern Artworld, composed of artists and audience, perform-
ances and museums, works of art intended to be aesthetically appreciated 
and theories which discuss art, is a phenomenon familiar to most people 
today. However, this familiar Artworld has not always existed in its 
current form. Medieval Europe knew little of artists and nothing of 
museums~ the Polynesian carver certainly did not believe he was making 
a "work of art." How then did the modern Artworld come about? It is 
my intention in this chapter to demonstrate that a set of circumstances 
came together during the Renaissance to give birth to the Artworld, and 
that the informal nature of the Artworld gradually matured or evolved 
into a more formal institution. 
This chapter deals with the Renaissance and with the various 
elements that combined to see the art object emerge from the medieval 
art product, the artist separate from the craftsman, and a gap widen 
between the art establishment and the general public. The elements 
that are explored within this chapter are ~~e technological changes 
which affected the practice of art, discoveries internal to the arts, 
the role of a theoretical approach to art, the changing status of the 
artist, the involvement of laymen in a critical position and the estab-
lishment of academies. However, before we begin, it is perhaps best to 
examine a few terms that will be used in the following pages. 
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First, the term "Renaissance" must be clarified. For the pur-
pose of our discussion, I would like to include what is commonly called 
the Proto-Renaissance within the general category of the Renaissance 
so that the ti~me-frame is inclusive of the fourteenth through the early 
sixteenth centuries. Paul Oskar Kristeller has remarked on the am-
biguity involved in tJ."l.e term "Renaissance" and has concluded: 
I . • . prefer to define the Renaissance as that historical period 
which understood itself as a Renaissance or rebirth of letters 
and of learning, whether the reality conformed to this claim or 
not. Yet I think it is still safer to avoid even this questionable 
commitment, and to identify the Renaissance with the historical 
period that extends roughly from 1300 to 1600 A.D. and that has 
been conventionally designated by that name.l 
Although Kristeller ends the Renaissance at 1600, I would rather hold 
to the feeling of Kristeller's definition and end the Renaissance peri-
od with the emergence of the Mannerists at roughly 1520. In using the 
time-frame from 1300 to the second decade of the sixteenth century, I 
believe that the changes in the making and viewing of art seem less 
startling and more understandable as an evolutionary process which was 
part of the complex growth of Western culture during this period. 
Second, in order to delineate the work produced by the medieval 
craftsman and the Renaissance artist, I use the terms "art product" 
and "art object." Both refer to the work of art, but the change in 
terms is used to denote the attitudinal changes within the maker and 
viewer of art in the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance. "Art product" 
is the w-ork of a craftsman, "art object" is the work of an artist. 
Whether we are looking at a page from the Book of Kells, Simone 
Martini's Annunciation or Durer's The Four Apostles, we are viewing a 
work of art and an aesthetic object; we do so as persons of the twen-
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tieth century who are familiar with the fully matured Artworld. Yet 
the illuminator, Martini and Durer would have looked at the products 
of their labor quite differently; it is this difference that the terms 
"art product" and "art object" refer to. Both are different from 
"aesthetic object" which is not used until there is a full system of 
aesthetic theory.2 
Third, I use the term "utilitarian" in the widest sense possible. 
By "utilitarian" I mean the use to which an object is put and I am not 
restricting the use to a purely physical sense. For example, we can 
see ~~e immediate purpose of a window -- to provide light and keep the 
elements out. Windows are used much ~~ way a spoon or a spade is 
used. However, the stained glass windows of the medieval cathedral also 
provided decoration for the church, education in the Church's rich 
pageantry for the illiterate and inspiration for prayer. Thus the 
wL~dows served purposes which went beyond a narrow usage of utilitarian. 
It is this wider sense that I would like to employ, so tr~t I am not 
restricting an object's use to a purely physical sense. 
With these distinctions in mind, let us turn to the Renaissance 
and the birth of the Artworld. 
Technological/Internal Discoveries 
The Renaissance was a tL~e when Western Europe seemed to take 
on a new and exciting character. Within the space of two hundred years 
towns had replaced the feudal manor as tr~e hub of activity; trade and 
the fervor of exploration had supplanted t:.he ::nedieval meditative 
spirit; and a :?:ising middle class, combined tvith an increasing cen-
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tralized royal authority, had overcome the feudal system itself. 
Greater availability of classical manuscripts, the shift from Scho-
lasticism to a broader approach to philosophy and science, and the in-
fluence of Italian humanism combined to broaden intellectual horizons 
as the physical horizons had been expanded. Art was no less suscepti-
ble to this changing tempo than any other facet of life; in fact, the 
changes were perhaps nowhere else so tangible. The Renaissance marked 
a turning point in the history of art and it marked the beginning of 
the modern Artworld; it was a time of breaking away from medieval tra-
ditions and forming a new way of making art and looking at art. During 
this period painting was freed from the walls (fresco painting) and 
the manuscript page, sculpture from architectural detail, and the 
artist from the status of craftsman. The medieval ars began the tran-
sition to Beaux Arts and in the process created the aesthetic object, 
an object whose purpose was to be appreciated in a special manner. The 
result of the ascendancy of the aesthetic object was to create a chasm 
between the "Fine Arts" and the ''utilitarian crafts," between the art-
ist and the craftsman. The practice and appreciation of the Fine Arts 
then became a special practice -- the Artworld. The Artworld existed 
outside the normal activities of day-to-day life, and its boundaries 
were delineated by a set of conventions that divided initiates from 
non-initiates, practitioners from non-practitioners, and art objects 
from non-art objects. As with any other institution, these conventions 
began informally and gradually became formal in nature. However, it is 
in the period of the Renaissance that these informal conventions be-
carne apparent and laid the foundations for a more formal approach. 
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Technological advancements, cultural change and the emergence of the 
individual from the society all contributed not only to the "rebirth" 
of ~~e classical period but also to the birth of the modern Artworld. 
Through all of the changes during the Renaissance ran the 
thread of technological advances. These ranged from innovations in 
mining, manufacturing, and agriculture to development of precision in-
struments, chart and map making, and the building of ships and roads. 
The last of these was extremely important as better communication from 
various points of the continent contributed much to the dissemination 
of ideas. The process of paper making also made its appearance in 
Europe at this time. The first European paper factory was founded at 
Padua in 1340, and by 1450 paper was in common use throughout all 
Europe. A related invention -- and probably the most important in-
vention of the period -- was that of moveable type, making the printing 
of multiple copies feasible. In 1423 Coster of Harlem made the first 
engraved single page, and by 1456 Gutenberg and Faust had printed the 
Bible. As the new roads had made communications easier and quicker, so 
paper making and moveable type made the dissemination of ideas much 
quicker. Both paper making and engraving also added to the dissemina-
tion of artistic styles by making one artist or group of artists aware 
of what other artists were doing. This was because engravings could be 
~ade in multiple copies, were relatively cheap in materials, time and 
labor, and easily portable -- especially when contrasted with frescoes 
or architectural sculpture. In addition, the low price of paper en-
abled the artist to do more in the way of preliminary sketches and 
studies from nature which were saved for future reference, often in 
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notebook form. Another aspect of the changing technology was the 
shift from fresco to tempera to oil as a medium and wall to wood panel 
to canvas as a painting surface. Jan van Eyck is credited with the 
first successful use of oils -- although oils had been used for a peri-
od of time with tempera or on a tempera ground -- and Botticelli's 
Birth of Venus, ca. 1480, is done on c~~vas. As in most cases, the 
technology would have been irrelevant had not the desire for change 
been present. To the north, Gothic architecture left little room or 
possibility for fresco murals and the very style of book illuminators 
led them to change from the page to the panel. Helen Gardner points to 
this change in Northern painters: 
Toward the end of the fourteenth century, illuminations began to 
take on the character of independent paintings, expanding upon the 
page until they occupied it completely. By about 1400, these new 
forces generated in miniatures seem to demand larger surfaces, and 
the shift was made to panel painting.3 
In the South, this change from wall to panel was not as rapid nor di-
rect because of both the different architecture which had plenty of 
room for mural painting and the predominance of patronage over free 
trade; nevertheless, it did occur. I believe the important point here 
is that the technological advances combined with the growing needs of 
the painter to help remove painting from the close association with 
architecture and decoration that it had during the Middle Ages and 
provided it with. a "space" and place of its own. The painting became 
an entity in itself, a special area delineated by its frame. 
If we examine the sculptured figures of the Gothic and Ren-
aissance we can see the same tendency toward the creation of a self-
contained space which becomes the art object. The jamb figures of the 
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Royal Portal of Chartres Cathedral, ca. 1145-1170, can be viewed pri-
marily as an integral part of the building facade (see figure 1). 
They do not "reach beyond" the building because they are such an in-
tegral part of the building itself. This is not to say that they do not 
hold aesthetic interest for us today, for they surely do; rather, when 
they were created they were made as part of the building and were not 
viewed as a separate entity in themselves. In contrast, we can view 
Donatello's St. Mark which was created for the Or San Michele in 
Florence in the early part of the fifteenth century (figure 2). Not 
only does the classical influence show in ~~e distributed weight, the 
flowing drapery, or the less stylized features, but also in the fact 
that the statue is more indicative of a figure for a niche in the 
building than an integral part of the architectural features. An even 
more conclusive figure can be seen in Donatello's David, the first free-
standing nude figure since Roman times (figure 3). Gardner describes 
this figure in the following way: 
The nude as such had been proscribed in the Christian Middle Ages 
both as indecent and idolatrous, and was shown only rarely, and 
then only in biblical or moralizing context, like the Adam and 
Eve story or descriptions of sinners in hell. Donatello rein-
vented the classical type, even though in this case we have neither 
god nor athlete but the young David, slayer of Goliath, biblical 
ancestor and antitype of Christ, and symbol of the Florentine love 
of liberty •.• Although the body has an almost Praxitelean radi-
ance and a sensuous quality unknown to medieval figures, David 
is involved in a complex psychological drama unknown to antique 
sculpture. The glance of this youthful, still adolescent hero is 
not directed primarily toward the severed head of Golia~~ but 
toward his own graceful, sinuous body, as though, in consequence 
of his heroic deed, he were becoming conscious for the first time 
of its beauty, its vitality, and its strength. This self-
awareness, this discovery of the self, is, as we have stressed, a 
dominant theme in Renaissance art.4 
Figure 1: Detail, jamb figures, 
Royal Portal, Chartres, early 
twelfth century. 
Figure 2: St. Mark, Donatello, 
Donatello, 1411-13. 
Figure 3: David, 
Donate1lo, 1430-32. 
..... 
U1 
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The above described "self-awareness" was shown not only in the e-
merging individualism of the Renaissance but in the increasing "self-
awareness" of the space in which t..~e work of art was set. 
While this visual framing may seem a relatively minor point, I 
think it is very important because it released painting and sculpture 
from their dependence upon the architecture in which they were embedded. 
As long as painting and sculpture were closely associated with other 
objects, they also shared the context, and to some extent, the meaning, 
of the other object. Thus, the altar panels in a church were very much 
locked into the context of a church and the meaning of religious ritual. 
A framed painting, however, began to lose the close contextual associ-
ation and could be viewed as something in itself. This is not to say 
that the painting was, at the moment of its first framing, seen as an 
aesthetic object. That was another and more complex step. It is merely 
argued here that the changes in the technology of the arts affected, to 
a degree, the way that the arts were presented. In a like way, the way 
they were presented affected the way that they were perceived. 
Other currents which seemed to meet in the Renaissance and 
change the course of the arts were "internal discoveries" within the 
arts. The most important of these was the use of linear perspective, 
generally credited to Brunelleschi (1377-1446). This new "optical 
. .,or!.d" affected painti."lg in two ways: it provided a theoretical basis 
for painting and it turned the painter's vision to the study of nature. 
Perspective used a great deal of geometry and was thought to be math-
ematical in nature; and as such was thought to possess a theoretical 
precision and accuracy ~~at previously painting had lacked. Particu-
17 
larly within the new "picture space," that is, the framed or de-
lineated space, perspective brought the suggestion of a window open 
upon reality, that is, a selected and arranged moment from life. 
Gardner states: 
This discovery was of enormous importance, making for what has 
been called the rationalization of sight, the bringing of our 
random and infinitely various visual sensations under a simple 
rule that is expressible mathematically ••• There is little 
doubt that perspective, with its new mathematical authority and 
certitude, conferred a kind of esthetic legitimacy from the fact 
that it rnade the picture measurable and exact. 5 
By "measurable," I think Gardner is indicating the artist's feeling of 
an increased ability to replicate at will what was seen and also the 
ability to "check" the work he had done in a somewhat scientific man-
ner. The Renaissance artist believed that the mathematical foundation 
of perspective gave the artist criteria by which he could correct mis-
takes -- and perceive that he had made the mistakes. We will return to 
the role of theory in the development of the Fine Arts at a later 
point; suffice it to say at this point that perspective provided the 
lir~ between painting and theory. 
Perspective also gave the artist the tools to approach nature in 
an objective and investigative manner. This is not to say that the me-
dieval art maker did not draw from nature; rather, he approached nature 
in a less analytic manner. For example, Villard de Honnecourt writing 
in the thirteenth century notes: "You should know that this lion was 
also drawn from life."6 However, this note appears at the end of a 
description of medieval lion taming which suggested that a lion could 
be manipulated by beating two dogs within the lion's sight. Both the 
description and the sketch (figure 4} demonstrate a creduious attitude 
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Figure 4: Sketch Book, Villard de Honnecourt, 13th century. 
that lacks the scientific objectivity of the Renaissance artist. Per-
haps the key to the difference hetween the medieval and Renaissance 
artist's attitude toward the natural world lies in the word "analytic." 
The medieval art maker used his perceptions of the world in a general 
sense ~~d as an expression of his faith; his attention was given to an 
internal as well as an external world . His perceptions were not ob-
tained through systematic study, investigations or experimentation. In 
contrast, the Renaissance artist isolated and dissected the particulars 
of the world around him to better understand the world and to put his 
work on a firm theoretical foundation; he based these investigations 
on scientific objectivity and experimentation as they existed at t he 
time. So we might say that "analytic" carried connotations of scien-
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tific objectivity and a theoretical nature to the Renaissance artist 
that would not have interested the medieval art maker because fidelity 
to images of this world was not his main concern. Also, perhaps be-
cause of the weight of medieval tradition which was transmitted through 
the guild system and its stable and slow-changing nature, the medieval 
art maker learned his craft from the master rather than from an inde-
pendent study of nature. Cennino Cennini, writing in The Craftsman's 
Handbook, represents a mid-point between medieval and Renaissance 
thought. He commends copying from a master but also practicing from 
nature. For instance, he says: "Having first practiced drawing for a 
while as I have taught you • • • take pains and pleasure in constantly 
copying the best things which you can find done by the hand of great 
masters."? In a later section he adds: 
Mind you, the most perfect steersman that you can have, and the 
best helm, lie in the triumphal gateway of copying from nature •• 
• . and always rely on this with a stout heart, especially as you 
begin to gain some judgment in draftsmanship.a 
Despite the mixed metaphor, the message is clear: learn ~~e oasics first 
from copying the best masters; then, as the eye becomes better trained, 
work from nature. Leon Battista Alberti gives a more characteristically 
Renaissance view: 
• • • there is no more appropriate and sure way than to follow 
nature, recalling in what way nature ••. has composed the sur-
faces well in beautiful bodies. To imitate her in this, it is 
necessary to take great thought and pains about it constantly. 9 
This trend toward an analytic study of nature reached a culmina-
tion in ~~e work of Leonardo da Vinci, who was as much scientist as 
artist. While he does not forbid studying masters, he gives this 
warning: "The painter will produce pictures of little merit if he takes 
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the works of others as his standard: but if he will apply himself to 
learn from the objects of nature he will produce good results."lO Thus 
da Vinci believed nature to be the best master. This attitude is quite 
different from the medieval practice of guild training. The use of per-
spective was instrumental in this change. Perspective aided in the 
quest for an analytic way of studying nature in that it gave the artist 
tools for checking his accuracy as well as a formal way for observing 
nature. 
Art Theory 
The transition from craftsman to artist, from craft to art, was 
in great part due to the increasing role of theory within the visual 
arts, to the disintegration of the guilds and their traditions, ana to 
the emergence of the idea of the individual. Theory, as a foundation 
for art, provided a way of including the arts within the liberal arts, 
thus gaining the artist a status separate and distinct from craftsman; 
it also allowed the individual artist to'be recognized as a man of a 
particular talent and genius. The medieval concept of the craftsman 
was that he manipulated materials or practiced the "mechanical arts." 
With the inclusion of the visual arts within an intellectual sphere, 
the status of the artist was elevated, and so was his product. H. w. 
Janson has noted: 
The liberal arts were defined by a tradition going back to Plato, 
and comprised ~~e intellectual disciplines necessary for a gentle-
man's education ••• ; the fine arts were excluded because they 
were "handiwork," lacking a theoretical basis. Thus, when the 
artist gained admission to this select group, the nature of his 
work had to be redefined: he was acknowledged as a man of ideas, 
rather than a mere manipulator of materials; and the work of art 
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came to be viewed more and more as the visible record of his 
creative mind. This meant that art need not -- indeed, should 
not -- be judged by fixed standards of craftsmanship; soon every-
thing that bore the imprL~t of a great master -- drawings, 
sketches, fragments, unfinished pieces -- was eagerly collected, 
regardless of its incompleteness.ll 
The ancient distinction between thought and manual labor which rele-
gated the visual arts and their practitioners to a lesser status began 
to be challenged at tile beginning of the fifteenth century, first by 
the addition of a theoretical basis and later by being compared with 
another artistic endeavor, poetry. Cennini, writing in the spirit of 
the Middle Ages, made one of the first tentative moves toward the in-
elusion of the visual arts within a theoretical context. He wrote: 
Man afterward [after the fall] pursued many useful occupations, 
differing from each other; and some were, and are, more theoretical 
than others; they could not all be alike, since theory is the most 
worthy. Close to that, man pursued some related to the one which 
calls for a basis of that, coupled with skill of hand: and this is 
an occupation known as painting, which calls for imagination, and 
skill of hand, in order to discover things not seen, hiding them-
selves under the shadow of natural objects, and to fix them with 
the hand, presenting to plain sight what does not actually exist. 
And it justly deserves to be enthroned next to theory, and to be 
crowned with poetry.l2 
'1'he "theory" that Cennini refers to is the world of ideas, and he in-
eludes painting within this world not on the basis of its rationality 
but on almost a mystical basis. It is interesting to note that Cennini 
emphasizes the use of the imagination in painting. This is certainly 
not ~~e scientific theor] introduced later in the Renaissance, nor is 
it a sense of inventiveness based on the reality of nature; rather, it 
is almost a pre-scientific attitude, one in which it is claimed that 
the artist can unlock the mysteries of nature with his perceptive abili-
ties. Thus, in a sense, the artist is allowed to participate, albeit 
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minimally, in the world of ideas. As such, theory is a first step in 
separating the craftsman, who merely manufactures, from the artist, who 
uses knowledge and imagination to create; however, for Cennini, this 
separation has not yet taken place. 
The next step is provided by Alberti who begins the delineation 
between arts that are necessary and useful and those which go beyond 
utilitarian concerns. He wrote: 
Our Ancestors have left us many and various Arts tending to the 
Pleasure and Conveniency of Life, acquired with the greatest in-
dustry and diligence: Which Arts, tho' they all pretend, with a 
kind of emulation, to have in view the great end of being ser-
viceable to mankind; yet we know that each of them in particular 
has something in it that seems to promise a distinct and separate 
Fruit: some Arts we follow for necessity, some we approve for 
their usefulness, and some we esteem because they lead us to the 
.knowledge of things that are delightful.l3 
With this statement we find the first hint of the separation of crafts 
and arts -- some of the products that the artist manufactures are nee-
essary and utilitarian in nature, some go beyond merely utilitarian 
concerns and are valuable for another reason. Alberti not only gives 
the suggestion of the separation of crafts and arts, but also gives the 
cornerstone of later art theory -- the concept of beauty as an end of 
art. His definition of beauty was a departure from the medieval con-
cept because he used the concept in a sense that was divorced from the 
way it had been used by medieval philosophers like Thomas Aquinas: 
Alberti applied ~~e concept of beauty to the visual arts. I think that 
Kristeller's explanation of the use of the term "beauty" in the medieval 
epoch is accurate and succinct: 
. the concept of beauty that is occasionally discussed by 
Aquinas and somewhat more emphatically by a few other medieval 
philosophers is not linked with the arts, fine or otherwise, but 
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treated prL~arily as a metaphysical attribute of God arid of his 
creation ••• Among the transcendentals or more general attributes 
of being, pulchrum does not appear in thirteenth-century philoso-
phy, although it is considered as a general concept and treated 
in close connection with bonum.l4 
One of the most often quoted statements of Aquinas in relation to the 
concept of beauty is the following: 
for those things are said to be beautiful which please when 
seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion, for the senses de-
light in things duly proportioned, as in what is like them --
because the sense too is a sort of reason, as is every cognitive 
power. Now, since knowledge is by assimilation, and likeness re-
lates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal 
cause.lS 
However, this statement is not found within a discussion of art but 
rather within the context of goodness and is part of a refutation that 
goodness is an efficient cause. In contrast, Alberti offers a defini-
tion of beauty within the context of a discussion of architecture: 
In order therefore to be as brief as possible, I shall define 
Beauty to be a harmony of all the parts, in whatsoever subject it 
appears, fitted together with such proportion and connection, that 
nothing cou'd be added, diminished or altered, but for the worse.l6 
While the two statements may sound remarkably alike, Aquinas is speaking 
of what God makes while Alberti is speaking of what man makes, of the 
function of beauty within art. It is precisely this contextual differ-
ence which marks the separation of medieval and Renaissance thought. 
As has been stated, Alberti was directing these remarks to archi-
tecture and was distinguishing between beauty as an inherent quality 
and Ornament which was an extrinsic quality. But this same notion of 
beauty is found in his other treatises on painting and sculpture. In 
all of these cases, beauty is thought of by Alberti as an idealized en-
tity which requires some manipulation by the artist but which, at the 
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same time, is subject to rules. For example, Alberti related the story 
of zeuxis with the following result: 
Because he [Zeuxis] thought he could not find in a single figure 
among the Crotonians as many aspects of beauty as he sought, 
since nature did not give them all to one person, he therefore 
selected the five most beautiful girls from all the youth of that 
land, to take from them whatever beauty is praised in women •.• 
Therefore we should always take what we want to paint from nature, 
and always pick out the most beautiful thing·s.l7 
Thus we have a rather conflicting notion of beauty as both universal 
and particular, but what Alberti seems to be saying is that beauty is 
perceived by the viewer as a universal quality, a perfection which 
exists in the mind if not always in life. The artist may have to pick 
and choose in his execution of the work to achieve this sense of beauty, 
but it will then be recognizable to the viewer as such. Because of 
this notion of beauty, Alberti also made a distinction between personal 
taste and artistic judgment which called for an understanding of the 
arts on a rational plane: 
Whoever wou'd build so as to have their building commended ••• 
must build according to a justness or proportion, and this justness 
of proportion must be owing Art. vfuo therefore will affirm, that 
a handsome and just structure can be raised any otherwise than by 
the means of Art? and consequently this part of building, which 
relates to beauty and ornament • • • must without doubt be directed 
by some rules of art and proportion ••• But there are some who 
will by no means allow of this, and say that men are guided by a 
variety of opinions in their judgment of beauty and of buildings; 
and ~~at the forms of structures must vary according to every man's 
particular taste and fancy, and not be tied down to any rules of 
Art. A common thing with the ignorant to despise what they do not 
understand! • • • I shall only take notice that all Arts were be-
got by Chance and Observation, nursed by Use and Experience, and 
improved and perfected by Reason and Study.l8 
Anthony Blunt notes: 
Alberti believes that man recognizes beauty not by mere taste, 
which is entirely personal and variable and judges of attractive-
ness, but by a rational faculty which is common to all men and 
leads to a general agreement about which works of art are 
beautiful. Beauty, in fact, is detected by a faculty of artis-
tic judgment.l9 
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In other words, because art is a rational undertaking and has a theo-
retical basis, it transcends personal taste. 
The statements of Alberti by no means had the weight of a sys-
tern of aesthe~ics at the time they were made, nor were they intended 
to. They were the explorations of an artist who was thinking about the 
work of art as art and not as craft. Nevertheless, the work of Alberti 
was an important step toward the formation of such an aesthetic. He 
consistently applied a theoretic approach in his writings -- a study of 
vision for painting, a system of proportions for sculpture, and a 
theory for city planning. In all of these works, Alberti carefully es-
tablishes ~~e theoretical basis for each art and encourages the artist 
to do likewise. Alberti wrote: 
I like a painter to be as learned as he can in all the liberal 
arts, but primarily I desire him to know geometry. I like the 
saying of P~~philus, an ancient, most noble painter, with whom the 
noble youths began to learn of painting. He held that no painter 
could paint well if he did not know a great deal of geometry.20 
Alberti is important to the early Renaissance because he made the break 
from medieval tradition in the arts complete: he articulated a theoreti-
cal approach to the arts and turned the artist's eyes from tradition 
to a study of nature. It should be noted that, because of this theo-
retical approach, Alberti has little to say about the imagination and 
its role in the arts; in fact, he somewhat negates the role of imagina-
tion in order to emphasize the importance of reason and study, the 
theoretical foundations for art. Blunt notes: 
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Seen in relation to his predecessors, Alberti's most striking 
characteristics are his rationalism, his classicism, his scientif-
ic method, and his complete faith in nature. In relation to the 
Neoplatonists of the later Quattrocento, the feature which stands 
out most is the complete absence of the idea of imagination in his 
writings. Everything is attributed to reason, to method, to imi-
tation, to measurement; nothing to the creative faculty. And this 
is quite logical. The artists of the early Quattrocento whose 
ideas he expresses were entirely occupied with exploring the visi-
ble universe which they had so recently discovered. 21 
If Alberti brought theory to art, da Vinci might be said to have 
married the two. He was a learned man, as well read and as well versed 
in the classics as Alberti. He brought to painting an attitude of 
modern scientific observation, that is, experimentation and direct ob-
servation. His notebooks are full of the observations he made on a wide 
variety of subjects -- from anatomy to zoology. His work in anatomy 
alone demonstrates the amazing quality of his scientific observations. 
His devotion to what he would call a scientific approach to painting is 
demonstrated again and again throughout the Notebooks: "Practice should 
always be based upon a sound knowledge of theory, of which perspective 
is the guide and gateway, and without it nothing can be done well in any 
kind of painting."22 And, "The painter who draws by practice and judg-
ment of the eye without the use of reason, is like the mirror that re-
produces within itself all the objects which are set opposite to it 
•.o~ithout kl"!.OWledge of the same. n23 He even defines "perspective" in 
terms of its scientific appeal: "Perspective is a rational demonstration 
whereby experience confirms how all things transmit their images to the 
eye by pyramidal lines."24 This definition also points to the value 
~~at da Vinci placed on experience, that is, what is directly observable. 
He believed that art was a science, and in that light could be verified 
as accurate and could be judged. Blunt comments: 
Considered as a kind of knowledge, the art of painting is to be 
judged by two standards: the certainty of its premisses and 
methods, and the completeness of the ~~owledge represented by 
its productions.25 
In other words, both process and product could be judged in a sci-
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entific way. Furthermore, while the painting is in progress, da Vinci 
encouraged the comments of other artists and laymen, believing that the 
artist could become too involved with the painting to remain objective 
and accurate. While this cannot be heralded as the birth of criticism, 
it is the first time that an artist is recorded as having asked for 
criticism from both fellow artists and laymen. And it indicated the 
beginning of judgment of painting in terms of the painting rather than 
in terms of the purpose of the painting. 
But even as da Vinci espoused the scientific aspects of art, he, 
unlike Alberti, allowed the presence of imagination in his view of art. 
This was not the mystical imagination of Cennini but was closer to the 
modern ideas of talent and creativity. Giving precepts to the painter, 
da Vinci states: 
For these, then, and other reasons which might be given, you should 
apply yourself first of all to drawing, in order to present to the 
eye in visible form the purpose and invention created originally 
in your imagination~ then proceed to take from it or add to it . 
until you satisfy yourself; then have men arranged as models 
draped or nude in the way in which you have disposed them in your 
work; and make the proportions and size in accordance with per-
spective, so that no part of the work remains that is not so 
counselled by reason and by the effects in nature.26 
The key phrase here is "present to the eye in visible form the purpose 
and invention created originally in your imagination," but I have in-
eluded the rest of the passage to indicate where in da Vinci's scheme 
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he placed the imagination. He gives imagination the role of insti-
gator in the creative process and "reason" the place of "judge" both 
in process and product. In another place, da Vinci makes this clear: 
"The idea or the faculty of imagination is both rudder and bridle to 
the senses, inasmuch as the thing imagined moves the sense."27 In a 
sense, then, according to da Vinci, the imagination has a central place 
in the creative process, a place that cannot be fulfilled by reason 
alone. He believed that mathematics could be learned by consistent ef-
fort; painting, on the other hand, needed a student with imagination 
as well as a purely analytic ability. 28 However, it must be reiterated 
that imagination drew from the images of nature and that it worked 
hand-in-hand with reason to form the finished product. It is important 
to note that painting, in da Vinci's view, was a creative process, not 
merely manipulation of materials nor solely intellectual. 
Da Vinci also had a definite opinion on the position of the 
visual arts. In an oft-quoted passage, he compared painting with 
poetry. Poetry's position within the liberal arts was firmly estab-
lished and the comparison between poetry and art helped to elevate 
painting, and eventually the other visual arts. He begins his argument 
by asserting that vision is the most important sense -- which is con-
sis·tent with his view that sense experience is the basis for know-
ledge29 -- and that vision gives the most accurate representation of 
reality. He then points to the poet's reliance upon the verbal: 
Although the poet has as wide a choice of subject as the painter, 
his creations fail to afford as much satisfaction to mankind as 
do paintings, for while poetry attempts to represent forms, actions 
and scenes with words, the painter employs the exact images of 
these forms in order to reproduce them. Consider, then, which 
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is more fundamental to man, the name of man or his image? The 
name changes with change of country; the form is unchanged except 
by death. And if the poet serves the understanding by way of the 
ear, the painter does so by the eye, which is the nobler sense.30 
Thus, in terms of portraying a concrete reality, one that is per-
ceivable and measurable, painting is superior to poetry; if painting 
is superior to poetry, then it should be valued at least as much as 
poetry and placed among intellectual pursuits. Da Vinci continues the 
argument by noting the non-mechanical nature of painting: 
You have set painting among the mechanical arts! Truly were 
painters as ready equipped as you are to praise their own works 
in writing, I doubt whether it would endure the reproach of so 
vile a name. If you call it mechanical because it is by manual 
work that the hands represent what the imagination creates, your 
writers are setting down with the pen by manual work what origi-
nates in the mind.31 
This is an important passage because he emphasized the intellectual 
nature of painting and equated the pen and the brush as tools of each 
respective medium. It is also important because it sets aside painting 
from the mechanical arts. He pressed this point in a comparison of 
painting and sculpture, where he cited painting as being the more in-
tellectual and demanding art of the two. However, he believed that 
sculpture also possessed enough of an intellectual basis to be separated 
from the mechanical arts. In this way, painting and sculpture were 
made different from the mechanical arts because they involved the use 
of the intellect while the mechanical arts involved the use of formula 
without thought. The role of theorj in this process of separation was 
crucial for it formed the basis of the involvement of the intellect in 
areas that had previously been merely "mechanical." 
This separation of the arts was initially informal in nature; 
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the Fine Arts were not yet named as such nor had they evolved to the 
point where the theoretical basis was entrenched enough to be chal-
lenged by new theories and new schools of painting. While different 
styles of painting existed during the fourteenth and fifteenth centu-
ries, the notion of "schools" of art did not yet exist. Theory up to 
this point had served two related purposes: giving the visual arts a 
systematic and abstract foundation and, because of this foundation, 
elevating them to membership in the liberal arts. However, it had not 
received a doctrinal status yet; it was still a practical guide for the 
artist. Erwin Panofsky notes: 
The purpose of art theory as it was developed in the fifteenth 
century was primarily practical, only secondarily historical and 
apologetic, and in no way speculative. That is, it aimed at 
nothing more than, on the one hand, to legitimize contemporary art 
as the genuine heir of Greco-Roman antiquity and to wrest a place 
for it among the artes liberales by enumerating its dignity and 
merits1 and, on the other hand, to provide artists with firm and 
scientifically grounded rules for their activity.32 
It was during the sixteenth century that the Fine Arts began to be 
readily recognized as something separate from ~;e crafts and that 
artistic theory began the transition to aesthetic theory. Blunt 
connnents: 
the painter, sculptor, and architect obtained recognition as 
educated men, as members of H~~anist society. Painting, sculpture, 
and architecture were accepted as liberal arts, and are now 
grouped together as activities closely allied to each other and 
all differL"lg fundamentally from the manual crafts. The idea of 
the "Fine Arts" comes into existence this way, though a single 
phrase is not attached co them till the middle of the sixteenth 
century, when they come to be known as the Arti di disegno. At 
the same time critics begin to have the idea of a work of art as 
something which is justified simply by its beauty and which is a 
luxury product.33 
The first step toward the autonomous artwork had been taken. 
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Individualism in the Visual Arts 
As in the early Renaissance when a series of currents ran to-
gether to change the direction of Western art, so in the late Renais-
sance several factors met -- not to change the direction of art, but 
rather to deepen and widen the channel first formed in the early 
Renaissance. These factors were the acknowledgment of the artist as a 
creative individual and a transition from art theory as a practical 
guide to art theory as speculation on the nature of the creative pro-
cess. Central to both of these factors was the changing view toward 
the individual involved in the visual arts -- from craftsman to artist 
and from communal worker to a singular creative genius. 
The individual craftsman of the Middle Ages existed as a cog in 
the machinery of artistic production, as part of a group effort to meet 
the demands of commissioned work. The workshop was a collaboration of 
master, journeymen and apprentices, all of whom contributed in varying 
degrees to the finished product. And the finished products were not 
just paintings or sculptures but rather a wide variety of everyday pro-
ducts from armorial bearings and flags to patterns for carpet-weavers 
and embroiderers. The medieval craftsman's workshop was essentially a 
guild workshop where those who could afford the products went to buy 
the objects that they needed or wanted to use. Painters belonged to 
the Guild of St. Luke which also included saddlers, glassworkers, mir-
ror-workers and others. The communal concept and its weight upon the 
medieval craftsman is apparent; this influence lingered well into the 
early Renaissance. Hauser states: 
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The artist's studio of the early Renaissance is still dominated by 
the communal spirit of the mason's lodge and the guild workshop; 
the work of art is not yet the expression of an independent per-
sonality, emphasizing his individuality and excluding himself from 
all extraneous influences. The claim independently to shape the 
whole work from the first stroke to the last and the inability 
to co-operate with pupils and assistants are first noticeable in 
Michelangelo, who, in this respect too, is the first modern 
artist. Until the end of the fifteenth century the artistic 
labour process still takes place entirely in collective forrns.34 
The guild system lost its predominance over artistic activity for a 
variety of reasons: the collapse of feudalistic society, the increasing 
amount of trade and commerce, the emergence of some masters who were 
more sought after than others, and the broadening arena of patronage. 
It might be noted here that where medieval craftsmen served Church and 
nobility, the artist of the Renaissance received patronage from Church, 
an increased nobility, and ~~e merchant class. This broadened patronage 
and also meant in the South that the artist travelled more, thereby 
loosening guild restrictions. This long process might be seen as end-
ing with ~~e case of the Guild vs. Giovanni Battista Paggi in 1590 
where the courts found in favor of Paggi and asserted his rights to be 
a painter in Genoa even though he had not received guild training. The 
freedom from guild restrictions and the broadening public interest con-
tributed much to the interpretation of the artist as an individual. 
Blunt remarks: "In his new freedom the artist was no longer a purveyor 
of goods which every one needed and which could be ordered like any 
other material goods, but an individual facing a public." 35 This 
sense of artist as individual creator also caused a kind of competition 
that would have been unheard of in the medieval workshop. Students be-
gan seeking out certain masters because of their reputations; noble 
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families employed those artists who were well-known and well though of; 
a town would hire an artist whose reputation would enhance their own. 
By the middle of the sixteenth century the medieval communal aspect 
had been laid to rest and the modern concept of the artist as creative 
individual was born. Blunt remarks: 
The artist was now faced with a wide public consisting of educated 
people, not merely of Church officials and a few princes, which 
he attempted to attract by his art; and in this spirit of com-
petition he began to carry out works other than those directly 
commissioned. The artist was still closely tied to his public, 
and most of his work was commissioned. The days of exhibitions 
were yet a long way off.36 
The feature of competition between individual artists also influenced 
the product of their work: their work came to be valued as the special 
product of a special talent. Bernard Myers comments: 
[During the sixteenth century] the individuality of the artist 
himself was not undermined; quite the contrary, he became a very 
significant figure indeed. He was no longer the simple guild 
artisan working for a local patron but more often an important 
social being, a free agent whose art (the product of his studio 
instead of his workshop) was much sought after by pope and prince. 
With his liberation from the guild, the object of art became an 
"aesthetic object" of interest to collectors and to dealers.37 
It must be cautioned that the term "aesthetic object" in the above pas-
sage does not have its full modern connotations; instead, the phrase 
connotes an object set aside from utilitarian concerns, an object which 
might be considered beautiful or delightful but which does not yet have 
the weight of aesthetic theory attached to it. It must also be added 
that the reference to "collectors" and "dealers" carries somewhat dif-
ferent connotations from the modern sense. The collectors in the South 
were, for the most part, clergy and nobility who used art as much to 
enhance their own status as to simply appreciate it. In the North, 
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where there was an active merchant class and fewer powerful noble 
families, there was more of an active trade in paintings. Booksellers, 
publishers of engravings, jewellers and innkeepers dealt in art in the 
North countries; even framers, who were originally an auxiliary to 
painting guilds, became dealers who sold the paintings to a rather 
broad clientele. 3A While this trade in art cannot be seen as the same 
as modern art trade, it does carry the origins of the modern business 
of art. 
It was not just the freedom from guild regulations that helped 
form the new conception of artist. The Renaissance emphasis on theory 
elevated the visual arts to a higher status; in a like manner, theory 
helped elevate the status of the artist from just another craftsman to 
a gentleman. Gardner notes: 
We must emphasize again the high value the Renaissance artist 
placed upon theory. In his view, if any occupation or profession 
were to have dignity and be worthy of honor, it must have an in-
tellectual basis ••• The Renaissance artist strove to make him-
self a scholar and gentleman, to associate with princes and the 
learned, and to rise above the long-standing ancient and medieval 
prejudice that saw him as merely a kind of handicraftsman.39 
This idea of artist as gentleman was new and was a product of the 
Renaissance. It was more prevalent in the South than North, perhaps be-
cause of Italian humanism and the Italian concept of virt~. . ' V~rtu re-
ferred to a sense of personal achievement and enterprise in both thought 
and action and was indicative of the rising sense of the individual 
within Renaissance society. While this was not the democratic indi-
vidualism of modern times, it was an acknowledgment of personal merit 
which no longer confined great achievement to those of noble birth. 
Gardner points to this when she remarks: "Class distinctions and social 
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hierarchies had loosened, and men of arr~ition and talent could now take 
their places even as the friends and companions of princes."40 A mark 
of the esteem in which a generally wider group of persons was included 
was the proliferation of biographies written about people other than 
nobilitY or saints. Kristeller comments: 
Another branch of historical literature that was very much cul-
tivated by the humanists was biography. There was the model of 
Plutarch and of other ancient writers, but there obviously was a 
great contemporary demand for biographies, not merely of princes 
or saints, but also of statesmen and distinguished citizens, of 
poets and artists, of scholars and businessmen. Like the por-
trait painting of the time, the biographical literature reflects 
the so-called individualism of the period, that is, the importance 
attached to personal experiences, opinions, and achievements, and 
the eagerness to see them perpetuated in a distinguished work of 
art or of literature.41 
Brunelleschi's biography was the first of an artist, Ghiberti's the 
first autobiography by an artist. In 1550 Giorgio Vasari published his 
first edition of Lives of the Most EnUnent Painters, Sculptors, and 
Architects, a collection of artists' lives who were contemporary with 
Vasari and of those who lived in the early Renaissance. With these 
publications the artist joined the ranks of celebrated· personages. 
Again, it must be noted that this new status was a great deal different 
=rom the anonymity and communal attitude of the medieval craftsman. It 
was a new way of looking at ~~e artist, and a new way for the artist to 
view himself. Hauser, referring to the biographies and o~~er honors 
given to artists, states: 
All this is the expression of an unmistakable shift of attention 
from the works to the personality of the artist. Men begin to be 
conscious of creative power in the modern sense, and there are in-
creasing signs of the rising self-respect of the artist. We pos-
sess signatures of nearly all the important painters of the 
Quattrocento, and Filarete actually expresses a wish that all 
artists should sign their works.42 
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Hauser also goes on to point to the increased self-consciousness of 
artists, demonstrated by the increasing amount of work done without 
direct commission. If one is to work on a painting to satisfy a per-
sonal desire, often ignoring commissioned work for a period of time, 
then the implication is of an awareness of talent and vision, a self-
consciousness of one's self as an artist. In other words, the artist 
had something to say, to c~nmunicate, that was important enough to him 
to risk his financial security. The medieval workshop would never have 
allowed such a pursuit of one's own vision, but more importantly, the 
medieval craftsman was not self-conscious of himself as a creator. H. 
w. Janson also points to this changing image of the artist: 
Certainly the tendency to view the artist as a sovereign genius, 
rather than as a devoted craftsman, was never stronger than during 
~~e first half of the sixteenth century. Plato's concept of 
genius -- the spirit entering into the poet that causes him to 
compose in a "divine frenzy" -- had been broadened by Marsilio 
Ficino and his fellow Neo-Platonists to include the architect, the 
sculptor, and the painter. Men of genius were thought to be set 
apart from ordinary mortals by the divine inspiration guiding 
their efforts, and worthy of being called "divine," "immortal," 
and "creative" (before 1500, creating, as distinct from making, 
was the privilege of God alone). 43 
I think we must be careful with this statement for several reasons, but 
the statement is indicative of the changing perception of the artist, 
and Janson is an important art historian whose authority is well ac-
cepted. But before dealing with those issues, it would perhaps be ~est 
to place them in the context of Florentine Nee-Platonism. Marsilio 
Ficino, the leader of the Florentine group, was employed by Cosimo de' 
Medici in the early 1460's to translate, interpret and teach the works 
of Plato, which he did until the 1490's. During this forty year span 
he published a number of works which dealt with Plato, amen them his 
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commentary on Plato's Symposium, Theologia Platonica, and a translation 
of and commentary on Plotinus. Central to Ficino's writings, and thus 
to the circle of Florentine Neo-Platonists, were the ideas of contem-
plation, Platonic love, and the immortality of the soul. Ficino's 
notion of beauty was associated with the Good in that beauty kindled a 
desire for Good within the soul and aided man in transcending the cor-
poreal. Perhaps because of Ficino's background in medicine and astrolo-
~J, this transcendental element had a marked mystical flavor, one that 
was far different from medieval Scholasticism. We will return to a 
more detailed discussion of Florentine Nee-Platonism in a later section, 
but it should be noted at this point that Ficino was not writing about 
art, but rather on theological and philosophical concerns. 
So my fi•st concern with Janson's statement is that his emphasis 
on Ficino's influence within the arts at the time of his pre-eminent 
position in Florence is exaggerated. Alberti and da Vinci did not sub-
scribe to Nee-Platonic thought, especially not the mystical portions. 
Also, it was primarily theological and philosophical in nature and was 
not resurrected as a main tenet in art theory until nearly a century 
later 'N'hen it was joined with !·1annerist theory. Panofsky notes: 
Ficino's writings were concerned with beauty, but not with art,. 
and up to then art theory was not concerned with Ficino. But 
now we are confronted with a notable fact of intellectual history: 
the mystical, pneumatological theory of beauty associated with 
Florentine Neoplatonism was resurrected, after the course of a 
whole century, as a Mannerist metaphysics of art.44 . 
Second, t.."le "sovereign genius" of Janson's passage might better 
be described in more limited terms. While there were strong personal-
ities during this period, neither the status nor the self-awareness of 
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the artist might be described as "sovereign." Rather, there was an 
increasingly self-consciousness within the artist which eventually led 
to the widespread acceptance of the concept of genius. Panofsky notes: 
Insofar as the formation of ideas was connected in Renaissance art 
theory with observation of nature, it was placed into a realm 
that, while not yet that of individual psychology, was nevertheless 
no longer that of metaphysics. ~1is was the first step toward 
recognizing that which today is called "genius."45 
And third, during the Renaissance, the artist was not set apart 
from ordinary mortals but rather from the status of craftsman. How-
ever, despite these problems, Janson does raise an important point --
that of the change from "maker" to "creator." Within this context, the 
"maker" connotes the manipulation of materials in a mechanical way 
while "creator" implies more than mere manipulation; "creator" signi-
fies origination of a work through the imaginative faculty. Used with-
in the context of art, it implies not only the use of the imagination 
but a freedom from the slavish copy of nature. As we have seen, in the 
early Renaissance copying from nature was important to the artist, per-
haps because artists felt that the return to what they thought was a 
more realistic portrayal of the natural world needed a certain amount 
of direct imitation for a sense of authenticity. Panofsky points to 
this in the following passage: 
• nature could be overcome by the artistic intellect, which --
not so much by "inventing" as by selecting and improving -- can, 
and accordingly should, make visible a beauty never completely 
realized in actuality. The constantly repeated admonitions to be 
faithful to nature are matched by the almost as forceful exhorta-
tions to choose the most beautiful from the multitude of natural 
objects, to avoid the misshapen, particularly in regard to pro-
portions, and in general ••• to strive for beauty above and be-
yond mere truth to nature.46 
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In the latter part of the Renaissance, the artist entered more 
and more into the creative process, not just selecting and re-arranging 
parts into a more beautiful whole, but allowing a new creative vigor 
into their work. Perhaps the best example of this is Michelangelo 
Bucnarroti. Michelangelo believed deeply in the creative power of the 
artist and distrusted other artists' belief in the absolute mathematical 
measurability of the natural world. To a great extent, the belief in 
the creative ability of ~~e artist was based on Nee-Platonism. Blunt 
notes: 
For Michelangelo it is by means of the imagination that the 
artist attains to a beauty above that of nature, and in this he 
appears as a Neoplatonist compared with the rational Alberti. To 
him beauty is the reflection of the divine in the material world.47 
This Nee-Platonic influence was a strong thread that ran throughout 
Michelangelo's life, but not withou certain changes. In the early 
part of his life, Nee-Platonism co-existed with the more scientific at-
titudes of Alberti and da Vinci; I have said "co-existed" because nei-
ther was predominate but both were exhibited. He studied nature, even 
dissecting cadavers for the study of anatomy, but without the sense of 
exploration that da Vinci brought to his studies. During this early 
part of his life Michelangelo also displayed Nee-Platonic influences. 
To him, the artist was the creator of the artistic product, a product 
shaped by his hands but formed in his mind. The inspiration for the 
creation is the Idea, that is, a refined inward L~age that is a trans-
formation of the external world and one that is a reflection of the 
absolute Idea of Beauty. In other words, it is the beauty of the 
natural world which, in the artist's mind, is made to conform to an 
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ideal standard. For Michelangelo, the artist's inner vision was still 
closely tied to the external world, but with the transformation to a 
nobler state made within the mind of ~he artist. 48 However, with age 
and the increased insecurity of the times, Michelangelo increasingly 
emphasized the internal image, the inspiration derived from God, and the 
divine gift of talent. Embedded in this shift was an imperious concern 
for his own talent and his own vision. Blunt comments on this aspect 
of Michelangelo: 
Painting is no longer talked of as an imitation of nature, and the 
artist's interest is diverted almost entirely towards the inward 
mental image, which excels everything that can be found in the 
visible world • 49 
The last part of his life Michelangelo spent in what might be termed 
religious fervor; he spent an increasing amount of energy on the pur-
suit of spiritual rather than temporal beauty, and even recanted his 
1evotion to art. But, in many ways, the earlier portions of his life, 
his strong personality, and the Nee-Platonic attitudes of both his 
poetry and his work combined to create the image of the Artist, that is, 
scmeone set aside from the average man by his talent. Italians had a 
term for Hichelangelo and his 'l'lork: "terribilita -- the sublime shadow-
ed with the awesome and the fearful."SO 
The implications of Michelangelo's mystique were far reaching. 
Gardner comments: 
He mistrusted the application of mathematical methods as guaran-
tees of beauty in proportion ••. Thus, he would set aside 
Vitruvius, Alberti, Leonardo, Albrecht Durer, and others who 
tirelessly sought the perfect measure, being convinced that the 
inspired judgment could find other pleasing proportions, and that 
the artist must not be bound except by the demands made by the 
realization of the Idea. This insistence upon the artist's own 
authority is typical of Michelangelo and anticipates the modern 
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concept of the right of talent to a self-expression limited only 
by its own judgment.Sl 
I think this is an important point: with the mystique of Michelangelo 
set in the minds of those dealing with art, the artist's talent and 
i~~er vision were established. Also, the need for self-expression in 
the artist was set up as an alternative for the utilitarian purposes 
which had previously motivated artistic production. The artist was 
not only an educated man, but one who possessed special abilities that 
set him aside from the ordinary man. Gradually, over the course of the 
next two hundred years, the conception of "genius" became firmly inter-
twined with the artist and with artistic pursuits. A great part of 
~~is evolution came about because of the value that was attached to 
the process of artistic creation, the step-by-step process of making the 
product. Hauser comments on the increasing value of the internal pro-
cess of the artist: 
For the Renaissance, the drawing and ~~e sketch became momentous 
not merely as artistic forms, but also as documents and records 
of the creative process in art; they were recognized to be a par-
ticular form of expression on their own, distinct from the fin-
ished work; they were valued because they revealed the process of 
artistic invention at its starting-point, where it was almost 
completely merged with the subjectivity of the artist.52 
During the course of time, both the artist and his product became sep-
arated from the normal currents of everyday life -- the artist by ;rir-
tue of his new status and special ability, and his product through 
losing its connection with everJday life; it was no longer the banner 
or carpet pattern, but was the work of art. 
The emergence of the individual artist, along with the lessening 
influence of the guilds, gradually led to another method of teaching 
42 
new generations of artist -- the academy. During most of the Renais-
sance, the strong personalities and glittering reputations of the major 
artists attracted young men who wanted to study with them. Not only 
did the students of a particular master champion his work, but so did 
patrons and laymen who were involved with the master. Myers points to 
this development of different "schools" of thought about the visual 
arts and their effect on later artists: 
There were many "schools" of art during this era, centering about 
transcendent personalities like Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo 
rather than about workshops, but all had in common the aspiration 
toward an ideal human form and an ideal state of being. Grandiose 
general statements were made in sculpture and architecture that 
were destined to form the basis for later academic practice. 
Painting techniques became more standardized; these systematic 
procedures were also fated to be transmitted to future genera-
tions.53 
The "schools" of art were informal in nature until the middle of the 
sixteenth century when Vasari helped to form the Accademia del Disegno 
in Florence in 1563, which was totally freed from guild obligations 
and restrictions by 1571. The Roman academy of St. Luke was raised to 
the status of an art academy in 1593. Kristeller describes the acad-
emies in the following way: 
T~e Art Academies followed the pattern of the literary Academies 
that had been in existence for some time, and they replaced the 
older workshop tradition with a regular kind of instruction that 
included such scientific subjects as geometry and anatomy.54 
This is not to say that the workshops of the Renaissance did not teach 
any geonetrj' nor anatomy, but these subjects were taught in a less 
comprehensive and systematic manner than the later offerings of the 
academies. 
As well as establishing a course of studies, the academies 
created a blend of professional and non-professional that was unique 
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to the history of art. Not only were artists admitted to the acad-
ernies, but also amateurs and laymen of a cultured circle. Hauser corn-
rnents on some of the effects of this new mingling: 
The fact that amateurs and laymen are also elected to membership 
of the art academies creates a solidarity between the cultured 
circles of the general public and the artist which is without 
precedent in the history of art. The Florentine aristocracy is 
strongly represented in the Accademia del Disegno, and this new 
role leads to quite a different kind of interest in artistic mat-
ters from that connected with previous forms of patronage. The 
same academicism, therefore, which on the lower level separates 
the artists as a body from non-artistic craftsmanship, on the 
higher level bridges the gap between the productive working artist 
and the cultured layrnan.SS 
Indicative of the involvement of the layman in the arts during 
the sixteenth century was the gradual acknowledgment that the layman 
could become an active judge of the work of art. 56 Lodovico Dolce, 
writing in L'Aretino in 1557 gave a formal recognition to this new 
place of the layman within the arts. In answer to the question "whether 
a man who is not a painter himself is qualified to judge painting," 
Dolce replies: 
I maintain that man's ability to judge comes, in general, from 
practical experience of the way things are. And since nothing is 
more familiar and close to man than man himself, it follows that 
each man is qualified to pass judgment on what he daily sees --
that is, to judge the beauty and ugliness of any individual human 
being. What produces beauty is nothing other than a harmony of 
proportion, such as resides in the human body in general, and in 
the relation of limb to limb in particular~ and disproportion 
similarly gives rise to its opposite. Granted this, ~~erefore, 
when the eye is called upon to make a judgment, who is the man 
who cannot distinguish the beautiful from the ugly? Certainly no 
one can fail, unless he lacks altogether both eyes and intellect. 
Thus, if man has (as indeed he does have) this knowledge of what 
the true form is for an individual of this kind -- that is to say, 
a living human being -- why should he not have the same knowledge, 
only much more so, in the case of the suppositious reality of in-
animate painting?57 
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one of the interesting effects of the inclusion of laymen into 
the arts was the fact that it was not the general public who was ad-
mitted to this circle, but rather a select group. This group was corn-
posed of the aristocracy and learned men who were already familiar 
with artistic theory and had been educated to understand and appreciate 
the visual arts. 58 Dolce had argued that any man could make a judgment 
about painting because of painting's fidelity to nature and because of 
all mankind's intrinsic "sensitivity towards ••. beauty and ugliness, 
in such a way that they recognize the attributes." 59 However, Dolce 
goes on to say: 
My argument, however, does not turn generally on the masses, but 
specifically on certain men of fine intelligence, who have re-
fined their powers of judgment with the aid of literature and 
practical experience. In this way they can reliably judge a 
variety of things, and most expressly painting.6° 
Thus it would seem that Dolce is limiting the circle of laymen who can 
creditably judge the work of art. ~1oreover, these "men of fine intel-
ligence" had the leisure to explore new ideas and new styles within the 
arts. I think this is a very important distinction because it set up 
a pattern that the arts were to follow for centuries after. During 
the previous periods, art had been a real part of everyday life, not 
only as utilitarian objects but also as something which could be 
readily understood. But with the attachment of ~~eory to art, art 
became something that had to be learned, not only for the practitioner 
but also for the viewer. With more of the content of the visual arts 
returning to classical themes, combined with the increasing role of 
theory, the understanding and appreciation of art became more and 
more connected with an elite circle of "cultured" people. 
Nathan Knobler offers an interesting definition of "academy": 
The cultural and artistic establishment, formerly an elected 
group with teaching {academic) and standard-maintaining re-
sponsibilities. 51 
I have maintained that an elite circle of cultured people formed the 
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nucleus of the new-born Artworld and I believe that Knobler has pointed 
accurately to this group in the choice of the phrase "cultural and 
artistic establishment." In recent years the term "establishment" has 
acquired a pejorative sense, one in which the opposition to change is 
pre-eminent. However, the Oxford English Dictionary supplies a more 
balanced definition: 
A social group exercising power generally, or within a given 
.field or institution, by virtue of its traditional superiority, 
and by the use especially of tacit understandings and often a 
common mode of speech, and having as a general interest the 
maintenance of the status quo.62 
Does this definition fit the academy of the late Renaissance? Yes, in 
most ways, it does. With the advent of the academy there was indeed 
a "social group exercising power • • • within a given field or insti-
tution." That social group was composed of artists and of aristocratic 
laymen who may be called cognoscenti or connoisseurs. The power that 
they exercised was fledgling. However, it was still enough to prohibit 
an artist admittance to the group. Moreover, art was rapidly becoming 
a field of its own, that is, an area that was beyond normal daily 
activity and required special knowledge obtained through study and ex-
posure to or experience of the art object. Their "tacit understanding" 
and "common rn.ode of speech," although in the early stages of formation, 
existed. For example, in treatises on the visual arts beauty was dis-
cussed more in a speculative manner and less in a theological manner, 
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thus widening the theoretical horizons of art and narrowing the 
participants in the discussion. This theoretical and speculative dis-
cussion of the visual arts helped to enclose art within the confines of 
an educated minority whose leisure and education formed an "informed 
vocabulary" and common attitude. I think the phrases "traditional 
superiority" and "maintenance of the status quo" might be found ac-
ceptable also. The Renaissance sense of superiority was not based on 
a traditional continuity, but rather on the Renaissance belief that the 
"dark ages" had been abolished by the light of classical learning to 
which they were heirs. The status quo was certainly something to be 
maintained new heights of artistic creation had been achieved and it 
was difficult for the Renaissance artist to believe that succeeding 
generations would not be in his debt. Hence, the academy which would 
supervise academic areas and maintain standards of artistic production 
would indeed be interested in maintaining the status quo; maintenance 
was an inherent part of the academy. So, in the sense that Knobler 
had defined art establishment, I think that we can say that an art es-
tablishment existed at the end of the Renaissance. 
How did this establishment differ from what had gone before, 
particularly in the Middle Ages? It might be argued that such an es-
tablishment existed in the ~iddle Ages in the form of the guilds. In 
a limited sense, this is true. However, there was a marked difference 
between the guild and the academy which dramatically affected the 
perimeters of the Artworld. I would suggest the two important areas 
of difference lie in the inclusion of laymen and the addition of a 
theoretical base for art. BoL~ of these changes rest upon an educated 
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practitioner and an educated audience. In other words, the base of 
those who participated on an educated level was expanded while the 
actual audience contracted. This seeming paradox may be clarified if 
we again think of the utilitarian nature of the crafts during the Mid-
dle Ages in contrast with the non-utilitarian nature of art in the 
Renaissance. The craft establishment of the Middle Ages was composed 
of guild members. Church and monarchy acted as patrons or consumers 
of the art product. But I do not believe that these consumers could 
properly be called part of the craft establishment anymore than they 
could have been counted as part of the establishment of any other guild. 
They bought art products in the same way ~~ey bought clothing or food 
products -- according to personal preference but without being an ex~ 
pert in the areas of winemaking or weaving. In contrast, by the end 
of the Renaissance, the uninformed consumer began to be supplanted by 
the educated connoisseur, that is, someone with expert knowledge of the 
field. The addition of both laymen and a theoretical basis for art to 
the medieval craft establishment helped to change the structure of the 
visual arts in the Renaissance to a more exclusive practice. 
Summary 
As we have seen, the transformational influences during the 
Renaissance may be described as the technological and internal dis-
coveries, the role of theory and of the individual, and the formation 
of new ways to educate the artist and the viewer. The first of these, 
the technological and internal discoveries, helped to transform the 
direction of art in several ways. The technological advances of 
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papter-making, engraving, and moveable type helped to disseminate 
artistic ideas throughout Europe more easily and more quickly than ever 
before. The medieval dependence upon the relationship between archi-
tecture and painting and sculpture also changed in the Renaissance. 
A percentage of this change came with the technological advances with-
in the arts. During the medieval period, the craftsman who painted 
was limited to frescoes to adorn church works or to the illuminated 
page. In the Renaissance, the framed painting and free-standing 
statue were developed. In breaking away from the medieval conception 
of painting and sculpture as handMaidens to architecture, the framed 
space and free-standing statue heralded a new way of perceiving art, 
a new way of looking at art as a separate entity which was to be 
separated from the medieval criteria for judging painting and sculpture 
as part of the architectural enclosure. Each was transformed to an 
entity of its o~~, to be appreciated on its own merits. The third 
technological discovery of the Renaissance was the introduction of 
perspective studies which included a theoretical basis in geometry. 
This advancement, which made a reproduction of the natural world more 
possible for the artist, was seized upon by some artists of the 
Renaissance to provide a theoretical basis for art which would then 
carry art to a higher plane than the medieval craftsman had ever en-
visaged. If the visual arts had not been provided with a theoretical 
foundation in the Renaissance, further discussion in later aqes could 
not have occurred, especially on a philosophic level. 
Closely intertwined 'llith the new status of art was the new 
status of the artist. He not only received a higher place in Renais-
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sance society than he had ever had before, but he also began to emerge 
as an individual whose talent was an integral part of his success. 
This latter feature was consistent with Italian Hunanisrn. During the 
Renaissance, as a body of theory began to accumulate around the artist, 
as he gail&ed a sense of individual recognition, and when the idea of 
talent had become accepted, the artist began to practice art in a new 
and different way. He was no longer a craftsman practicing his craft 
he was an artist creating art. This new way of viewing the artist, both 
by the public and by the artist, certainly prefigured the idea of 
•Jenius. And more importantly, it set the precedent that the artist, 
by virtue of his talent and individuality, could not always be expected 
to be easily understood nor could his product receive the immediate re-
sponse that the craftsman's had. The product no longer had the immedi-
ate recognizability of the utilitarian object and the artist no longer 
had a clear-cut status within the society. He had embarked upon a new 
path which, at this point, was still not clearly delineated. 
Finally, we find, toward the end of the Renaissance, a new way 
of training artists the academy. The medieval guilds gradually lost 
their monopoly over artists and their training. While this loss of 
influence may be traced to several sources, much of it was no doubt due 
to the increased status of individual artists of the Renaissance and 
the theoretical teaching that these artists espoused. The academy was 
basically composed of artists who were elected for their talent and 
reputation and of laymen who were elected for their knowledge of the 
arts and their culture. It i3 the inclusion of laymen, thought ac-
ceptable as judges of artistic creation, that becomes an i~portant 
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point in the development of the Artworld. Election to the academy was 
not granted to anyone "off the street," but rather to a select group 
who were educated to appreciate and judge the work of art. The forma-
tion of an art establishment in conjunction with the emergence of the 
art object and the artist as artist signalled the birth of the Artworld. 
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though they are certainly part of it -- but rather the whole matrix of 
official and social relations within which power is exercised." 
CHAPTER III 
SEVENTEENTH TO T\olENTIETH CENTURIES : 
MATURATION OF THE ARTWORLD 
Introduction 
The last chapter examined the birth of the Artworld in the Ren-
aissance. This chapter deals with the additional elements that occur-
red within the Artworld during the seventeenth through the mid-nine-
teenth centuries which created the concept of an art movement, a theory 
of art and which removed the contextual restrainsts of the work of art 
to create the autonomous work of art. The elements which are examined 
within this chapter are the Mannerist painters, the Nee-Platonic and 
Peripatetic arguments concerning a theory of art, the rise of personal 
collections and museums, and the introduction of formal criticism to the 
visual arts. 
The Mannerists 
The beginning of the Renaissance had signalled major changes in 
the fabric of life in Western Europe; so too, did the end of the 
Renaissance. Politically, France, England and Spain assumed power 
under highly centralized monarchies and the Italian peninsula was pri-
marily controlled by puppet governments of Spain and France. The 
political climate was also much affected by changes in the religious 
structure of Europe. What had begun as an effort to reform certain 
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abused practices within the Church of Rome had lead to the formation 
of Protestant sects, primarily Lutheranism, Calvanism and Anglicanism 
in the sixteenth century. The Catholic Church countered with the 
Council of Trent, 1545-1563, but the universal Church of the Middle 
Ages was gone. Civil and religious strife not only plagued the se-
curity of Europe, but new theories and discoveries in science challenged 
and expanded the notion of the world that Western man had held since 
classical times. Copernicus provided the first impetus toward a new 
science with his theory that the planets revolved around the sun. 
Kepler, Galilee and Newton followed in his footsteps to provide the 
foundation for modern mathematics, astronomy and physics. Francis 
Bacon argued for the tools of modern science -- induction, observation 
and experiment -- and helped to usher in the new age of scientific 
knowledge. The seventeenth century saw Newton create the fundamentals 
of calculus and formulate the universal law of gravitation, Pascal con-
tribute to geometry, physics and computing machines, Descartes add to 
the theory of analytic geometry and algebraic symbolism, Napier invent 
logarithms and use the decimal point, and Leibniz add to the knowledge 
of symbolic algebra, probability and number theory. Important dis-
coveries were made in physiology, botany and zoology and provided the 
basis for the modern natural sciences; alchemy was gradually trans-
formed into the systematic study, chemistry. As well as laying a 
foundation for modern scientific thought, these new discoveries 
and the new attitude toward science -- combined with the religious and 
political upheavals to end the Age of Faith and put Western man firmly 
on the path of "rationalism," that is, accepting reason as the supreme 
56 
authority in all areas of dispute. 
The beginning of these changes can be traced to the middle dec-
ades of the sixteenth century: Pope Leo X excommunicated Luther in 
1521, the Sack of Rome by Charles V occurred in 1527, Calvin published 
The Institutes of the Christian Religion in 1536 and Copernicus pub-
lished On the Revolution of the Celestial Bodies in 1543. At the 
same time, a new generation of artists followed the masters of the 
High Renaissance into prominence. They have been called the Mannerists 
and the period of their production was roughly from 1520 to 1600. The 
Mannerists are important because they are the first of the "modern 
movements" in art, that is, the first of the pendulum motions from or 
toward a particular theory within artistic practice. They also must 
be noted for their insistence upon the artist as creator and the intro-
duction of a self-conscious expressiveness in their work. 
For a long period of time, the work of the Mannerists was viewed 
as nothing more than a degeneration of the Renaissance, a period in 
which artists tried to emulate the masters of ~~e Renaissance without 
success. However, more modern art historians tend to view the Man-
nerists as a separate group who stand between the Renaissance and 
Baroque periods, not as a negative entity but rather as a transitiorr 
between the two periods. It is perhaps misleading to call these artists 
a "group," because art historians for the most part do not readily agree 
upon a particular group but include various artists according to their 
view of Mannerism. The most often L~cluded artists are Bronzino, 
Parmigianino, Jacopo Pontormo, Giovanni da Bologna, Andrea Palladia, 
Tintoretto, and El Greco. The visual characteristics of Mannerism, 
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opposed to the restrained classicism of the Renaissance, involved 
slendarized and elongated figures and more emotional and complicated 
surface compositions in which the manipulation of space has become a 
more conscious device. Gardner has described maniera as "a self-con-
scious stylization involving complexity, caprice, bizarre fantasy (the 
'conceit'), elegance, preciosity, and polish."1 Perhaps the difference 
between the High Renaissance classicism and Mannerism can be demonstrat-
ed best by a comparison of the Last Supper as portrayed by da Vinci 
(figure 5) and by Tintoretto (figure 6). Da Vinci's is calm, with a 
balanced stability due, in part, to the strong horizontal movement. 
Christ occupies the center of the canvas and the central vanishing 
point is directly behind his head. And even though the painting por-
trays the moment when Christ has announced that one of the apostles 
will betray him, there is a feeling of restrained emotion in the paint-
ing. In contrast, Tintoretto's is based on a strong diagonal axis 
which gives it a dynamic quality that the horizontal does not have. 
The painting is full of figures of both natural and supernatural origin 
and the Christ figure is identified by the brilliant halo of light be-
hind him. The moment, too, has changed, from betrayal to the Eucha-
ristic feast. This is a much more emotional rendition, and one which 
includes not only a multitude of everyday details but the supernatural 
as well. The restraint and simplicity of the Renaissance is gone. 
Myers, commenting on this painting, highlights the basic differences 
between the Renaissance and Mannerist painters: 
Like other Mannerist works, Tintoretto's version destroys single-
point perspective, stresses the spiritual over the rational, and 
transforms the balanced, closed composition of the Renaissance 
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Figure 5: The Last Supper, Leonardo da Vinci, 1495-98. 
Figure 6: The Last Supper, Tintoretto, 1592-94. 
into a deliberately unbalanced, infinitely extending space in 
which figures assume uneasy agitated postures.2 
Tintoretto's painting was not only a departure from what had 
come before but it was a reaction against what had gone before. Al-
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though the Mannerist drew heavily from the artists of the Renaissance, 
their anti-classical stance was a revolt from the "coolness" and ra-
tionality of the previous period. The qualities of maniera overcame 
the qualities of restraint and simplicity which were important in the 
Renaissance~ expression of emotion overcame the rational approach of 
artists like Alberti and da Vinci. Federico Zuccari, founder of the 
Academy of St. Luke in Rome, wrote a refutation of da Vinci's insist-
ence upon a mathematical foundation for art: 
I say -- and I know I am saying the truth -- that the art of 
painting does not draw her principles from the mathematical sci-
ences. Nor is there any need to have recourse to them in order 
to learn this art's rules and methods, nor even in order to be 
able to discuss them theoretically. 3 
A bit later, Zuccari, still referring to mathematical rules, notes: 
The artist's mind should be not only clear, but free. His fancy 
should not be trammeled and restrained by a mechanical slavery 
to such rules.4 
Thus the scientific foundation for art that Alberti and da Vinci had 
believed so important for art became unwanted baggage for the Manner-
ists.s In a like manner, the scientific observation of nature which 
had been so important to the Renaissance artist was relegated to a less-
position by the Mannerists. Giovan Battista Armenini, now more known 
for his writing on painting ~~an his own painting, advised students 
that the best method for perfecting their own painting technique was 
to copy an ac~~owledged master, one whose work approached that of an-
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tiquity. He further stated: 
• that besides seeking the best a~d most perfect things of 
nature, you must supplement them with a good manner, and go with 
it as far as you deem sufficient, because, once you have combined 
a good manner with a good living model, you can make a composition 
of excellent beauty.6 
While this advice may sound quite similar to that given by medieval 
craftsmen, it is quite different. In contrast to da Vinci's advice 
to observe nature, Armenini counsels the student to seek "the best and 
most perfect things of nature," that is, what comes closest to ideal 
beauty. This is an echo of Alberti, but framed within the Mannerist 
context of Nee-Platonism (which will be discussed more fully a bit 
later). Armenini then suggests that one may further improve on the 
original with a good manner. In other words, the artist may "interpret" 
what is before him. The medieval craftsman interpreted the visible 
world to a great extent, but would never have believed he was doing so; 
his interests lay beyond the natural world. The Renaissance artist on 
the other hand, was primarily interested in the natural world, and 
while he used selection and arrangement as tools, they were not an 
overriding concern. With the Mannerists, however, selection and ar-
rangement became even more important and became intertwined with the 
artist's desire to create. In this sense, interpretation took on a new 
meaning to the artist, one which allowed him to express his own point 
of view. The aim of Armenini is not fidelity to nature but rather "a 
composition of excellent beauty." Fidelity to nature has been sub-
ordinated by a desire to create "art" as a primary aim of the artist. 
Gardner points to this in the following statement: 
The Mannerists, instead of continuing former research into nature 
and natural appearance, turned for their models to the masters of 
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the High Renaissance, especially Michelangelo, and to Roman 
sculpt,Jre, especially relief sculpture. Thus, instead of nature 
as their teacher, they took art. One could say that whereas 
their predecessors had sought nature and found their style, the 
Mannerists looked first for a style and found a manner.7 
Hauser also comments: 
We are dealing here ••• with a completely self-conscious style, 
which bases its forms not so much on the particular object as on 
the art of the preceding epoch, and to a greater extent than was 
the case with any previous significant trend of art. The con-
scious attention of the artist is directed no longer merely to 
choosing the means best adapted to his artistic purpose, but also 
to defining the artistic purpose itself -- the theoretical pro-
gram is no longer concerned merely with methods, but also aims.S 
Thus, it is bo~~ in the turning to art rather than nature and 
in the revolt from the previous period that the Mannerists initiated 
the notion of a "movement" in art. The artist began to build the Art-
world, consciously marking out the perimeters of his concerns. The 
Mannerist artist had fastened his attention more upon the work he did 
in relation to other artists and less upon the utilitarian context of 
his work. 
Art Theory and Philosophical Thought 
As Hauser has pointed out, Mannerist theorJ was not only con-
cerned with methods but with the aims of art; at the center of art is 
the creative act and the Mannerists turned their theoretical inquiry in 
that direction. If art had not become more self-conscious, had not 
seen the artist as creator, then the need to scrutinize the creative 
act would not have become as important. And if the Mannerists had not 
put fidelity to nature in a secondary place, the need to explore the 
relationship between the external world and the artist's imagination 
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might not have been felt at this early date. However, the writings of 
two Mannerists clearly show that the relationship between ideation and 
sensory experience had become important. The first of these writers 
was Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo, mentioned in the previous chapter in con-
nection with the Nee-Platonism of Marsilio Ficino. Lomazzo published 
T~attato del'Arte della Pittura, Scultura, et Architettura in 1584 and 
Idea del Tempio della Pittura in 1590, but it is the latter work that 
holds interest for us. In chapter 26 of Idea, Lomazzo offers a defini-
tion of beauty that is often quoted as the I1annerist position: "First 
we must understand that beauty is nothing more than a certain spiritual 
and lively grace • n9 However, the full quotation bears a somewhat 
different message: 
First we must understand that beauty is nothing more than a certain 
spiritual and lively grace, which by means of the divine ray is 
first infused into the Angels, in whom the shapes of any sphere 
may be seen; reflected in the Angels these are called exemplars 
and Ideas. Then it passes on to the spirits, in whom these shapes 
are called reasons and notions, and finally into matter, where 
they are called images and forms 10 
Ficino's contribution to this passage comes from chapter 6 of Commen-
tary on the Symposium which is entitled "What Components Are Needed to 
Make a Thing Beautiful, and That Beauty Is a Spiritual Gift." This pas-
sage is as follows: 
Beauty is a certain vital and spiritual grace, which is in-
fused first into the Angel by the divine ray, then into the spir-
its of men, and following these, into corporeal forms and voices; 
and this grace by means of reason and sight and hearing moves and 
delights our spirit; and in delighting, enraptures, and in en-
rapturing, inspires ardent love.ll 
Ficino was speaking of beauty in relation to the good, and the ardent 
love of which he speaks is basically the love of God. Lomazzo, on the 
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other hand, was writing a tract on art and used this definition as an 
introduction and basis for his following remarks. For Lomazzo, the 
heart of the creative act is beauty which is the "face of God" and is 
reflected through the angels, the human soul and finally into the cor-
poreal world. This is not to say that beauty is at all corporeal, but 
rather that it remains like the light which transmits it; it is recog-
nized on a spiritual level. Lomazzo states: 
And the spirit, created as it is, surrounded by an earthly body, 
stoops from its corporeal ministrJ. Weighed down by this pro-
pensity, it forgets the beauty that is hidden within it, and inso-
far as it is enveloped in a terrestrial body, it proceeds to use 
this body, accommodating to it the senses and sometimes also 
reason. Hence it does not behold this beauty which radiates with-
in it, until the body has matured and reason has awakened, with 
which it observes the beauty that shines in ~~e sight of the 
whole world and there abides.12 
In other words, Lomazzo believed that beauty abides within man, a 
"stamp" of God, an internal image, and that it is recognized through 
the intellect. Beauty is a visible manifestation of the good, one 
which is perceived internally through reason and not through the 
senses. Lomazzo notes: 
True beauty is only that which may be truly understood through 
reason and not through these two corporeal windows. This may 
easily be demonstrated in that no one doubts that it can be found 
in the Angels, in the spirits and in the bodies, and that the eye 
cannot see without light. So that ~~e shapes and colors of the 
bodies are not seen, if not illuminated by light, and they do no~ 
appear with their matter to the eye, although they must be in the 
eyes in order to be seen.:3 
This rather confusing passage may be clarified by examining Ficino's 
explanation from which Lomazzo borrowed: 
We do not doubt that this Beauty is incorporeal, since it is mani-
festly incorporeal in the Angel and the spirit, and we hav·e shown 
above that it is incorporeal in the bodies. From this then we 
can understand that the eye does not see else but the light of the 
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sun, because the shapes and colors of the bodies are never seen 
unless illuminated by light, and they do not appear with their 
matter to the eye. Yet it seems necessary to have them in the 
eye, so that they may be seen by the eye. Hence one and the same 
light of the sun, painted with the colors and shapes of all the 
bodies it strikes, presents itself to the eyes. The eyes through 
their own natural rays receive the light of the sun so painted, 
and once they have received it, they see the light and all the 
paintings that are in it. That is why the entire order of the 
world, which is visible, is perceived with the eyes, not in the 
matter of the bodies, but in the light which flows into the eyes. 
And because this order is in the light, separated from matter, it 
is necessarily incorporeal.l4 
Thus, Lomazzo argues, it is not the eyes which see beauty, but the in-
tellect which recognizes it. Within this somewhat transcendental and 
mystical presentation, Lomazzo has settled the conflict of ideation and 
sense perception to his satisfaction by placing both issues within a 
divine context. 
While Lomazzo concentrates on the concept of beauty, the second 
Mannerist writer, Federico Zuccari, addresses the nature of the crea-
tive act in a more direct fashion. In his L'Idea de' Pittori, Scultori 
e Architetti, he states that the work of art exists first in the mind 
of the artist, but uses an argument that is more within the tradition 
of the Scholastics than Lomazzo's Nee-Platonism. He calls the idea 
disegno interno and the resulting work of art as disegno esterno. He 
defines disegno interno as: 
I shall say that by Inward Design is meant the concept formed in 
our mind which enables us to apprehend any object and to do prac-
tical work in accordance with ~~is concept •.• It is true, 
though, that by this term Inward Design I do not mean solely the 
concept formed in the mind of the painter, but also that concept 
which is formed in any intellect; but for the sake of greater 
clarity and for the better understanding of my fellow artists, I 
have defined in the begir~ing this term Inward Design for our pro-
fession alone. If we wish to define the term completely and uni-
versally, we shall say that it is the concept and the idea formed 
so as to understand and to put into practice any object.lS 
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According to Zuccari, this "idea" exists first in the mind of God, then 
in the angels and then in the mind of man. It is again, like Lomazzo, 
divine inspiration. But unlike Lornazzo, Zuccari does not overlook the 
role of sensory experience. He acknowledges the debt that any cor-
poreal being has toward the senses, but he also subordinates the senses 
to the idea. He states: 
Here perhaps some fine mind may want to object by saying that 
this ideal concept, this intellectual Design, although it provides 
the first impulse and the first light to the intellect, does not 
operate by itself, inasmuch as the intellect does everything by 
means of the senses. 
A penetrating objection, but empty and of no substance: for 
as communal things are the property of all, and each may use them 
freely, possessing a part of them as the wealth of the republic, 
yet no one may become their absolute master except the Prince him-
self; in the same way we may say that, since the intellect and the 
senses are subjects to Design and concept, Design, as their 
Prince, ruler, and governor, uses them as his own property.l6 
Thus the senses become participants in the process, but are always at 
the service of the idea. The act of artistic creation has become just 
that -- creation. Since man may share in Divine inspiration through 
his intellect, m~~ also shares in the ability to create. Zuccari bor-
rows from Thomas Aquinas to apply ~~is concept directly to the visual 
arts: 
The reason, then, that art imitates Nature is that the inner arti-
ficial Design, and therefore art, proceeds to bring forth artifi-
cial objects in the manner that Nature itself proceeds. And if we 
wish to know why Nature can be imitated, it is because Nature is 
guided toward its own goal and toward its own procedures by an 
intellective prL~ciple. Therefore her work is the work of uner-
ring intelligence, as the philosophers say; for she reaches her 
goal by orderly and infallible means. And since art, chiefly 
with the aid of the above-named design, observes precisely the 
same method in its orocedure, therefore Nature can be imitated by 
art, and art is abl~ to imitate Nature.l7 
It should be noted here that Zuccari is not talking about the direct 
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reproduction of the external world as mimetic, but rather is examining 
the process of the creative act. His argument is based on the fact 
that art follows the same ideational procedure as nature and so imi-
tates nature's generative forces. The notion of "genius" became ac-
ceptable in application to an artist because of the artist's participa-
tion in the idea.l8 
With the writings of Lomazzo and Zuccari, both Nee-Platonic and 
Peripatetic thought became a part of the theory of the visual arts. 
However, both men were Mannerists and as the sixteenth century closed, 
the Mannerist movement came to an end. As the Baroque age began, the 
new generation of artists reacted against the Mannerists much in the 
same way that the Mannerists had reacted against the Renaissance mas-
ters. Many of the new artists viewed the Mannerists as degenerate and 
excessive. 
One of these artists was Michelangelo da Caravaggio whose work 
r:~ay be characterized as uncompromising realism. The term "naturalism" 
has been used in connection wi~~ Caravaggio's work and the reason can 
be seen when examining such work as The Calling of St. Matthew (figure 
7). In this painting we see a sacred theme treated in a totally con-
temporary and realistic mar~er. The place might have been a common 
Roman tavern of ~~e times, and the participants drawn from common 
people of the day. The supernatural of the Mannerists has no place in 
this work; it is intended to be a statement that the common people 
could associate with. The ver] thin halo over the head of Christ is 
~~e only suggestion of his divine nature. The emphasis on Christ is 
achieved by ~~e manipulation of light, which is a characteristic of 
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Figure 7: The Calling of St. Matthew, Caravaggio, ca. 1597-98. 
Caravaggio. But it is the realism of the situation that is so strik-
ing, its everyday setting and characters. However, as much as Cara-
vaggio had intended his work for the common man, it was not well re-
ceived in that quarter. Janson notes: 
His work was acclaimed by artists and connoisseurs, but to the 
man in the street, for whom it was intended, it lacked propriety 
and reverence. The simple people resented meeting their likes in 
his paintings; they preferred religious imagery of a more idealized 
and rhetorical sort.l9 
Albert E. Elsen also shares this opinion: 
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Dedicated to making art that would meet the needs of the masses, 
Caravaggio was a failure, for the people, conditioned by mere 
aristocratic images of insincere piety, distrusted the stark 
reality of his types and the brutal realism with which the Bible 
was interpreted. It was with connoisseurs and artists that the 
recognition of his talent was achieved.20 
caravaggio not only brought realism to his religious art, but also ex-
tended the concept of painting by being one of the first genre painters 
(The Card Sharps, The Fortune Teller) and still life artists (Basket of 
Fruit). It is in relation with the latter that he caused reaction a-
mong other artists. He believed that regardless of the subject matter, 
the treatment should be consistently on a high level which meant that 
he would take as much trouble with a still life as a Biblical scene. 
His insistence on a realistic portrayal of all the world around him 
sharply separated him from the Renaissance and the Mannerists; it also 
divided him from theorists of the time who found his naturalism lacking 
in intellectual capabilities and imagination. 
One of the foremost spokesmen for the seventeenth century visual 
arts was Giovanni Pietro Bellori, a layman who had been appointed "an-
tiquarian of Rome" by Clement X. He was associated with the Academy of 
St. Luke in Rome and also with Colbert and Poussin. Although he was 
not a painter by profession, he was considered an expert judge of art 
by his contemporaries and in his "L'Idea del Pittore, della Scultore e 
del'Architetto" he argued against the excesses of the Mannerists on one 
hand and the naturalism of Caravaggio on the other. 
idea. 
Bellori began with the accepted Nee-Platonic exposition of the 
Sublunar bodies ..• are suoject to change and deformity; and 
although nature always intends to produce excellent effects, 
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nevertheless, because of the inequality of matter the forms 
change, and human beauty is especially disarranged, as we see from 
the infinite deformities and disproportions that are in us. For 
this reason the noble Painters and Sculptors, imitating that first 
maker, also form in their minds an example of superior beauty, and 
in beholding it they emend nature with faultless color or line.21 
He then cited the story of Zeuxis which Alberti had used to demonstrate 
this point. It was from this reference that Bellori went on to argue 
against the likes of Caravaggio whom Bellori accused of being a slave 
of nature and of painting without the benefit of the idea. 
Thus nature is for this reason so inferior to art that the copyist 
artist and imitators of bodies in everything, without selectivity 
and the choice of an Idea, were criticized. Demetrius was told 
that he was too natural, Dionysius was blamed for having painted 
men resembling us • • • just as in our time Michel Angelo da 
Caravaggio was criticized for being too natural in painting like-
22 nesses 
But Bellori also had to contend with what were felt to be excesses by 
the Mannerists, that is, the ignoring of nature and the turning inward 
to expression. Bellori therefore stated that the idea had its roots in 
the senses, but the senses as purified and raised from their lowly 
state. 
Born from nature, it [the Idea] overcomes its origin and becomes 
the model of art; measured with the compass of the intellect it 
becomes the measure of the hand; and animated by fantasy it gives 
life to ~~e image . • • The Idea of the Painter and the Sculptor 
is that perfect and excellent example of the mind, to which imag-
ined form, imitating all things that come into sight assL~ilate 
themselves •.. Thus the Idea constitutes the perfection of natur-
al beauty and unites the truth with the verisimilitude of what 
appears to the eye, always aspiring to the best and the most mar-
velous, thereby not emulating but making itself superior to na-
ture; revealing to us its elegant and perfect works3 which nature does not usually show us as perfect in every part. 2 
He summarized his argument against both extremes as follows: 
Quintillian teaches us that all things perfected by art and hu-
man ingenuity have their origin in the same nature, from which the 
true Idea springs. Hence those who without knowing the truth 
70 
follow common practice in everything create spectres instead of 
shapes; nor are they dissimilar from those who borrow from the 
genius and copy the ideas of others, creating works that are not 
natural children but bastards of nature, so that it seems as 
though they are wedded to the paintbr~shes of their masters. Ad-
dded to this evil, arising from lack of genius or the inability 
to select the best parts, is the fact that they choose the defects 
of their teachers and form an idea of the worst. On the other 
hand, those who glory themselves with the name of Naturalists 
have no idea whatever in their minds; they copy the defects of 
the bodies and satisfy themselves with ugliness and errors, they, 
too, swearing by the model, as their teachers. If the mode~ is 
taken from their sight, their whole art disappears with it. 4 
Thus Bellori had dealt with both schools of painting, counseling a mid-
dle path for the artist. By using a blend of statements and attitudes 
from such Renaissance masters as Alberti and da Vinci and by answering 
the twin challenges of Mannerism and Naturalism, Bellori formulated in-
to a concrete theory what had been only implied speculation before. It 
had become a system of thought, one that to enter into French, Ge=man 
. h . . b . f h . h 25 and Engl~s wr~t~ngs on art as a as~s or aest et~c t eory. 
Bellori also added this interesting comment about the relation-
ship between the common man and the visual arts: 
Yet the 
sense. 
things; 
they do 
disdain 
art, on 
Idea is 
common people refer everything they see to the visual 
They praise things painted naturally, being used to such 
appreciated beautiful colors, not beautiful forms, which 
not understand; tire of elegance and approve of novelty; 
reason, follow opinion, and walk away from the truth in 
which, as on its own base, the most noble monument of the 
built.26 
It would seem that the arg\tment which Dolce had first put forward, 
that the refined and educated man can best judge art, had found an echo 
in Bellori. In this second instance, it is a stronger statement and 
seems to be predicated on the fact that the common people rely solely 
on the senses and are not trained to use their intellect when viewing 
~~e work of art. When so much emphasis had been put on the use of 
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reason as a transcendental part of making art and viewing art, it 
would seem natural that those who were illiterate and limited in using 
their intellect were relegated to a lesser position, a position where 
they might view but were not expected to appreciate. 
Thus far, art theory had been a conglomeration of thought from 
artists and art theorists, bo~~ practicing artists and laymen, who had 
borrowed from various philosophical writings and brought these writings 
into the Artworld. Also, the rift between the artist and the general 
public was widening, due in great part to the increasingly complicated 
theoretical basis for the visual arts which required training in clas-
sical images and thought. This gap was to continue to widen with the 
rise of public exhibitions, art criticism and museums. 
Formalization of the Institution 
Leadership in the visual arts, which for so long had rested in 
Italy, began to be posited in the hands of the French during the seven-
teenth century. However, many of the leading French artists had been 
educated, or at least had spent time in Italy and much of Italian 
thought found its way into the new French ascendancy. Particularly 
noticeable was the spread of the academy from Italy to France. The 
L'Academie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture was founded under the 
leadership of Charles LeBrun in 1648 and was modeled after the Academy 
of St. Luke in Rome. By 1655 the Academy had acquired the exclusive 
rights to teach life drawing, and with the death of cardinal Mazarin in 
1661, the Academy came under the increasingly centralized power of 
Louis XIV, the "Sun King," and his Finance Minister, Jean Colbert. 
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Colbert, who was in charge of economic policy for the King and who had 
organized and regulated most industries and trade for France, became 
surintendant des bRtiments and brought the same type of policies to 
the French artists and craftsmen. Using a government subsidy, Colbert 
put the Academy under the firm control of the monarchy in 1664. All 
artists who won commissions from the government had to join the Academy 
and all members of the Academy were expected to show their work in the 
annual exhibitions which began in 1665 in the galleries of the Palais 
Royal. These exhibitions were limited for many years to court society 
much in the same way that the painting and sculpture was limited to the 
glorification of the monarchy. 1664 also saw the beginning of the con-
ftrences which LeBrun initiated to set down a body of theory which was 
as absolute as the monarchy. 27 ~ The Conferences took the fo~ of lee-
tures before the Academy in which works of art were discussed and prin-
ciples drawn frcm the discussion. The following example is excerpted 
from a lecture entitled "Concerning Expression in General and in Par-
ticular" which LeBrun gave in 1667 and which was published in Amsterdan 
in 1698: 
When anger takes possession of ~~e soul, he who experiences this 
emotion has red and inflamed eyes, a wandering and sparkling pupil, 
both eyebrows now lowered, now raised, the forehead deeply 
creased, creases between the eyes, wide-open nostrils, lips press-
ed tightly together, and the lower lip pushed up over the upper, 
leaving the corners of the mouth a little open to form a cruel 
and disdainful laugh.28 
This is a short example of the type of cataloguing that the Academy at-
tempted. While this type of cataloguing had been done since the Ren-
aissance, it never before had the weight of authority that the Academy 
carried. This kind of authority also affected the subject matter that 
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was thought to be appropriate for painting. This attitude toward sub-
ject matter can probably be traced from Bellori and Poussin to LeBrun.29 
In "Observations on Painting," published by Bellori in Vite de' Pittori 
Scultori et Architetti Moderni in 1672, Poussin counsels the painter 
as follows: 
The grand manner consists of four elements: subject or theme, con-
cept, structure, and style. The first requirement fundamental to 
all the others, is that the subject and the narrative be grandiose, 
such as battles, heroic actions, and religious themes ••• Thus the 
painter not only must possess the art of selecting his subject, but 
judgment in comprehending it, and must choose that which is by 
nature capable of every adornment and of perfection.3° 
This attitude had been present in the Renaissance, but had never been 
explicitly stated as a canon of artistic belief or placed in the posi-
tion of primary importance. 
Poussin's attitude toward beauty follows that of his Italian 
predecessors, but his definition of painting adds a new note to art 
theory and the viewing of art: 
It is an imitation made on a surface with lines and colors of 
everything that one sees under the sun. Its end is to please.31 
The interesting elements here that painting is imitation and that 
its aim is to please -- may have been implied before this time, but 
never in such an unadorned manner. It is quite likely that Poussin 
was commenting on, or perhaps quoting from De Pictur~ Veterum by 
Fran9ois Junius, but this statement was published under his name and 
can be acknowledged as representati'le of his thought. The reference to 
painting as imitation would seem to carry the usual Nee-Platonic con-
notations, i.e., that the process of creation shares in the divine. 
However, the second part of his statement, that the aim of art is to 
• 
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please, is a further development. In the Middle Ages this notion 
would have been impossible; in the Renaissance, irrelevant. The Man-
nerists, particularly Lomazzo, pointed in this direction with their 
emphasis on beauty and the creation of beauty. But it is with this 
statement that the ground is fully prepared for aesthetic theory. 
It is interesting to note that the concept of the beaux arts was 
popularized at this time, especially in the works of Abbe Dubos (1719) 
Abb , ub . h , . ' .A • and e Batteux, who p ll.s ed Les beaux arts redu~ ts a un meme pr~n-
cipe in 1746. Batteux, in fact, established the main categories of 
the Fine Arts which have been accepted until recent years: the separa-
tion of the Fine Arts from crafts, or mechanical arts, and the five 
major divisions of the arts into music, poetry, painting, sculpture and 
the dance, with the addition of the theatre as a combination of the 
others.32 The audience who viewed the beaux arts was still primarily 
a court-centered aristocracy whose world centered on the bon mot, 
court intrigue and the splendor of Louis XIV. It was an educated, re-
fined and elite society that maintained the Rococo period until the 
French revolution. 
Because of the tremendous influence of the French court during 
this time, academies of art were opened all over Europe, so that by 
the middle of the eighteenth century there were over one hundred acad-
emies which eL~ibited the work of their members in annual Salons. 33 
The Royal Academy of Arts in London was granted a charter in 1765 and 
opened their first exhibit in April, 1769. The French Academy had 
moved their exhibit to the Louvre and had opened the show to the public 
in 1725. The exhibits and ~~eir open~ngs became important social oc-
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casions and the news of them was eagerly sought throughout Europe. 
Elizabeth Holt notes: 
Because of the ritual of the opening on the name day or fete of 
the king and of the ceremony of the awarding of prizes, the an-
nual or biennial exhibition became an event in the court calendar, 
particularly in France. French was the lingua franca of the 
European courts, as French fashions and customs were paramount. 
What transpired in Paris was "news."34 
Reporting and commenting on the exhibits became an established practice. 
Denis Diderot wrote a commentary on the Salon of 1759 which was conver-
sational in tone and represented his opinions of ~~e works involved. 35 
And although this report was published in Grimm's Correspondance lit-
teraire for only a small and select group of Europeans, this type of 
reporting became pervasive with the advent of newspapers and magazines. 
The end of the eighteenth century saw many periodicals come into exis-
tence: Der teutsche Merkur, Monthly Review, Propylaen, Artist's Reposi-
tory, The Foreign Quarterly Review, and Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 
to name a few. The tone of the articles varied according to the pub-
lication and author. Holt notes: 
The form these reports took was determined by the type of publica-
tion and its subscribers. It could be an informative, descriptive 
or even critical account of what was to be seen, written for the 
twenty thousand middle-class subscribers who were as eager to keep 
up with the news as were the two thousand persons in the literary 
and artistic world more intimately involved with the works exhibi-
ted. 36 
An early example of this commentary is J. H. 'iilhelm Tischbein 's "Let-
ters from Rome about new •11orks of art by contemporary artists, " pub-
lished in Der teutsche Merkur in February, 1786. 
Recently a painting was put on exhibition which attracted the at-
tention of all Rome. In the history of art we read of no painting 
~~at might have awakened more uproar on its appearance than this 
one. Not only ar~ists, art lovers, and connoisseurs, but even the 
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people troop by from morning until evening to see it. The en-
thusiasm is general. We must, willingly or unwillingly, join one 
side or the other. No one is allowed, in this case, to have his 
own opinion; that modest judgment of finding the good good and the 
mediocre mediocre no longer counts here. With the present public, 
a matter is either raised up to heaven or, with a peremptory order, 
cast down among the most wretched stuff. At parties, at coffee-
houses, and on the streets, we hear one judgment or the other, for 
nothing else is spoken of but David and The Oath of the Horatii. 31 
Following a description of the artist and the painting, Tischbein re-
layed the reactions of the French and the Italians to the painting and 
the more "neutral" reactions of German and English critics. While re-
luctant to admit David to the ranks of the great masters like Raphael, 
he does put David in ~~e same category as the Carracci and calls The 
Oath of the Horatii "the masterpiece of French art and the picture of 
our century." 38 
A more critical review was written by John Eagles on the ex-
hibit at Somerset House in 1835. Eagles reflects the conservative at-
titudes of his publication, Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine. Of J. M. 
W. Turner's The Bright Stone of Honour and Tomb of Marceau, Eagles 
writes: 
How paints the R.A.? All jumble and confusion in effect, colour, 
and composition. Here is in its utmost poverty, raw white, and 
unharmonizing blue -- ~~e texture is perfectly fuzzy. It repre-
sents no~~ing, substantial or unsubstantial, neither earth, air, 
fire, nor water ••• The figures are red and white dolls, and 
not quite so well painted as dolls usually are. There is not as 
much poetry as the paring of a nail.39 
After more criticism of Turner and Constable, Eagles goes on to say: 
The old masters made it [the value of shade] their principal care; 
we fly to the other extreme, and make light, or rather white the 
great aim. When I say we, I only speak in reference to the fash-
ion set by some great moderns. If they are right, Claude was 
wrong; if they are right, Poussin was wrong, ~~e Carracci were 
wrong, Correggio wrong, all wrong. I have spoken, it will be 
perhaps thought, on this subject, with too much severity; but it 
77 
is as I feel, when pictures that are meant, or ought to be meant, 
to please for ever, only to astonish at first, and then give un-
mitigated pain • • • 40 
In both of these reviews, the authors compare contemporary artists' 
work against the standards of the masters, that is, those artists from 
the Renaissance and later whose work was admired. They also state 
clearly that these are opinions, albeit opinions of learned men. Holt 
comments on ~~e effect exhibitions and reviews had upon the artist: 
The advent of art exhibitions as such and of widely published 
popular interpretive criticism brought major changes in both the 
artist's manner of working and the viewer's manner of evaluating 
art. By the end of the eighteenth century the artist no longer 
addressed himself, as he had for centuries, to the preferences of 
a particular patron or to the requirements of a particular occa-
sion or installation site. He conceived and executed his work 
according to aesthetic, philosophical and personal principles 
which belonged to him individually or to a group of artists. 
Finished works were sent out to compete for public recognition 
with those of other artistic persuasions. Here they were judged 
by the public, whose opinion might be disparaged or lauded but 
could never be disregarded. Because the ?ublic, unlike the ear-
lier highly cultured aristocratic patron, frequently felt itself 
in need of an introduction to and an interpretation of, the myriad 
of works and schools set before it, the critic became a persuasive 
and thus powerful arbiter of taste and value in the visual arts. 41 
This change in the Artworld was from the artist working on a commission 
basis for an aristocratic patron to a "freelance" basis subject to crit-
ics and public opinion. It was a major shift, not only in the economic 
structure but in the foundation of the Artworld. The artist was free 
to confront his public through the medium of exhibits. However, it 
should be noted that the "public" was still a relatively small group. 
Holt has put the number of subscribers to literary journals at twenty 
thousand which is still a small number of people when compared to the 
entire population of Europe at the time. The range of classes in-
volved in the visual arts had expanded from the aristocracy and cler~J 
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to the middle class, but the "people" were still another entity who did 
not belong in the Artworld. 
The final element in the formal structure of the Artworld was 
the advent of the museum. Originally, a few wealthy men collected 
items of interest to them. These collections included examples of the 
natural sciences, books, archeological finds and art works. Normally, 
the collections were broken up upon the death of the collector. How-
ever, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the collections 
became larger, more methodical and provided the basis for later museum 
collections. For example, the collections of the naturalist Aldrovandi 
formed the nucleus of the museum of Bologna; the manuscripts of the Earl 
of Arundel formed the center for the book collection of the British 
Museum. The earliest modern use of the term "museum" appears to have 
been in connection with the collection of Elias Ashmole in 1659, which 
was the foundation of the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford that became the 
property of the University in 1677. Gradually, museums became more 
well defined and were devoted to either science or art. The formation 
of art museums was stimulated by the excavations of Pompeii and Hercu-
laneum and the need to classify and display the objects found. The 
Museo Pio-Clemenrine was completed in 1774 and housed many examples of 
Greek and Roman art, catalogued according to Winckelmann's history of 
art styles. The Grand Galerie of the Louvre was dedicated to house 
France's collection of art in 1793 and the Musee des Monuments Francais 
was formed to house chronologically arranged medieval and Renaiss~~ce 
sculpture two years later. Museums added to the stature of the nation 
and were appropriately designed. Holt notes: 
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The exterior form of the museum was that of a temple. Within the 
museum, heterogeneous art objects of different cultures and pre-
vious epochs were subjected to analysis, documentation, and clas-
sification. Chronology determined the arrangement of the ob-
jects.42 
Holt also remarks on the differences between the older collections of 
the nobility and the new museums: 
The nineteenth-century museum was separated from the collections 
in princely or royal galleries by the impersonal nature both of 
the installations and the acquisition of the objects. In the 
museum the single art work or fragment existed for itself, avail-
able for contemplation and stimulation, free from any specific 
purpose. The art museum was a treasury of objects that came to 
possess the quality of reliquaries whose presence augmented the 
quality of nationality.43 
The nationalistic character of the early museums, as well as their ed-
ucative nature, is clearly stated by Alexander Lenoir, the first curator 
; 
of the Musee des Monuments Francais • 
• 
A museum in its institution ought consequently to have two objects 
in view; the one political, the other that of public instruction. 
In a political point of view, it should be established with suf-
ficient splendor and magnificence to strike the eye and attract 
the curious from every quarter of the globe, who would consider 
it as their duty to be munificent amongst a people friendly to the 
arts; in point of instruction, it ought to contain all that the 
arts and sciences combined can produce towards the assistance of 
public teaching: such were the museums of the ancients, whose mem-
ory we still respect.44 
Another museum of a national character was the National Gallery, opened 
in London in 1838. Holt describes the early years of the National Gal-
lerJ and its reception by the public: 
Drawn by the exhibitions as much as by the visits of royalty, 
Londoners flocked to th.e building, located on "the finest site in 
LOndon," the recently completed Trafalgar Square designed by John 
Nash. Visitors crowded into the National Gallery on Mondays es-
pecially, when admission was free. On May 1, ~~e traditional open-
ing date of the Royal Academy exhibition, they hurried to the East 
Gallery, where t.'le Hanging Committee placed the paintings it con-
sidered exceptional, and noted eagerly which artists had been fur-
ther honored by having work placed "on the line" marked 'by a 
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ledge about eight feet from the floor.45 
Public response was good and museums of art were founded all over 
Europe ~~d America. While at first most contained paintings or sculp-
ture only, and normally that which was of a national character, the 
museums gradually began to acquire objects and artifacts from all over 
the world and from every period of artistic production. The amalgama-
tion of so many diverse pieces created the "museum context," that is, 
the removal of the work of art from its original context and the substi-
tution of an aesthetic context. Andre Malraux comments upon this trans-
formation: 
So vital is ~~e part played by the art museum in our approach to 
works of art to-day that we find it difficult to realize that no 
museums exist, none has existed, in lands where civilization of 
modern Europe is, or was, unknown; and that, even amongst us, they 
have existed for barely two hundred years. They bulked so large 
in the nineteenth century and are so much part of our lives to-day 
that we forget they have imposed on the spectator a wholly new 
attitude towards the work of art. For they have tended to es-
trange the works they bring together from their original functions 
and to transform even portraits into "pictures."46 
~ialraux at a later point expands his notion of a changed context: 
' The Middle Ages were as unaware of what we mean by the •11ord "art" 
as were Greece and Egypt, who had no word for it. For this con-
cept to come into being, works of art needed to be isolated from 
their functions. What common link existed between a "venus" which 
was Venus, a crucifix which ~as Christ crucified, and a bust? But 
three "statues" can be linked together.47 
The context of a particular piece of art changed when it was pulled in-
to the Artworld and was given aesthetic value. If one views an African 
mask in a museum one •Tiews it as an aesthetic object. To the general 
observer, little may be known of its function in the society within 
which it was created; in fact, its original function has little to do 
with its viewing. The utilitarian and contextual connotations that 
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it had originally have been superseded by the museum context; the 
mask is no longer an accoutrement of ritual but rather a piece of 
primitive art analyzed as an abstract and expressionistic work. When 
viewed in the museum context, any object was to be viewed as a work of 
art, as an autonomous artwork. 
Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century we have a matured 
Artworld, an Artworld that gradually evolved from the practices of the 
Renaissance to an institution with which we are now familiar. It is 
populated by artists, critics, connoisseurs and lovers of art; its 
habitat is the museum, the gallery and the printed page. 
Summary 
In the centuries following the Renaissance, developments quickly 
succeeded one another until the adult figure of the Artworld was formed. 
The first of these developments, the Mannerist "crisis," contributed 
several elements to the maturation process. The first of these was an 
art which both built upon and reacted to the preceding period of art. 
In this dual response, the first "modern movement" in art was created. 
I think we are able to say that the visual arts turned inward at this 
point; the artist became aware of what had been done within art as a 
point of commencement for his own work. The notion cf "movement" in 
art came into being with the Mannerists and gradually evolved to the 
concept of the changeable nature of the visual arts. 
The second element that the Mannerists contributed to the de-
velopment of the Artworld was in the area of theory. While the 
Renaissance had given a theoretical foundation ·to art, the Mannerists 
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expanded the area of theory to include the aims of art and the nature 
of the creative act. What had been philosophical writings on the 
nature of beauty and the good, both in Nee-Platonic and Peripatetic 
traditions, fully entered the Artworld as theories of beauty. With the 
advent of the Baroque age, these theories underwent change as a new 
generation of artists reacted to the Mannerists. Bellori stated that 
the idea had its roots in the senses, that is, what is perceptible in 
the natural world, but that the senses were purified by the idea, which 
is man's sharing in the divine. The delicate balance that Bellori had 
set remained one of the main tenets of art theory; through LeBrun and 
Poussin, it entered the writings and attitudes of the French Academy 
where it was filtered and passed on to the rest of the European art 
establishment. 
As the Baroque period moved into the Rococo and Neo-Classical, 
three other elements became fixtures in the Artworld that completed its 
basic structure. These elements were the introduction of art exhibits, 
critics and museums. The pattern of the French Academy, which became 
pervasive throughout Europe, contributed much toward the development of 
exhibits and critics. The French court of Louis XIV used their tight 
control of artists to add splendor to the monarchy; exhibitions of the 
new works of art, first for the court only and later for the general 
public, certainly fulfilled the desire for aggrandizement. The openings 
became social occasions of the first magnitude -- and also became a 
mark of the refined individual. Because of the evolution of schools 
and styles of painting, the general public needed a guide through the 
sometimes bewildering displays. Hence, the critic was born. Follow-
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ing in the Renaissance tradition of the educated layman, most critics 
were just that. The advent of the newspaper and periodical gave these 
critics a voice and a forum for debate, and they soon became powerful 
arbiters of public taste. Another arbiter of public taste was the 
museum. Two conventions of the Artworld followed from the development 
of ~~e museum: the demarkation between the original context of the 
work and its aesthetic properties became important, and the creation of 
the resulting thought that any object might be brought into the Art-
world and examined on an aesthetic level. Both of these concepts are 
important, and both result from the museum context. 
What then are the main characteristics of the Artworld at this 
point? First, we have an art object which may be differentiated from 
the medieval art product by the fact that it is no longer primarily 
utilitarian in nature but is autonomous. It is no longer inevitably 
tied to architecture or book page but occupies its own space. The 
art object has lost much of the utilitarian feature of instruction for 
a more contemplative attitude of viewing it as a beautiful object. 
Moreover, it is an object which requires an unveiling, requires a critic 
and is at home in the museum. It also requires a body of theory, 
theory on creating and on the aims of art, to be understood. Second, 
the artist is no longer considered a craftsman but an artist who draws 
upon theorj and imagination to create the art objec~. His status is 
no longer a maker, an equivalent to the weaver or winernaker, but a 
creator, an equivalent to the poet or man of genius. He no longer is 
confined to the guild and patron, but by vir~ue of reputation~ can also 
produce a work for his own satisfaction ~d present that work to the 
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public at large. He draws not only on the world around him for in-
spiration, but also on the body of work done by his predecessors. 
While at times subject to strict canons of representation, the artist 
still sees himself more and more as an interpreter and feels the need 
to express his own vision. And third, there is an audience which is 
more stratified. Dolce noted that he was less concerned with the 
masses than the man of refined intelligence, and the advent of the 
academy reinforced this trend toward a much more restricted and select 
audience. The more participation that was required to belong to the 
art establishment, the fewer people who were qualified to belong. 
Even the audiences of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were 
given only limited participation in the art establishment, who made 
judgments about the art object, and who exercised power within the art 
establishment. Thus, the basic structure of the Artworld is intact by 
the beginning of the twentie~~ centur] and ~~e only remaining component 
to be examined is aesthetic theory which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AESTHETIC THEORY AND THE ART"flORLD 
Introduction 
In the last two chapters the various elements which combined to 
form the Artworld were examined. The gradual transformation of the 
Artworld from an informal to a formal institution had been accomplished 
by the end of the nineteenth century. The art object had emerged as 
an autonomous entity surrounded by critics, curators, dealers and art 
historians; the artist had emerged as creator, as an interpreter of his 
world and his vision; the audience had become educated and refined 
spectators, led in their taste by critics and curators. However, the 
last remaining transformation, from art object to aesthetic object re-
mains to be discussed. In this chapter, I would like to briefly ex-
amine the beginnings of aesthetic theory in the eighteenth centur] to 
demonstrate how they contributed to the conventions of the Artworld 
and at the same time were a result of the Artworld which they described. 
This excursion into eighteenth century aesthetic theory is intended to 
demonstrate the two-way relationship between aesthetic theory and the 
Artworld. Each aesthetic theory will not be examined in detail, rather 
particular features of several seminal theories will be discussed. 
There will be an equally brief excursion into the modern Artworld to 
demonstrate the other side of ~~e relationship. 
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Origins of Aesthetic Theory 
As we have seen, the theory which surrounded the visual arts un-
til the eighteenth century was primarily a distilled version of Pla-
tonic or Peripatetic thought voiced by practitioners of art or those 
laymen closely associated with the practice of art as connoisseurs or 
critics. In the eighteenth century this condition changed with the 
emergence of the philosopher into the perimeters of the Artworld. This 
is important because it defined the study of art as a distinct area of 
study, a pursuit that separated the arts from other activities in a 
. 1 1 specl.a way. 
The naming and describing of aesthetics as a separate field was 
made in the middle of the eighteenth century, but other developments 
had somewhat prefigured it. TWo British writers of the early eight-
eenth century should be noted here: Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl 
of Shaftesbury and Joseph Addison. Both contributed to the notion of 
"disinterestedness" which was not only important to later aesthetic 
~~eories but indicated the separate nature of the aes~~etic. Very 
basically stated, disinterestedness describes a state of contemplation 
in which self-interest or self-concern is excluded. There is an ab-
sence of practical action directed toward an anticipated goal as well 
as motivation for such action. As a mode of contemplation, the view-
er's attention is directed toward and absorbed in the object of such 
contemplation. That a work of art could find itself the object of such 
attention in the theories of Shaftesbury and Addison was an indication 
of the changed status of artworks; they were no longer thought of as 
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utilitarian objects but rather as autonomous objects. 
The concept of disinterestedness first appears in Lord Shaftes-
bury • s Characteristics o.f Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, a series of 
essays published in 1711. Shaftesbury was much influenced by the Cam-
bridge Platonists and he examined ethical and religious concerns of the 
day from much the same perspective. Shaftesbury was reacting to re-
ligious and ethical systems which depended upon future reward or pun-
ishment for motivation. Neither seeking good for ultimate benefits 
nor avoiding evil for fear of punishment seemed to Shaftesbury to be 
an adequate basis for either ethics or religion; rather, he proposed 
seeking the good for its own sake only, without thought of eventual 
reward or punishment. This contemplative mode he called disinterested-
ness, and his concept of disinterested love may be found in the follow-
ing passage: 
A love which is simple, pure, and unmixed, which has no other ob-
ject than merely the excellency of that being itself, nor admits 
of any other thought of happiness than in its single fruition.~ 
Thus for Shaftesbury, the love of God is unconcerned with anything 
other than "its sL"lgle fruition." In a like manner, the contemplation 
of virtue is of primary importance for the moral life; contemplation of 
virtue is not instrumental and a man who demonstrates disinterestedness 
is one who has no thought of eventual reward or punishment. 
However, it is not just in the area of moral life t~at ShaftesburJ 
uses the concept of disinterestedness. He applies it specifically to 
objects which require the same kind of disinterested attention, that 
is, nature and works of art. The most commonly cited passage which 
da~cnstrates disinterestedness wit~in an aesthetic domain is the 
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following: 
Imagine ••• if being taken with the beauty of the ocean, which 
you see yonder at a distance, it should come into your head to 
seek how to command it, ~~d like some mighty admiral, ride mas-
ter of the sea, would not the fancy be a little absurd? 
Let who will call it ~~eirs • • • you will own the enjoyment 
of this kind to be very different from that which should natural-
ly follow from the contemplation of the ocean's beauty.3 
He continues: 
Suppose that, viewing such a tract of country as this delicious 
vale we see beneath us, you should, for the enjoyment of the 
prospect, require the property or possession of the land. 
The covetous fancy • • • would be as absurd altogether as 
that other ambitious one.4 
In these examples and the two which follow, Shaftesbury suggests a 
contemplation of beauty in which enjoyment of the object is the only 
end of the contemplation. This excludes a desire to possess, control 
or use the objects. While this parallels his beliefs for the moral 
life, the contemplation of beauty is a separate area, in a large part 
because the object of contemplation is different. When disinterested 
attention is focused on the ·~rk of art, the perfection of the per-
ception and contemplation of the work are the only ends. 
Joseph Addison published a series of articles in the Spectator 
entitled "Pleasures of the Imagination" which certainly point toward 
~~e concept of aesthetic responsiveness. To Addison, the imagination 
was contained neither in the realm of sense experisnce nor understand-
ing. While dependent upon an original experience of the sense of 
sight, i.e., "when we have them actually in our view," the imagination 
mediates the original experience: 
We cannot, indeed, have a single image in the fancy that did not 
make its first entrance through the sight; but we have the power 
of retaining, altering, and compounding those images, which we 
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have once received, into all the varieties of picture and vision 
that are most agreeable to the imagination 5 
Addison does not specifically define the imagination, but does convey 
that the imagination is neither purely sensual nor cognitive: 
The pleasures of the imagination, taken in their full extent, are 
not so gross as those of sense, nor so refined as those of the 
understanding. The last are, indeed, more preferable, because 
they are founded on some new knowledge or improvement in the mind 
of man; yet it must be confest, that those of the imagination are 
as great and as transporting as the other.6 
Addison divides the pleasures of the imagination into those which are 
primary, that is, the pleasure derived from objects before us, and 
secondary, the pleasure derived from memory or from objects that recall 
a memory. He then discusses the man of polite imagination: 
A m~• of polite imagination is let into a great many pleasures, 
that the vulgar are not capable of rece~v1ng. He can converse 
with a picture, and find an agreeable companion in a statue. He 
meets with a secret refreshment in a description, and often feels 
a greater satisfaction in the prospect of fields and meadows, 
than another does in ~~is possession. 7 
Al~"lough Addison does not use the term "disinterested," this passage 
indicates the same lack of possessiveness, or of desire of possession, 
as Shaftesbury's description. Addison also examines nature and art as 
pleasing to the imagination. He finds nature more pleasing but notes 
the relationship between the two: 
••• we find the works of nature still more pleasant, the more 
they resemble ~~ose of art • . • Hence it is that we take delight 
in • . • any thing that hath such a variety or regularity as may 
seem the effect of design, in what we call the works of chance. 
If the products of nature rise in value, according as they 
more or less resemble those of art, we may be sure that artifi-
cial works receive a greater advantage from their resemblance of 
such as are natural • . • 8 
He then turns his attention to architecture, statuary, painting, de-
scription and music, all of which are classified as secondarf pleasures 
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because they are associative. 9 In all of these cases, Addison is re-
ferring to a particular kind of experience, one that he might have 
called "aesthetic" had the term been in use. The clearest exposition 
of this experience occurs in his discussion of ~he beautiful, the great 
and the uncommon as e~~ally viable initiators of the experience: 
Our imagination loves to be filled with an object, or to grasp 
at any thing that is too big for its capacity. We are flung into 
a pleasing astonishment at such unbounded views, and feel a de-
lightful stillness and amazement in the soul at the apprehension 
of them.1° 
This then, is the pleasure of the imagination for Addison: a delightful 
stillness and amazement in the soul. He has described a contemplative 
mode and something that is set off from usual experience. He has used 
~~is kind of experience to describe the response to the beauty of 
nature, and also its great and uncommon qualities. Furthermore, he has 
extended this experience to the Fine Arts, although he does not name 
t.'le system as such. 
The recognition of a separate type of perception or perceptual ex-
perience led to the publishing of Meditaticnes philosophicae de non-
nullis ad poema pertinentibus by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten in 1735. 
In contrast to Shaftesbury and Addison, Baumgarten was influenced by 
Descartes, Leibnitz and Wolff and tried to work out a system of aes-
thetics according to Cartesian principles. There is no mention of the 
term "beauty" in Baumgarten's theory; instead, he is interested in the 
examination of perception, its autonomy and perfection. Perception, 
especially in relation to t.~e arts, is the core of Baumgar~en's theory. 
Basic to his dissertation was the way one might differentiate poetry 
from eloquent language and ~~roughout .'>!edi tationes he attempted to de-
scribe ways in which this could be accomplished. Baumgarten notes: 
The philosophers should be busy in general in drawing boundar] 
lines and especially in defining accurate limits between poetry 
and ordinarJ eloquence.ll 
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Bau."tlgarten coined the word "aesthetics" to describe this special study, 
later expa~ded to the arts in genera1, 12 which was based on ~1e belief 
that the arts represented cognition of an inferior kind because this 
cognition was mediated by the senses: 
• • • things known are to be known by the superior faculty as the 
object of logic; things perceived [are to be known by the inferior 
facultyi as the object] of the science of perception, or aes-
thetic. 3 
For Baumgarten, aesthetics is the counterpart of logic for sensate cog-
nition and has as its end the perfection of perception. The rational-
ists had put a premium on clear and distinct ideas, that is, logical 
discourse. Baumgarten based his theorJ of poetry and the arts on sen-
sate cognition, that is, clear and confused ideas. By "confused," 
Baumgarten meant a fusion of sensual images as opposed to the distinct 
ideas of purely cognitive discourse. The clarity he refers to is what 
he describes as "extensive" clarity, that is, a compilation of sen-
suous data as opposed to the "intensive" clarity of logic where es-
sences are the main concern. Thus, for Baumgarten, logic and scientif-
ic discourse are concerned with classification and essences; poetry and 
~,e arts are =oncerned with an intuitive representation of concrete 
sense data. Both are modes of cognition; sensate cognition is an in-
ferior mode, but one that can still be perfected. 
All three of these theories, despite their differences, point 
toward the development of a philosophical inquiry that was new and 
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different. In Shaftesbury, disinterestedness was central to all of 
his writings, but was applied specifically to an aesthetic domain. Yet 
it is difficult to perceive Shaftesbury as a turning point in aesthetic 
theory, perhaps because large portions of his ideas on the aesthetic 
were embedded in discussions of the moral life. However, the impor-
tance of Shaftesbury lies in his introduction of the notion of dis-
interestedness to the arts. Addison is equally important because he 
turns his attention clearly on the nature of the aesthetic experience. 
He discusses both nature and the arts within the context of the aes-
thetic and includes the great and the uncommon along with the concept 
of beauty as integral parts of the aesthetic experience. Both men, 
publishing in the early portion of the eighteenth centur], were pivotal 
figures in aesthetics in that they took important steps toward under-
scoring the nature of the aesthetic as an autonomous activity in life. 
Baumgarten, although his eventual influence upon aesthetic theor] was 
considerably less than Shaftesbury or Addison, should be remembered as 
more than the man who coined the term "aesthetic." Baumgarten thought 
that the aesthetic domain was clearly different from other areas of 
life and tried to apply a rationalist analysis to the aesthetic. In 
doing this he established a systematic approach to the aesthetic. 
Jerome Stolnitz, commenting on the installation of disinterest-
edness as a central point of aesthetic theory, suggests that it also 
led to the distinguishing of Fine Arts from those of utility or enter-
tainment: 
that the work of art must be evaluated in respect of its 
intrinsic structure and significance, not as a moral ''ehicle or 
a source of knowledge ••. That the work is autonomous and unique, 
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and that it therefore defies such extra-aesthetic criteria, is 
an idea which comes into prominence only after the concept of 
"disinterestedness" has established itself. For it is just in its 
relation to disinterested perception that the work is autonomous 
-- because it is attended to for its own sake -- and unique --
because such perception dwells upon and relishes its qualitative 
individuality ••• It is by reference to the aesthetic attitude 
that other thinkers distinguish "fine" art from "the arts of u-
tility" or "entertainment."l4 
This is a complex statement ~~d there are several important 
points to be considered in it. First, that the Artworld, by its evo-
lution from the Renaissance had already prepared ~~is step. As we 
have seen in the previous two chapters, the art product of the Middle 
Ages evolved into the art object of the eighteenth century through its 
gradual divorce from utilitarian purposes -- the art object had been 
divested of most of its utilitarian connections with architecture and 
common usage, its ritualistic connotations and its feature of instruc-
tion -- and had been invested wiL~ its own purpose -- to be viewed as 
a beautiful object. If this had not happened, the next transformation, 
from art object to aesthetic object, could not have happened. And in-
deed, it is this second transformation which Stolnitz has described. 
Disinterestedness describes and names what had become a common feature 
of the Artworld, tha~ is, the contemplation of the art object without 
utilitarian or contextual considerations as primary. The art object 
had attained the status of an autonomous object, one whose purpose for 
being was to be appreciated; the aesthetic experience gave a name for 
the mode of appreciation or contemplation for this special object. 
Aesthetic theory attempted to describe this mode of attention, to dis-
cuss it in systematic terms, and to define the perL~eters of the aes-
thetic. Harold Osborne has noted the autonomy of the work of art: 
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A work of art, it is now held, is in concept an artifact made for 
the purpose of being appreciated in the special mode of aesthetic 
contemplation; and although particular works of art may be in-
tended to do other things and may in fact serve other purposes 
as well as this, the excellence of any work of art as art is 
assessed in terms of its suitability for such contemplation. This 
is what is meant by claiming that art is autonomous: it is not 
assessed by external standards applicable elsewhere, but by stand-
ards of its own.lS 
This statement occurs during a discussion of the autonomy of ~~e work 
of art as a relatively new attitude. Osborne goes on to note that 
while the autonomy of the work of art is an accepted notion now, it 
was first L~plied within the notion of the Fine Arts, which made its 
appearance in the eighteenth century, ~~d from there found its way in-
to aesthetic theory. The concept of disinterestedness was the first 
step toward an aesthetic theory; it was also the first naming of the 
work of art as autonomous by those outside the practice of art. 
Second, although Stolnitz does not emphasize it, the concept of 
evaluation is an important facet of his statement. He notes that the 
classification of works into Fine Art categories or other categories is 
dependent upon an evaluation of the work's uniqueness and qualitative 
individuality. I think this sense of evaluation is important in the 
transformation of the art object to aesthetic object and very much part 
of the structure of the Artworld at the time of this transition. There 
are several interconnected issues here. One is that evaluation became 
part of being an artist, an artist who was known by reputation as an 
individual capable of creative genius. The medieval craftsman had been 
embedded within the guilds and guild system; when individuality had 
been introduced in the Renaissance and extended by the Mannerists and 
academic system, the evaluation of the work of a particular artist be-
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came an integral part of the Artworld. Not only was a work judged on 
the basis of its craftsmanship, but also on the notion of the creative 
genius of its creator. The later development of the connoisseur, the 
critic and the curator reinforced the idea of evaluation as a major fac-
tor of the Artworld. 
Another issue is the consistency of the visual art object from 
the Renaissance to the time in question in Western European culture. 
While painting had experienced several movements -- the Renaissance, 
Mannerist, Baroque, Rococo and Neo-Classical movements -- there had 
been a general agreement within the Artworld as to what constituted a 
painting: (1) a general agreement to theme~ (2} a basic understanding 
of plastic elements, which might include composition, perspective, 
color, light, pigment, line, space, general handling of surface~ and 
(3) the representational method, that is, production of a recognizable 
image of the natural world. For example, in the early part of the 
eighteenth century a great debate raged among painters who were divided 
among the "Poussinistes" and the "Rub~nistes." The one group, who fol-
lowed the writings of Poussin and LeBrun, insisted that form was the 
most important of the plastic elements; those who were "Rub~nistes" 
thought color the most important of these elements. The debate was in-
ternal to painting, that is, was based on a discussion of accepted con-
ventions that were painterly. The discussion assumed canvas, pigment 
and a certain relationship among methods of painting. The style of 
painting of Antoine Watteau, a colorist, might be discernable from 
that of Hyacinthe Rigaud but both would be recogn~zable and regarded 
as paintings. The same kind of understanding or assumptions could also 
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be applied to sculpture, or for that matter, to other arts. Thus, at 
the time when aesthetic inquiry was becoming a separate field, the 
visual arts had developed an evaluative criteria that changed somewhat 
from movement to movement but was basically consistent because there 
was noting within the Artworld to challenge the criteria. It is not 
until the mid-nineteenth century that the Artworld began to experience 
serious challenges to its conventionally held notions. We might say 
then, that when aesthetic inquiry was originated, it was within an Art-
world that had solidified and concrete expectations of artists, their 
products and the presenters of the works of art. 
For brevity's sake, I think we can say that early aestheticians 
were aware of a particular kind of attention that was afforded to nature 
and to certain objects which were considered works of art. Aesthetic 
theory, which even in its inception was multifaceted, grew in different 
directions as it developed. Attention was most often concentrated on 
the aesthetic object or the perception of the object. Rather than pur-
sue in detail the developments within these areas of aesthetic theory, 
I would like to return briefly to the Artworld to delineate changes 
which affected the further development of aesthetic theory. 
The Modern Artworld 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the visual arts began what was to 
be a radical change. This change was most apparent in what I have de-
scribed as the tmderstanding within the Artworld as to what constituted 
a particular medium. I described those factors L~ painting as a gen-
eral agreement to themes, a basic understanding of plastic elements, 
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and a representational method. The challenge to the first came pri-
marily from Gustave Courbet and the movement called Realism. Courbet 
wanted to paint the reality of what he could see, that is, the people 
and situations around him. In this he defied the conventional approach 
~;at had long been in operation which stated that grand themes of 
painting should come from fiction, history or imagination. 16 Courbet 
was criticized for the commonplace character of the subject matter of 
painting, but in his treatment of the everyday he opened the way to 
later painters. Courbet noted: 
In particular, the art of painting can consist only in the repre-
sentation of objects visible and tangible to the painter. An 
epoch can be reproduced only by its own artists. I mean by the 
artists who have lived in it. I hold that the artists of one 
century are fundamentally incompetent to represent the things of 
a past or future century • • • It is in this sense that I deny 
the existence of an historical art applied to the past. Historl-
cal art is by its very nature contemporary.l7 
He continued: 
I hold also that painting is an essentially concrete art, and 
can consist only of the representation of things both real and 
existing.l8 
Courbet ~;ereby placed the everyday and the commonplace directly with-
in the artist's vocabulary. 
Courbet also was criticized for his "sloppy" handling of the 
medium, particularly in using the palette knife at times (see figure 
8). The application of paint to the surface of the canvas in this 
manner, for a finished product, was virtually unknown. This was the 
beginning of the challenge to the second of our factors, the plastic 
elements. This second challenge was begun in earnest by the Impres-
sionists and continued through successive movements until the present 
' 
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Figure 8: The Stone Breakers, Gustave Courbet, 1849 • 
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Figure 9: Detail, Portrait of Mme. Pissarro Sewing Near a Window, 
Camille Pissarro, 1878-79. 
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time. Katharine Kuh has analyzed the modern movements in terms of 
their break-up of the plastic elements and has commented: 
The art of our century has been characterized by shattered sur-
faces, broken color, segmented compositions, dissolving forms 
and shredded images. Curiously insistent is this consistent em-
phasis on break-up ••• And during the last hundred years, every 
aspect of art has been broken up --color, light, pigment, form, 
line, content, space, surface and design.l9 
If we examine the Impressionists, we can see this initial break-
up. Their emphasis on the fleeting moment and the quality of light 
caused experimentation with the palette knife to build up juxtaposed 
areas of color that when viewed from a distance merged together to 
form highly saturated colors (see figure 9) • This also ended the tra-
ditional underpainting and brushwork techniques. 
These initial experiments were carried further with Post-
Impressionism, Expressionism, Cubism, Futurism, Constructivism, Sur-
realism and finally abstract art. During the progression of these 
movements, all of the conventional plastic elements were changed in 
drastic ways. For example, the multiple viewpoints and simultaneous 
presentation of discontinuous planes by the Cubists resulted in a new 
kind of pictorial space (see =igure 10). 
During this same progression, our last factor, the representa-
tional mode, was also denied. The very term "abstract" explicitly de-
nies ~~e representational mode as the only mea~s for expression. While 
the abstract movement might be seen as climaxing with Kasimir Malevich's 
Suprematist Composition: White on White L~ 1918, I think the progres-
sion through each movement -- and their interrelationships -- was not 
in fact complete until the New York School of abstract painting in the 
Figure 10: Guitar and Flowers, 
Juan Gris, 1912. 
Figure 11: Man.' s Head, Pablo 
Picasso, 1907. 
Figure 12: Mask, Itumba region, 
Africa. 
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1950's with works of artists like Jackson Pollack and Willem de 
Kooning. It should also be noted that although I have used the term 
"progression," I have not used this term to describe a linear sequence 
where one movement followed another. Rather, many movements were con-
current with one another and some artists were active in more than one 
movement. 
Simultaneous with the break-up of all of the conventional factors 
which had previously defined painting there was also a recognition of 
new objects, new media and new technology in the Artworld. The new ob-
jects ranged from Japanese prints to African masks and other ritual ob-
jects. I have commented in the last chapter on these items and the 
fact that they were brought into the Artworld, but it should be noted 
here that they helped to broaden the idea of what art could be. These 
objects influenced many modern artists directly (see figures 11 and 
12); they also expanded the plastic elements by bringing to attention 
their expressive and stylized elements. 
The new media included photography and film, and most recently 
video. Each required its own category within the system of the arts 
because each had characteristics similar to but yet very different from 
existing categories. For example, film was like theatre in that it 
shared the basic story-telling characteristic; yet film changed the 
idea of proscenium presentation, time sequence and location. The 
viewer was no longer "rooted" in one position while the action of the 
drama unfolded before him in the theatre. With film, an overview of a 
battlefield, medium shots and close-ups of ~~e men in battle could be 
cut together to move the viewer through the action. Small details 
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could be shown as easily as full-scale scenes. Moreover, film could 
demonstrate the mind of the actor by directly projecting such psycho-
logical effects directly onto the screen, either as special effects or 
flashbacks. In Spellbound (1946), Gregory Peck's character begins to 
unravel his amnesia by association of certain sights with others; this 
associative process is shown to the viewer by short cuts of the original 
sight with those he is currently seeing. There are many other conven-
tions within film that helped to separate it from the theatre, but this 
discussion is not intended as a complete description or analysis of 
film. Rather, it should be noted that the new media were admitted to 
the Artworld and that they helped to enlarge the horizons of the Art-
world. It should also be noted that each of these --photography, 
film and video -- had its roots in what Erwin Panofsky has called folk 
art.20 In other words, they began as documentation (photography) or 
entertainment (film and video) and only later came to be recognized as 
art forms. The genesis of photography as an art form will be discussed 
in detail in chapter 6 as a case study for the theory of the institu-
tional analysis of the Artworld. 
The new technology included materials never before used, from 
plywood and plastics to neon, and methods like vacuum molding. These 
new materials and methods also helped to change the categories in which 
~~e visual arts had been placed. Painting and sculpture had been two 
definite and distinct areas, but with new materials and the explora-
tions they caused, sculpture and painting became much less differenti-
~ d 21 a.e • Sculpture often had painted surfaces that were comparable to 
two-dimensional paintings, and which were quite different from older 
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Figure 13: Still Life, Pablo Picasso, 1914. 
polychrome forms. An early example of this blending of the conven-
tions of the two media was Pablo Picasso's Still Life which featured 
painted wood and curtain fringes (figure 13). Also, paintings were no 
longer always contained within two-dimensional space, but expanded to 
three dimensions, either by the addition of three-dimensional objects 
to the canvas or by expanding ~,e dimensions of the canvas itself. 
Sculpture and painting also lost additional distinctive characteristics 
with their entry into performance pieces and environmental events. · A 
good example of this merger of theatre and sculpture was Jean Tinguely's 
The Machine that Destroyed Itself, a found-object sculpture which self-
destructed on the grounds of the Museum of Modern Art. 
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The addition to the Artworld of new objects, media and tech-
nology in conjunction with the break-up of the traditional plastic ele-
ments increasingly focused attention on what constituted the work of 
art. As we have seen, from the Renaissance to the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, the work of art was clearly identified as a work of art; the 
definition between what was art and what was not art was clear. In a 
sensef until the modern movements, the more clearly the work of art 
was perceived as autonomous, the more clearly the conventions governing 
the work of art were understood by artists and audience. It would 
clarify the changes in the Artworld if we could examine them with the 
aid of a more formal definition of conventions. George Dickie has 
noted the use of conventions within the Artworld as a relational at-
titude betwee~ artist and audience. 22 He describes the conventions as 
primary and secondary. The primary convention is a shared agreement 
between artist and audience that they are engaged in a formal activity; 
secondary conventions include spatial and/or temporal cues which em-
phasize the primary convention. He suggests that primary and second-
ary conventions are specific to each art form and while the secondary 
conventions may change as the Artworld changes, the primary convention 
remains stable. A more detailed discussion of Dickie's use of con-
ventions will be presented in the next chapter, but this will at least 
provide a starting place for the notion of conventions within this con-
text. The idea of a primary convention is tied very closely with the 
viewing of the artwork as autonomous. If we examine Dickie's state-
ment that a primary convention is a shared agreement between parties 
who are engaged in a formal activity, we must ask what that formal 
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activity is. The answer to the question must be the creation and 
viewing of the work of art. This assumes an autonomous work of art, 
one that is created to be viewed for no other purpose than its viewing 
and ultimately its appreciation. Thus, we can say that the primary con-
vention is the creation or viewing of the autonomous work of art. As 
we have seen in the previous two chapters, the work of art became rec-
ognized as an autonomous creation beginning in the Renaissance; until 
some of the modern movements, this autonomy of the artwork was clear 
and unchallenged. The same was true of the primary convention. For 
example, Impressionism or Cubism, although appearing different from 
previous movements in art, did nothing to challenge the proposition 
that artists were creating and audience viewing a painting, a work of 
art. It should be noted that when these works were originally created, 
they were not accepted by all members of the Artworld as great, or 
even good art; however, this was an evaluation of the work, and at no 
time were these objects rejected as not being artworks. On the other 
hand, Marcel Duchamp's "ready-mades" challenged the very notion of an 
artwork as autonomous and the primary convention of sculpture. The 
essential nature of a "ready-made" negated the autonomy of the art ob-
ject because the objects were mass manufactured and "pulled" from 
everyday life by the artist basically as they were. 23 In other words, 
the act of creation -- if any -- was in the naming of the objects as 
artworks, not in the conventional creation of the object. The formal 
activity engaged in between artist and audience was radically chal-
lenged -- Duchamp's The Bicycle Wheel or Fountain, albeit within the 
precincts of Dadaism, challenged the notion that the work of art was 
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created as an original form from the artist's imagination to be viewed 
and appreciated as a work of art. The Bicycle Wheel was not hewn from 
stone nor carved from wood -- it was assembled with "pre-fabricated" 
parts; Fountain was a more blatantly "pre-fabricated" piece. The in-
tention of the artist was one of challenging the primary convention. 
Duchamp used the ready-mades as neutral objects presented to the Art-
world as works of art. Octavio Paz has noted: 
The "ready-mades" are anonymous objects which the gratuit:ous ges-
ture of the artist, by the simple act of choosing them, converts 
into "works of art." At the same time this gesture dissolves the 
notion of work. Contradiction is the essence of the act; it is 
the plastic equivalent of the pun: the latter destroys meaning, the 
former the idea of value. The "ready-mades" are not anti-art, like 
so many of the creations of Expressionism; they are an-artistic. 
• • • It would be stupid to discuss them in terms of their beauty 
or ugliness, as much because they transcend beauty an~ ugliness 
as because they are not works but rather question-marks or signs 
of negation that oppose the idea of works.24 
Duchamp himself adds: 
Dada was an extreme protest against the physical side of painting. 
It was a metaphysical attitude. It was a way to get out of a 
state of mind -- to avoid being influenced by one's immediate en-
vironment, or by the past: to get away from cliches -- to get free • 
• • • Dada was very serviceable as a purgative.25 
The ready-mades were a protest, a challenge and, as Paz has noted, a 
visual pun which signalled a questioning of the values of the Artworld. 
They were a way of negating the conventional attitudes of the Artworld, 
of obtaining distance from the conventions of the Artworld. 
While Duchamp and the Dadaists were challenging the primary con-
vention, other artists were challenging the secondary conventions, al-
beit wi~~ the intention of exploration rather than negation. As we have 
seen, Dickie has described secondary conventions as spatial and/or 
temporal cues which reinforce the primary convention. Dickie does lit-
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tle to broaden this description, especially for the visual arts. If 
we are to view the secondary conventions as Dickie has suggested, as a 
relational attitude between artist and audience, not only the work hut 
the relations between artist and audience must be included. I think 
the secondary conventions can he made more explicit by referring to 
the historical precedents cited earlier. For example, the general 
agreement to theme, the handling of plastic elements and the use of a 
representational image might very well he considered secondary con-
ventions for painting during the seventeenth through mid-nineteenth 
centuries. Along with these elements, the framing and hanging of 
paintings in special galleries and museums, the internal discussion of 
painting and the subsequent theories of painting, the analysis and 
criticism of painting by critics, juries and curators, and the viewing 
of the paintings by an audience in special places, i.e., museums, gal-
leries or the artist's studio, might also be considered secondary con-
ventions. Therefore, I think we can say that the secondary conventions 
for the visual arts include the way of handling the plastic elements 
and the theory surrounding the creation, presentation and viewing of 
the artwork. 
As Dickie has noted, these conventions are subject to change in 
a way the primary convention is not. The secondary conventions which 
have been noted changed with the onslaught of the modern movements in 
~~e mid-nineteenth century. As we have seen, the most immediately 
noticeable changes were in the handling of the plastic elements. But 
the theories surrounding painting were also dramatically changed 
for artists, presenters and audience. As each movement formed, dis-
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cussion centered on the concerns of each movement and the discussion 
expanded the notions of what the painting could be. The Impression-
ists' concern for the momentary image of nature, the Cubists' use of 
simultaneous surface images, or the Post-Impressionists' emphasis on 
the expression of emotion all broadened the notion of what painting 
could look like, as well as what the audience response could and should 
be. The viewers of the modern movements were asked for an educated 
awareness of the rather fluid conventions the artists were forming as 
few other audiences before had been. In relation to the change which 
had occurred in the Artworld previously, the changes which the modern 
movements caused were extremely rapid and forced the viewer constantly 
to expand his understanding of the secondary conventions. This ap-
plied to aestheticians as well as other members of tae Artworld. For 
example, the older aesthetic theories of beauty and mimesis were ill-
equipped to deal with art that did not reflect the traditional second-
ary conventions. As a result, new aesthetic theories, or modifications 
of older theories, were formulated in response to the challenges of 
the new art. One such theory was that of Clive Bell first published in 
1913. It was intended as a positive response to the criticism of 
Post-Impressionist painters. Bell argued that the essential quality- in 
all works of art was that which provoked a personal response from the 
viewer, an aesthetic emotion. He called this quality "Significant 
Form" and defined it as "lines and colours combined in a particular 
way, certain forms and relations of forms, [which] stir our aesthetic 
emotions."26 He rejected the older notion that the essential quality 
was beauty because the response to beauty is not confined to the work 
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of art and the object of aesthetic emotion must be a more confined 
idea applicable only to the work of art. In this way, the older idea 
of beauty was transformed to Significant Form, a term which was more in 
keeping with the non-representational images of the Post-Impressionist 
painters. Also, Bell's emphasis on the aesthetic ~otion, a subjective 
response, reflected the shift from a search for absolute objective 
criteria for the work of art to a more relativistic and personal re-
sponse on part of the viewer. This shift was indicative of the chang-
ing and expanding condition of the secondary conventions. To be rele-
vant to the state of the Artworld, aesthetic theory had to make ad-
justments to reflect the change from stable and consistent secondary 
conventions to those which were expanding with each new movement of 
the moderns. 
It should be noted that the rapidity of change and the expand-
ing notions about the work of art increased the gap between the "aver-
age man on the street" and the members of the Artworld. Very often 
"Everyman" did not come into contact with the new art and when he did, 
his lack of understanding of the secondary conventions precluded ap-
preciation of the artwork. The Artworld had become too complicated 
and too riddled with competing ~~eories to be viewed without an educa-
tion in the preceding and current theories. 
The change and expansion of secondary conventions continued 
and, with the addition of new objects, media and technology, resulted 
in a proliferation of new movements in the 1960's and 1970's which 
challenged virtually every convention of art that had previously 
existed. Op, Pop, Minimal, Photographic Realism, Conceptual and Anti-
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art movements, to name a few, have all found favor within the Artworld 
in the last twenty years. Pieces like Jasper John's Painted Bronze 
(figure 14}, Robert Smithson's Spiral Jetty (figure 15), a number of 
empty flower pots, piles of dirt or other objects or even telephone 
calls that circled the earth have all found their way into museums, 
galleries, art books and journals. The state of the Artworld at this 
point has led one critic and artist, Helen Parmelin, to state: 
Something extraordinary is happening in the world of art. The 
situation, which was already strange, is now approaching a bi-
zarre climax. It is a situation where anything goes and all is 
forbidden ••• a situation in which art has every right1 is 
losing its every means, and is discovering other means. 20 
Some of these movements seem to be challenging the secondary conven-
tions, some the primary. For example, Photographic Realism seems to 
be attempting to blur the distinctions between the secondary conven-
tions of painting and photography; earthworks and wrappings seem to 
challenge the museum setting. On the other hand, Anti-art and Con-
ceptual movements seem to resume where Dada had stopped, that is, with 
a challenge of the primary convention. While Anti-art mounts the 
challenge in a very similar manner to Dada, Conceptual "art" attacks 
the central idea of the art object, i.e., replaces the art object with 
a concept. The artifacts which are presented in museum or gallery are 
usually documentation of the concept or resulting act, although oc-
casionally the act itself is presented in a museum setting. 
It is at this point that traditional aesthetic theories found 
themselves unable to deal with the Artworld they were supposed to be 
addressing. A new discussion 'NaS begun which tried to define art in 
a way which could take into account these occurrences within the Art-
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Figure 14: Painted Bronze, Jasper Johns, 1960. 
Figure 15: Spiral Jetty, Robert Smithson, 1970. 
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world. One of the most interesting theories to emerge from this dis-
cussion is the institutional theory of art which will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
Summary 
The final transformation of art object to aesthetic object was 
made in the eighteenth century with the appearance of aesthetic theory 
as a separate field of philosophic inquiry. Lord Shaftesbury provided 
the first step by applying the principle of disinterested contemplation 
not only to the moral life but also to nature and art. Joseph Addison 
took another step with the attention that he focused on the nature of 
the aesthetic experience. In his discussion of the "man of polite 
imagination," he describes what is very much the same quality that 
Shaftesbury had called disinterestedness. In both cases, aesthetic 
disinterestedness pointed to the aesthetic as an autonomous activity 
in life. The confirmation of this autonomy could be seen with Alexander 
Gottlieb Baumgarten when he instituted the study of the aesthetic as 
a particular branch of philosophic inquiry, named it as such and began 
the systematic study of it. With the initiation of a particular branch 
of study of the aesthetic and the installation of disinterestedness as 
a central concept in the aesthetic, the autonomy of the art object was 
fully realized. In this way, aesthetic theory joined the other cur-
rents within ~~e Artworld which had formed a new chapter in the history 
of art in the West. The territory occupied by the Artworld was a dis-
~inct area defined by the autonomy of the aesthetic object, an object 
created only to be viewed and appreciated. 
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Conditions within the Artworld did not remain stable for long. 
BY the mid-nineteenth century, the series of modern movements had be-
gun and with them, a series of challenges to the conventions of the 
Artworld. I have described the primary convention as a shared agreement 
between artists, presenters and audience that they are engaged in a 
formal activity which involves the autonomous work of art. The sec-
ondary conventions for the visual arts included the way of handling 
the plastic elements and the theory surrounding the creation, presenta-
tion and viewing of the artwork. It was these secondary conventions 
to which most of the modern movements addressed their challenges. The 
first challenge came from the Realists, particularly Courbet, who 
challenged the convention of theme. In a like manner, the modern 
movements, beginning with the Impressionists and continuing through the 
Abstract Expressionists, challenged the way of handling the plastic 
elements. The representational image was no longer considered the only 
method of painting. The theory which surrounded each of the modern 
movements provoked discussion of the secondary conventions and these 
conventions were broadened to include the new artworks. Along with 
the acceptance of the new movements and the subsequent expansion of the 
secondary conventions, new objects, new media and new tec~~ology fur-
ther expanded the secondary conventions. As a result, the conventional 
distinctions between media were blurred: painting could encompass three-
dimensional shapes or photography could be sculptural. Thus, while not 
changing the primary convention -- the work of art remained autonomous 
-- the secondary conventions changed as artists explored new paths of 
creation. 
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However, there were challenges to the primary convention in the 
form of Dada, Anti-art and Conceptual movements, the latter two oc-
curring within the last fifteen years. These attacked the primary con-
vention in two ways: by denying the autonomy of the artwork and by 
denying the artifactuality of the artwork. Both Dada and Anti-art 
removed the object which was created and original and replaced it with 
common, everyday objects that were usually mass produced. The con-
ceptual movement removed the artifact and replaces it with a concept 
or an act which represents the concept. In both cases, the primary 
convention has been challenged. The evaluation of the work of art 
seems to be as much in a state of flux today as other convention with-
in the Artworld. Traditional theories of the aesthetic seem inadequate 
to deal with the barrage of contemporary movements and their challenges 
to the conventions of the Artworld. However, one must remember that 
these challenges appear within the context of the Artworld -- they ap-
pear in museums and galleries, on the pages of art books and critical 
reviews. It would seem that a theory could be constructed which took 
into account the current state of the Artworld as well as past con-
ditions in its formation. The institutional analysis of George Dickie 
seems to provide a starting place for a discussion which can encompass 
the medieval illuminated page, the masters of the Renaissance and 
wrapped buildings. Dickie's theor1 will be examined in the next 
chapter, as will certain modifications which will render it a more 
complete analytical tool. What should be noted at this point is that 
the Artword is a formal institution with conventions governing its 
participants. These conventions, both primary and secondary, have 
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grown with the formation of the Artworld since its genesis in the 
Renaissance. They include an agreement between participants that they 
are engaged in a formal activity involving an autonomous work of art 
as well as secondary conventions which govern the creation and viewing 
of the artwork. 
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CHAPTER V 
A THEORY OF THE ARTWORLD 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, the origin of modern aesthetic theory in 
the eighteenth century was examined. Aesthetic theory became a sepa-
rate field of philosophic inquiry and with the concept of "disinterest-
edness" as a keystone in the theory, the autonomous nature of the work 
of art was underscored. The advent of the modern movements in the 
mid-nineteenth century caused the modification of older aesthetic 
theories and the formation of new ones in an attempt to better analyze 
occurrences in the Artworld. In this chapter, I would like to examine 
one of the most recent theories, that of the institutional analysis 
of George Dickie. The theory has caused considerable comment within 
philosophic circles, most of it critical. However, by making certain 
modifications based on the concept of the Artworld which has been pre-
sented in the previous three chapters and on John Raw~' notion of an 
institution, a more complete institutional theory may be achieved. 
Using these modifications, the perimeters of the Artworld then will be 
examined in an effort to distinguish art and non-art objects. 
An Institutional Analysis 
While there have been several institutional theories proposed 
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in recent years, one of the most complete is that of George Dickie. 
Central to this analysis is the attempt to define art, and to fit 
this definition within a cultural, social and historical context. He 
rejects the traditional attempts to define art and the contention that 
art cannot be defined and instead argues that art can be defined by 
relational and non-exhibited properties. As Dickie sees them, the 
defining characteristics are artifactuality and conferred status. A 
work of art is placed within the realm of the Artworld when it has con-
ferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some member 
or group of members of the Artworld. But before examining these ideas, 
it would be best to begin with a few distinctions that Dickie makes. 
Dickie begins with the well known proposal that art cannot be 
defined by Morris Weitz. 1 Weitz maintains that art cannot be defined 
because the necessary and sufficient properties for such a definition 
are lacking. If such properties existed, then art would be a closed 
concept, but by its very nature it is open. The properties which are 
often taken for defining are in reality noting but "strands of similar-
ities. Weitz notes: 
But the basic resemblance between these concepts is their open 
texture. In elucidating them, certain {paradigm) cases can be 
given. I can list some cases and some conditions under which ! 
can apply correctly the concept of art but I cannot list all of 
them, for t~e all-important reason that unforseeable or novel 
conditions are always forthcoming or envisageable.2 
Thus, to Weitz the concept of art and its subconcepts remain open. 
Dickie refutes this argument in the following manner: 
All or some of the subconcepts of art may be open and the generic 
conception of art still be closed. That is, it is possible that 
all or some of the subconcepts of art, such as novel, tragedy, 
sculpture, and painting, may lack necessary and sufficient con-
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ditions and at the same time that "work of art," which is the 
genus of all the subconcepts, can be defined in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. Tragedies may not have any character-
istics in co~mon which would distinguish them from, say, comedies 
within the domain of art, but it may be that there are common 
characteristics that works of art have which distinguish them 
from nonart, nothing prevents a "closed genus/open species re-
lationship.3 
The second of Weitz's arguments, that of classification, breaks 
down the concept of "X is a work of art" into descriptive and evalua-
tive utterances. For the descriptive sense, Weitz sees no necessary or 
sufficient conditions but rather the "bundle of properties" which 
normally are present when we describe a work of art but which need not 
be. Weitz notes: 
None of the criteria of recognition is a defining one, either 
necessary of sufficient, because we can sometimes assert of some-
thing that it is a work of art and go on to deny any one of these 
conditions, even the one which has traditionally been taken to be 
basic, namely, that of being an artifact: consider, "This piece 
of driftwood is a lovely piece of sculpture." Thus, to say of 
anything that it is a work of art is to commit oneself to the 
presence of some of these conditions. • • But • • • no one of 
these or any collection of them is either necessary or suffi-
cient.4 
Weitz also points out that the evaluative sense is used in two ways: 
one in which the criteria of evaluation becomes synonymous with art or 
one whe~e the criteria are used to justify a particular definition of 
art: 
. • • what cannot be maintained is ~~at theories of the evalu-
ative use of "art" are true and real definitions of the necessary 
and sufficient properties of art. Instead they are honorific 
definitions, pure and simple, in which "Art" has been redefined 
in terms of chosen criteria.S 
Dickie criticizes Weitz's position in several ways. First, he 
makes note of Maurice Mandelbaum•s6 contention that the essential 
nature of art may be found in non-exhibited relational characteristics, 
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that is, those characteristics which are not directly perceivable or 
are perceivable only in combination with others. Mandlebaum makes the 
following distinction: 
Like the biological connections among those who are connected by 
family resemblances • • • such a characteristic might be a re-
lational attribute, rather than some characteristic at which one 
could directly point and say: "It is this particular feature of 
the object which leads me to designate it as a work of art." A 
relational attribute of the required sort might, for example, only 
be apprehended if one were to consider specific art objects as 
havin? been created by someone for some actual or possible audi-
ence. 
In other words, Mandlebaum sees the relationship between object, art-
ist and audience to be more important than specific qualities of the 
pictorial surface. The former, relational characteristics, are basical-
ly what Dickie considers non-exhibited properties while the latter, 
specific qualities of pictorial surface would be an example of ex-
hibited properties. 
Second, Dickie introduces Richard Sclafani's8 notion of a third 
sense of "·..rork of art," that of the contingency of a non-artifact upon 
a paradigm work of art which is always an artifact. For example, a 
piece of driftwood, ·l'lhich is a non-artifact, may have properties in 
common with Brancusi's Bird in Space which is an artifact. It is the 
continuation of these properties in the eyes of t~e viewer which ex-
tends the term "work of art" from Brancusi's sculpture to the piece of 
driftwood. Sclafani notes that there is a primary or paradigmatic 
sense which is derivative. It should be noted here that the derivative 
sense is normally employed from non-artifact to artifact, but it can 
also be used from artifact to artifact. Dickie ~~en proceeds to as-
sert that there are three senses of the concept "work of art": (2.) 
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the classificatory or descriptive which is primary; (2) the secondary 
or derivative; and (3) the evaluative. The first sense, the classifi-
eatery, is to Dickie a purely descriptive one used to identify a work 
of art. Dickie notes: 
We rarely utter sentences in which we use the classificatory 
sense, because it is such a basic notion: we generally know im-
mediately whether an object is a work of art, so that generally 
no one needs to say, by way of classification, "That is a work of 
art" ••• 9 
The evaluative sense, on the other hand, carries quality meanings, or 
a belief that the referent has valuable qualities. Thus, the phrase 
"That is a work of art" can have three meanings or senses of interpre-
tation, depending upon the context of the utterance. In the case of 
any of these three uses, Dickie believes that artifactuality is a 
necessary condition of the work of art. 
Dickie then proceeds to the second defining characteristic of 
a work of art, that of conferred status. To do this, he enters Arthur 
Dante's "artworld." During a discussion of two "identical" appearing 
paintings and their possible interpretations and derivations, Danto 
turns to knowledge of theories of art and history of art as essential 
to the understanding of contemporary art. He states: 
To see something as art requires something the eye cannot decry 
an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history 
of art: an artworld.lO 
Dickie interprets this statement as agreement with Mandelbaum's idea 
of non-exhibited relational properties. Dickie believes that Danto 
is pointing to ~~e institutional nature of art; that art is not only 
the doing but the knowledge of what has been done and why within a 
loosely structured coalition of artists, presenters and audience. 
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Dickie uses the term "artworld" "to refer to the broad social institu-
tion in which works of art have their place."11 He further delineates 
his use of "institution" by equating it with an established practice. 
This established practice exists within the systems (theatre, painting, 
sculpture} and subsystems (theatre of the absurd, collage, junk sculp-
ture) of the artworld and is not only the doing of the artists in-
volved, but the conferring of status upon the products of their work 
by the people who populate the artworld of a particular time and place. 
This brings us to Dickie's definition of a work of art: 
A work of art in the classificatory sense is {1) an artifact (2) 
a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status 
of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on 
behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld) .12 
Dickie draws an analogy between some legal actions of the state and 
the conferring of status in the artworld. For example, a grand jury 
indicting someone, the chairma~ of the election board certifying that 
someone is qualified to run for office, a minister pronouncing a couple 
~an and wife, or congress conferring the status of national monument 
upon a thing or an area. He also gives examples of a non-legal con-
ferring of status: a degree bestowed by a university, the election of 
someone as Rotary president, or the title of village idiot upon some-
one. He goes on to say: 
The counterparts in the artworld to specified procedures and lines 
of authority are nowhere codified, and the artworld carries on 
its business at the level of customary practice. Still there is 
a practice and this defines a social institution. A social in-
stitution need not have a formally established constitution, of-
ficers, and bylaws in order to exist and have the capacity to 
confer status -- some social institutions are formal and some are 
informal.l3 
He defines the members of the artworld as practitioners, producers, 
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museum directors, rnuseum-goers, theatre-goers, reporters for news-
papers, critics, art historians, art theorists, philosophers of art 
and others. "In addition, every person who sees himself as a member of 
the artworld is thereby a member."14 And it is through membership in 
the artworld that status may be conferred. A sure sign of this would 
be a performance in a theatre or a show in a museum or a gallery. 
However, one person acting alone and privately may confer this status: 
The status in question may be acquired by a single person's act-
ing on behalf of the artworld and treating an artifact as a can-
didate for appreciation. Of course, nothing prevents a group of 
persons from ccnferring the status, but it is usually conferred 
by a single person, the artist who creates the artifact.lS 
This conferring of status is in no way connected with the 
evaluation of the work. The work becomes a candidate for appreciation; 
it is not necessary that the work actually be appreciated. By "ap-
preciation" Dickie means "in experiencing the qualities of a thing one 
finds them worthy or valuable."16 He finds no difference between ap-
preciating art and nonart except that the object of appreciation dif-
fers. However, he does believe that the work in question must have at 
least the potential for being appreciated. 
Dickie also introduces two other conditions to the artworld: 
human intentionality and originality. The first he uses to eliminate 
things like chimpanzee paintings and accidents. If paintings done by 
chimpanzees were exhibited at a scientific museum, they would not be-
long to the artworld; however, if they were exhibited in an art museum, 
they would belong to the artworld because they were sponsored, with 
h~~an intentionality by ~~e director of ~he museum. It should be noted 
here that Dickie is not using human intentionality in the interpretive 
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sense, that is, the author's intention as a necessary part of the mean-
ing of the piece, but rather as a human function. So, in other words, 
if a museum curator found the paintings of a chimpanzee interesting 
enough to be hung in the museum, then those paintings would enter the 
artworld via the credit of the curator. 
The second condition, ~~at of originality, would remove fakes or 
copies from the artworld. Originality covers the concept of a deliber-
ate fake for Dickie, but following the lead of Danto, he believes 
that work which is derivative or imitative is different from the de-
liberate attempt to duplicate a particular work of art. Dickie draws 
an analogy between the function of originality within the artworld and 
the concept of patent law. He states: 
Once an invention has been patented, one exactly like it cannot 
be patented -- the patent for just that invention has been "used 
up." In the case of patenting, of course, whether the second 
device is a copy or independently derived is unimportant but the 
copying aspect is crucial in the artistic case. 17 
Dickie believes that originality is an "antecedent requirement" for 
painting but is hesitant to extend this condition in a blanket fashion 
over the rest of the arts. 
In the discussion of aesthetic objects, Dickie again rejects 
various aesthetic attitude theories which are based in the belief that 
~~e aesthetic attitude is a special psychological state. Instead, he 
believes a relational "attitude" exists between artist and audience in 
that they are both aware of the conventions of the art practice and 
are governed by these conventions which he describes as primary and 
secondary conventions. He suggests that the primary convention is a 
shared agreement between artist and audience that they are involved in 
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in a formal activity. 18 Secondary conventions would include spatial 
and temporal cues which emphasize the primary convention. While the 
primary convention changes very little, the secondary conventions are 
subject to change as the artworld changes. Dickie does little to ex-
plain or define these conventions except to offer an example of a 
traditional theatre production. The primary convention is the realiza-
tion of the audience and actors that they are present at a theatre 
presentation --perhaps as opposed to a riot or a supermarket opening. 
The secondary conventions might include a specific stage area, seats 
arranged to view the stage, house lights dimming, the curtain being 
raised, a program, an arrangement of acts or scenes in a serial order, 
and even a backstage area which is concealed from the audience. These 
secondary conventions might vary from theatre to theatre, or with the 
kind of play presented; certainly the conventions of the ancient 
Greek theatre are different from the theatre of the absurd or from No 
drama of Japan. Dickie also states that these conventions are learned 
in an unself-conscious way, much like people learn their native lan-
guage. Thus, Dickie feels that discrimination between aesthetic ob-
jects and other things are obtained through knowledge of these con-
ventions: 
In general, the ability to make the locations and distinctions in 
a given case depends upon an understanding of the type of art 
which the given case is an instance. This means that the dis-
tinguishing of aesthetic objects is a piecemeal affair, since it 
depends upon experience and understanding of specific art forms. 
Each art form has a primar] convention or practice for presenting 
works of that type, together with a variety of secondary con-
ventions of greater and lesser importance.l9 
Thus, the conventions are used to "locate and specify" the aesthetic 
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features of a work of art. He further states: 
• if one must know of the aspect in order to understand what 
is presented through a primary convention, then that aspect of 
the work is also an aspect of the aesthetic object of the work. 20 
One might say that the artist is bound by the primary convention, that 
is, to create a work of art, and the audience shares in this aspect of 
the aesthetic when it seeks to locate and specify the aesthetic fea-
tures in the work. Dickie makes the distinction between the work of 
art and its aesthetic features in the following manner: 
Quite naturally, when the concern is with what makes something a 
work of art • • • the emphasis will be on the aspects of the art-
world that make creation possible -- on acting on behalf of an 
institution, on conferring of status, on being a candidate, and 
on appreciation. When, on the other hand, the concern is with 
the aesthetic and nonaesthetic features of works of art • • • the 
emphasis will be on those features of the artworld that govern and 
direct the spectator's attention. The connectedness of the two 
aspects of the artworld is obvious: the aesthetic object is the 
aspect of the work for the sake of which the art is created.21 
Let us examine a few examples that Dickie gives to concretize 
his views. First of all, a piece of driftwood could be considered a 
work of art in the derivative sense if it shared properties with a 
paradigm work of art. It would also seem that this piece of driftwood 
would have to be elevated to the status of candidate by a ma~er of the 
artworld. Second, a work like Duchamp's Fountain would seem to be a 
work of art in the classificatory sense because an artist has conferred 
the status of candidate for appreciation and a museum director has 
seconded ~~e nomination. However, the question of the potential for 
appreciation might be raised in that the gesture of Duchamp could be 
appreciated but the object itself could not. Dickie replies that only 
a minimal potential value is needed and that Fountain shares many 
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qualities with the work of Brancusi and Moore like gleaming white sur-
face, pleasing oval shape, etc. Finally, there is the case of forger-
ies and copies. Dickie insists these are not legitimate works of art 
because, like a patent, once the original piece is enfranchised, the 
franchise has been used up. As has been noted, Dickie is hesitant to 
extend his comments on originality beyond painting, but even in the 
area of painting he does not really distinguish between a forgery and 
a copy. He furthermore ignores related areas, those of printmaking and 
photography, where the distinctions could be demonstrated more readily. 
Dickie's theory is interesting in many ways, but one of the most 
important features is the flexibility it gives to the artworld. Ob-
jects which were not originally created as part of the artworld can be 
brought into the artworld. And change within the artworld is acom-
modated by the acknowledgment of the change in membership through suc-
csssive centuries, periods, artists and audience. Change, to Dickie, 
is a key concept, and perhaps the raison d'~tre for the institutional 
analysis. However, in his concern to formulate a theory which not only 
accommodates the artworks of today but also those of past and future, 
Dickie has left the theory ver] open-ended. If drawn to its logical 
cor.clusion, any person can elevate any object to the status of a candi-
date for appreciation. This is one of the main criticisms that Dickie's 
many commentators have made. Other criticisms point toward problems 
with the classificatory nature of the theory and the sense of ambiguity 
in conferral of status, in the object of conferral and in membership in 
the artworld. Let us examine some of these criticisms leveled at the 
instit~tional theory. 
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The first criticism has been voiced by Ted Cohen22 and al-
though Dickie has considered some of the objections previously, it 
would be well to examine Cohen's position. Cohen asks for clarifica-
tion of two points: "in what circumstances and by whom can this proper-
ty be bestowed, and what qualifies a thing to receive this bestowal."23 
Cohen questions the example of the Fountain that Dickie has cited --
who precisely confers status upon the object, the artist or the museum 
director? Would the end result have been the same if a plumbing 
salesman had entered the piece in the show? What if Duchamp had been 
rejected from the show but displayed the object in his studio? And 
what if a well known artist came to your house and drew on the wall to 
cover some cracks in the wall? How would this be different from a 
workman doing the same act? Cohen suggests that at least part of the 
answer to these questions lie in the enfranchisement of the artist: 
••. one of the ways the "art•11orld" breeds Art is by way of en-
franchising Artmakers. Anyone who did "Nude Descending a Stair-
case" and the rest would be an Artmaker (however good), but only 
an Ar~~er could make that urinal Art (if it is art). It is 
because he did "Nude" that Duchamp is an artist; it is because he 
is Duchamp that "Fountain" is not just a misplaced urina1. 24 
He does not pursue this line but turns again to question the construe-
tion of Dickie's analogy between legal enfranchisement and the art-
world's. He points out that an aldermanic candidate is not just 
"made," even by the mayor or the head of an election board. Rather, 
there are constraints placed upon the candidate (minimum age, resi-
dence requirements, etc.). And, if the analogy is extended, then there 
must be constraints placed upon the art object also, or upon the art-
makers. Furthermore, Cohen states that "there must be a boundary, how-
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ever hard to chart, between making art, and trying but failing to 
make art."25 Cohen returns to Duchamp's Fountain, stating that per-
haps we should neither judge it art nor non-art: 
• • • I think we must give up the compulsion to decide about 
"Fountain," to rule it in or out; and I think we can do this by 
taking seriously the suggestion that whether "Fountain" is art 
depends upon whether and how a certain kind of act was performed • 
• • • What we need to discuss are the ways in which "Fountain" is 
very much like normal art and the ways in which it is altogether 
unlike normal art, and then how this bears on the character of 
Duchamp's act of putting it forward and having it called art.26 
Dickie answers Cohen on several of these objections. First, he 
states that Fountain must be classified as an artwork because it shares 
with other artworks the distinction of being in art history books and 
being displayed in galleries. And he adds that "In the case of more 
ordinary art it is less easy to notice the status of the works as art 
because we are so used to experiencing such works and because their 
non-status features seize our attention."27 
Second, Dickie denies that every feature of political analogy 
could be transferred to the artworld. "Specifically, I did not intend 
to suggest ~~at the ability to confer ~~e status of candidate for ap-
preciation is acquired in a formal, procedural way • ,.28 Dickie 
also feels that his example of the plumbing salesman reinforces the 
non-formal qualities of the artworld. He believes that "the plumbing 
supplier could have conferred the relevant status if he were able to 
see himself in relation to and as an agent of the artworld and wanted 
to create a work of art."29 And, in reference to Cohen's question to 
the status of Fountain if it had been refused by the museum, Dickie 
says: 
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in speaking of an institutional setting, I was not talking 
about a thing's being in a museum or some sL~ilar physical in-
stitutional location; rather, I was referring to a social way 
of thL~king about and regarding things -- a social practice.30 
And third, Dickie restates his belief that any object can be 
placed as a candidate for appreciation. 
• • • the very things which Cohen cites as paradigms of things 
which cannot be appreciated -- ordinary thumbtacks, cheap white 
envelopes, and plastic forks -- have appreciatable [sic] qualities 
which can be noted if one focuses attention on them. Photographs 
frequently bring out these qualities of quite ordinary things by 
focusing narrowly on them.3I 
He adds that if there are constraints and whatever they might be, they 
are not very limiting ~~d almost anything can be a work of art. 
Richard Sclafani has also raised questions concerning the analo-
gy that Dickie used. First, he asks who can and who cannot confer 
status on behalf of the artworld. What he is asking for is a deline-
ation of who is a bonafide member of the artworld. Sclafani thinks a 
minimal condition of membership in the artworld is a concept of what 
a work of art is. If Dickie's analogy is to work, whether it refers 
to a political, an ecclesiastical, or an academic world, knowledge of 
that world is necessary. In other words, to be a member of that world 
L~plies a knowledge of "a vast network of beliefs, attitudes, conven-
tions, social practices, and historical happenings" 32 of that world. 
Sclafani rules out ~~e plumbing salesman because he would not have the 
knowledge of the artworld sufficient to make this gesture: 
The significance of Duchamp's act cannot be divorced from his 
ingenious conception of what the artworld of ~~e World War I era 
was and was not ready for. This required an intimate familiarity 
on Duchamp's part wi~~ both the recent and not so recent history 
of European art. It also required the recognition and develop-
ment of t~e notion that artistic creativity need not involve man-
ual craftsmanship.33 
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Second, he questions Dickie's contention that any object can 
have art status conferred upon it. Sclafani suggests that at least 
some justification be given for the object's status since so much is 
left unsaid about who can bestow status. Third, he asks for clarifica-
tion of the act of conferring status: is it simply the act of produc-
tion or is there another act which actually confers the status? 
Fourth, he asks if Dickie's definition does actually reflect linguis-
tic practice. And he suggests that Dickie is "committ.ed far more 
strongly to a theoretical stance on the nature of art than he would 
like to admit." 34 
Bruce N. Morton suggests that one odd feature of Dickie's theory 
is that it makes creating a work of art independent from an institution 
virtually impossible. For instance, i= a painter painted a picture in • 
his studio, kept it there for several days without shewing it to any-
one, and then destroyed it, Morton believes it would still be a work of 
art according to Dickie's sense; however, if the same procedure was 
done by a person outside the artworld, someone impelled to do this one 
painting even though he had no knowledge of art, Morton feels that 
Dickie would have difficulty fitting this example into his definition 
without stretching it to include everyone living in the society: 
To admit that almost any member of society has sufficient status 
within an artworld to be able by his own activity to confer the 
status "work of art" is to abandon any serious reliance on the 
notion of an institution within the institutional analysis. So 
we require some criterion (even if a very lenient one) to pick out 
those individuals able to confer status from within an institu-
tion, from those unable to do so because they are outside the in-
stitution.35 
He goes on to point out that to say membership is contingent upon 
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creation of a work of art develops a circular notion in which works of 
art exist for the artworld rather than the artworld existing for --
or because of -- works of art. He also denies the existence of the use 
of the classificatory sense in common practice. 
Joseph Margolis feels that Dickie's position can offer much in 
the way of analysis of the world of art, but as a definition it lacks 
credibility. Dickie has described artifactuality as a simple matter, 
but Margolis disagrees. In the example of the driftwood, Dickie has 
stated that artifactuality c~~ be conferred upon the object. Margolis 
asks if this is concurrent with conferral of the status of candidate, 
and if they are, then what distinguishes the two? He also believes 
~~at Dickie has not delineated the conventions within which an aes-
thetic object is presented and what is aes~~etically relevant to ap-
preciation. 
A fuller criticism is offered by Anita Silvers, who quotes from 
Samuel Butler's "Erehwon" and suggests that the artworld occupies in 
reality a similar place as Erehwon -- nowhere. She begins her argument 
with a brief look at the artworld as sketched by both Danto and Dickie, 
and some differences between these pic~ures. Silvers believes that 
Dante's artworld is people by theories about art: "In Dante's Art-
world, agents seem to play a secondary role; they exist to formulate 
relationships holding among art objects and to devise art theories 
which express these relationships." 36 She sees Dante's agents dealing 
with art objects in a more constrained manner because they must deal 
with the objects from a theoretical perspective. On the other hand, 
she feels that Dickie's artworld is peopled with agents who are vir-
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tually unrestrained by art objects; indeed, it seems that "the Art-
world is completely logically prior to art objects ... 37 Silvers draws 
an analogy between the conferring of status and between naming a child. 
A parent has an institutional position and can name a child anything 
the parent wants, regardless of the consequences to the child, other 
relatives, or the parents themselves. Naming a boy "Sue" may lower 
the credibility of the parents in society in general, but the name re-
mains valid. However well this reflects Dickie's position, Silvers be-
lieves that naming a child is an act of individuation -- naming a 
specific -- where naming art should be a classification rather than an 
act of individuation: 
Presumably, classification involves sorting things together and 
distinguishing them from other sorts of things in terms of their 
membership in a group rather than in terms of their individuality. 
Sorting things into a class or group would be useless if every-
thing equally warranted membership in the class.38 
She continues that there is nothing in Dickie's artworld that 
would stop a member from conferring status upon every object in sight, 
thus destroying all distinctions between the artworld and the world in 
general. She points to the pen and paper she is writing with and finds 
it hard to believe that they can share the same aesthetic status as 
Guernica. She discounts the notion that Dickie would accuse her of 
confusing the evaluative and the classificatory sense by stating that 
the two are "inextricable bound together in usage." 39 She adds that 
in cases where new theories are proposed and the artworld is expanded 
these theories very often are defended by evaluative criteria as well 
as acknowledged through evaluative criteria: 
The heart of the matter, then, lies in the attempt of Institution-
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al theorists to provide a liberal and tolerant account of art on 
which everything, from can openers and plumbing fixtures to 
artists' actual or threatened self-inflicted wounds, has an equal 
opportunity to qualify as art. This drive for what might be 
termed universal aesthetic sufference [sic] enjoys a current 
popularity which extends beyond the purveyors of the Institutional 
Theory of Art. 40 
Silvers sees this phenomena resting upon what she calls the 
"transmigration thesis" where an object is changed into an art object; 
moreover, it is these borderline cases which she finds interesting. In 
contrast to Cohen, she believes that borderline cases are important by 
the very fact that we are forced to consider what we me~~ by art. She 
re-examines the Fountain and suggests that what Duchamp did was not 
only to make a gesture but combined an object with the gesture in a 
total activity. 41 She goes on to note that this complicates Fountain 
because one must be aware of the activities of Duchamp as a Dadaist as 
well as the object itself; and the "uninitiated" would not be able to 
apprehend both constituents. She believes that Fountain was about 
art, that it was a conceptual statement. 42 However, while she agrees 
that there is an institutional aspect to art -- an identifiable group 
of participants who travel within the artworld -- she denies that it 
is the definition of art: 
• • • the fact that members of an institutionally defined group 
engage in applying the term ''art" to unusual objects does not 
prove that the term "art" is defined by reference to that insti-
tution. To make such an inference is analogous to claiming that, 
since policemen constitute the group who most often apply the 
term "criminal," the term is to be defined by those who are mem-
bers of the institutionally defined Policeworld. 43 
She finishes by saying that a defini~ion of art cannot be contained 
within the confines of the Artworld. 
Jay E. Bachrach also finds several points of criticism of 
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Dickie's position. First of all, he takes the act of conferring status 
as a command "that one take X in terms of certain conventions for ap-
preciating it."44 And a command once ordered is difficult to dispute. 
However, disputes do exist, and they exist because other people refuse 
the command, or perhaps because they issue a counter-command that X is 
not art. What is needed is justification that X may prove valuable 
enough to be appreciated. Next, Bachrach asks how an individual acts 
in behalf of the artworld. He suggests that acting in an institution 
as a member is not the same as acting on behalf of that institution 
and that those who act on behalf of an institution normally have been 
granted the authority to do so: 
But in presenting a work he (the artist) does not act in behalf 
of anyone but himself unless he is acting as the representative 
of a school of art, a movement, or an academy, in short some in-
stitution in the narrower, more clear-cut sense of that term, not 
the kind that Dickie says the artworld is. 45 
If Dickie means acting in the artworld then the distinctions between 
the artworld and the general world are blurred and become meaningless. 
Next Bachrach looks at other structures within the artworld. 
For instance, membership within the artworld seems to be overly demo-
cratic in that an occasional museum-goer has the same status as an art 
historian. Moreover, it is unstable. In addition, the individuality 
of the conferring of status I'enders a social structure meaningless 
if one does not need museums or critics to confer status, then why 
have a social institution at all? Thus, Bachrach feels that the art-
~orld should not be present within a definition of a work of art. He 
believes that status can be conferred but in a much different social 
sense tha~ Dickie has used: 
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The huge, untrained silent majority who time and again object to 
the untraditional offered as a work of art demonstrate that con-
ventions are not sufficient for making it so ••• I would like to 
stress • that one takes the object as work of art only insofar 
as he or she accepts it as initially worthy for appreciation.46 
Bachrach finds the terms "taking as a work of art" and "is a work 
of art" as non-equivalent terms. He further states that an object must 
have positive or negative aesthetic values -- not neutral as in the 
case of the tumbtack -- to be considered a work of art. He then offers 
his own definition of the work of art, one which omits Dickie's art-
world. 47 
Patricia H. Werhane argues that Dickie has ignored the evaluative 
aspect of the classificatory sense. She believes that it is possible 
for a viewer to say that "X is not a work of art," not basing th}.s 
opinion on the object's lack of interesting aesthetic qualities but 
rather questioning the artworld's classificatory criteria. She states: 
"The classificatory process is a selective process, a process which em-
ploys criteria for selectivity. And at least some of the criteria for 
selecting and rejecting phenomena as art are evaluative."48 She lists 
some of the evaluative criteria used in the artworld as follows: (1) 
any artifact done in a conventional or traditional medium or uses tra-
ditional materials; (2} phenomena produced by recognized artists~ (3) 
phenomena produced by those who claim to be artists~ (4} natural ob-
jects presented as art objects; (5) original uses of materials, art 
forms, or subject matter; and {6) artifacts with a content that com-
ments upon philosophical, ~~eological or sociological concepts. She 
further states that this list is not conclusive, is used by producers 
and consumers, is subject to historical and cultural constraints, but 
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does not need to be used singularly nor applied all the time. But it 
is important to recognize that there is a p~ocess of selection which 
is prior to the art object: 
This process is partly arbitrary, and the qualifications for 
"final choices" cannot be exhaustively delineated. But this is 
an important process, because what is finally chosen as art is 
determined by these evaluative a~d selective standards. Thus the 
institutionalization of art phenomena depends on evaluative cri-
teria, and this element of classifying art has largely been over-
looked by institutional definitions.49 
w. E. KennickSO has also raised some questions about Dickie's 
theory. He contends that the whole notion of the artworld is obscure 
as Dickie uses it and that not using the concept of art aids in this 
obscuration. Kennick asks who exactly belongs to the artworld -- a 
museum's custodian as well as the director and his secretarJ? Equally 
unclear is the concept of acting on behalf of a university in the con-
ferring of a degree, which can also be denied or withdrawn. And how 
do we know if an artifact has had the status of candidate conferred 
upon it? Could we expect some notification process? Kennick has no 
answers for these questions, nor does he expect Dickie's theory to pro-
vide any. 
As a final comment on Dickie's institutional theory, let us 
examine Jeffrey Wieand's assertion that there cannot be an institu-
tional theory at all. He begins by delineating two kinds of institu-
tions: A-institutions which are action oriented and governed by rules 
and P-institutions which are agent oriented. He notes: 
An A-institution, then, is simply a kind of conventional act. Ex-
amples of such acts include promising, christening, saluting, and 
marrying; examples of social practices which are not A-institutions 
include smoking cigarettes and driving to work. In general, a 
P-institution acts through those of its members who are empowered 
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to act on its behalf.Sl 
He gives the Catholic Church as an example of the latter when it is 
engaged in fund raising or condemning an injustice. He also notes a 
certain ambiguity in the term "institutional act."52 Wieand states 
that the actions of an A-institution, as an established practice, must 
conform to the conventions and that the members of a P-institution, as 
a social group, must act as agents. He argues that Dickie has de~ 
scribed what is a P-institution but has refused to acknowledge the art-
world as anything but an A-institution. He feels this is particularly 
true when conferral of status is considered. If viewed as a P-insti-
tution, Dickie's artworld still lacks the necessary ingredient for an 
institution because Dickie's artworld has agents without having an ac-
creditation process. Wieand also cites the lack of the ability to name 
or describe the conventions which govern the conferral of status as a 
sign that Dickie's theory is not an institutional one. He concludes 
with the following: 
If art itself were an institution in an interesting sense it 
would either be a kind of conventional act or a social group. 
But art, understood as a body of works or as an activity, is 
plainly neither of these things •.. Art is inextricably bound 
up with social institutions and artistic conventions, but none of 
these is so5§rucial or pervasive as to determine the nature of art itself. 
The main concerns that these critics have voiced seem to center 
on what they perceive as an egalitarian description by Dickie that ob-
scures positions and processes within the Artworld and also obscures 
any delineation between the perimeters of the artworld and other 
worlds. An underlying concern seems to be the absence of any evalua-
tive criteria within Dickie's theory, whether the evaluation is ap-
142 
plied to the aesthetic object or to the membership process within the 
artworld. The next section in this chapter will draw a more definitive 
portrayal of the artworld which will render this theory a better ana-
lytical tool and answer the criticisms that have been described. 
The Artworld Revisited 
It might appear that from the foregoing considerations that 
Dickie's theory of art is somewhat of a shambles. But, however severe 
his critics have been, all have taken him seriously enough to carefully 
examine his theory. I think this serious attention is indicative of 
the very perceptible sense of confusion within the Artworld today. For 
example, the philosopher's concern about a lack of evaluative criteria 
within Dickie's theory echoes a concern within the Artworld's member-
ship about a similar lack of evaluative criteria, particularly with the 
rise of Anti-Art and Conceptual movements. As we have seen, both of 
these movements have challenged the primary convention by either ne-
gating the autonomy of the artwork or denying artifactuality. In do-
ing this, they have also challenged the traditional and conventional 
understanding of evaluation of the aesthetic object. And because of 
the quotidian aspects of the objects or acts that these movements and 
artists have introduced into ~;e Artworld, they have provoked a dis-
cussion of art and non-art that precedes a discussion of evaluation of 
the aesthetic object. When empty flower pots, piles of dirt, or the 
self-infliction of wounds by the artist appear within the precincts 
of the museum or gallery, the focus of discussion must deal with the 
issue· of what differentiates these objects and acts from those ex-
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isting outside the Artworld. The discussion therefore becomes, with 
more and more frequency, "Is is art?" before "Is it good art?" I 
think this discussion of differentiation between art and non-art --
which is unequivocally a modern phenomena is what Dickie has noted 
with the classificatory sense of the work of art. What he has not 
noted is that this is a recent development and that such a distinction 
would have been as incomprehensible before the challenges to the pri-
mary convention as aesthetic contemplation would have been to a Navaho 
working on a sand painting two hundred years ago. He has also failed 
to note that the classificatory sense is operant within an institu-
tional framework. This is what Werhane has underscored in her sugges-
tion that the classificatory has an evaluative connotation -- within 
the Artworld. All of the six classificatory criteria which she has 
stated (see page 139 of the previous section) are part of the second-
ary conventions which govern the Artworld, i.e., the theory surrounding 
the creation, presentation and viewing of the artwork. The classifi-
catorf process is embedded within the theoretical framework of the 
Artworld and therefore does not lend itself to a simple "yes/no" 
situation. The complexity of classification within the Artworld may 
be better explicated if we look at an example. 
The classificatory process, in general as a logical tool, is 
usually used to establish a general category and the features which 
help to distinguish items within the category from those outside. 
These distinguishing characteristics are also used to establish sub-
categories and their relationships. For example, if one instituted 
a category as "chair," one would look for features which would dis-
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tinguish a chair from a non-chair. If we described chair features as 
a seat with a back, legs or other support usually intended for one 
person's seating, we would then have characteristics with which we 
could distinguish a chair from other objects. This would allow us to 
do several things. First, it would eliminate such objects as stools 
(no back support} , floor pillows (no legs or other support) , sofas 
{intended for multiple seating}, or other objects which clearly are 
not seats such as desks, tables or trees. Second, it would allow us 
to create sub-categories of chairs such as "rocking chairs" or "chaise 
longues." Third, it would help identify the Saarinen chair (a pedes-
tal chair} as a chair even though it looks different from traditional 
chairs and is made from different materials. And finally, it would 
al~o help us to see a relationship between chairs, stools, pillows and 
sofas that might cause us to create a category called "seating" where 
all of these items would be sub-categories. In all of these cases, the 
concepts and relationships among concepts are simple. As finer dis-
ti~ctions are made between chairs for sub-categories, as between a 
Saarinen chair and an Eames chair, more of ~~e histor] and theory of 
chairs must be known. Thus for a simple item, a simple description of 
the item is sufficient; for a finer discrimination or for a more. 
complex item -- considerable knowledge of the item is required. The 
concept of "work of art" is very complex because of its changing nature 
and the history and theory in which it is embedded. If we examine the 
chair as a work of art within the confines of the Artworld, we can see 
~~e much more complex nature of the work of art. The first chairs 
which come to mind in this context are those which were made by other 
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cultures in different times and which have been brought into the Art-
world at a later date from their origin. In this way, an Egyptian 
chair and a medieval throne are viewed in the museum as works of art. 
They have lost their original context, whether it be symbolic of 
power or comfortable seating, and are viewed as aesthetic objects. As 
we have seen, the museum context is a fairly recent occurrence and was 
achieved through a complex evolution. It rests on the autonomy of 
the art object and the selection of the best examples available for 
display. Part of the selection process also depends upon the knowledge 
of the curator and his ability to make very fine discriminations. So 
even this comparatively sL~ple example for the Artworld is a very much 
more complex notion than the simple discrimination between chair and 
non-chair. The chair in the Artworld becomes an even more complex 
notion when it is used as a motif. Alan Artner, art critic for the 
Chicago Tribune, has noted the use of the chair as a motif in recent 
art. Reviewing an exhibit of chairs at the Museum of Contemporary Art 
by artist Margaret Wharton, Artner describes one of the pieces in this 
way: 
• . • one wall piece from 1975 is a chair that has been cut into 
small sections, restructured with the addition of protruding wires 
and hung from a single nail. Everything slumps, as if pulled by 
gravity like a marionette on a peg. However, once we notice that 
Wharton has called the work "Martyr," the wires suggest flagella-
tion as surely as the overall attitude reflects suffering or 
death. But whose suffering, whose death? First, the chair's, as 
its life as a functional object has been drained through section-
ing and hanging; then the entire range of willing victims so 
often memorialized in Western sculpture; and, finally, more 
humorously, anyone who would think of occupying the seat of so 
prickly a chair. 
This kind of richness is characteristic of all ~~e works on 
show. It gives pleasure not only because much contemporarJ art 
is devoid of allusions, but because Wharton gives us many from 
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which to choose. Religious references are shawl-to-shoulder with 
innocent fun, and as the sculpture matures, there is also the 
growing sophistication of the artist's wordplay.S4 
An art histori~,, Carla Gottlieb, also comments on the use of the 
chair as a contemporary motif within the modern Artworld: 
As to chairs in contemporary art in general, it appears that 
none, with the possible exception of Rauschenberg, where this 
point is intentionally made ambivalent, invites the onlooker to 
sit down. ~lis feature separates contemporary from precontempo-
ary chairs. Contemporary chairs are not meant for leisure; they 
suggest waiting in tense suspense. Depending upon the artist, 
this nonleisurely chair motif may be a rejection of Matisse's 
hedonistic goal for art, or a reference to the psychological un-
rest of troubled times, or many other things.SS 
She continues: 
None of these comments on contemporary art could be made if 
a historical background were lacking; without it, the meaning of 
the empty chair as a motif in an individual artist, in a country, 
and in contemporary art as a whole, could easily be misunder-
stood.S6 
The point of the above comments, one from a critic and one from an art 
historian, is the complex nature of the work of art and how the work 
of art is understood through an understanding of the secondary con-
ventions. Artner has described a re-assembled chair as void of any 
utilitarian purpose yet viable as an aesthetic object within the museum 
context. The viability in large part is due to its title and the al-
lusions which it has created. Gottlieb directly points to the involve-
ment of history and theory in the understanding of the artwork. She 
states ~~at without an understanding of ~~ese secondary conventions, the 
meaning of contemporary art could be easily missed or misunderstood. 
In other words, removed from the museum context, the work might not be 
recognized as a work of art at all. I think all of this demonstrates 
the necessity of the secondary conventions in making the classification 
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of art and non-art. 
Furthermore, evaluation has been present within the secondary 
conventions since the advent of the Artworld. In the discussion so 
far, I have stated that the evaluative sense of classification resides 
in the theory which surrounds the creation, presentation and viewing 
of the artwork. I have not mentioned the handling of plastic elements, 
the other portion of the secondary conventions. This is because the 
handling of plastic elements is the normal location for the discussion 
of evaluation within the arts. How well or how poorly the artist has 
handled the plastic elements -- albeit within the movement -- is what 
concerns the artist, the critic, the curator and the general viewer. 
If we make this kind of distinction between the secondary conventions, 
we can still allow a classificatory sense of the work of art within the 
confines of an institutional theory. The classificatory sense refers 
to the theory surrounding the creation, presentation and viewing of 
the artwork. As has been noted, this involves some evaluative con-
notations. However, the normal usage for the evaluative sense invokes 
the handling of the plastic elements. Thus, while the two areas are 
related, Dickie's evaluative sense can be applied primarily to one, i. 
e., the handling of the plastic elements. Moreover, what this dis-
tinction underscores is the lack of a formal notion of an institution 
in Dickie's theory. Dickie has defined the work of art in terms of 
the institution in which the work is embedded. Yet, he has failed to 
describe the institution in the richness of its traditions, history, 
~~eories and conventions. 
I would like to suggest that the Artworld is a more formal 
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structure than Dickie has described. The usual meaning of "formal" is 
that which is conventional or in accordance with conventional require-
ments. It is in this sense that the Artworld of Dickie's description 
lacks dimension and definition. Dickie has called the Artworld a 
social practice, or an institution, yet has failed to give substance to 
these terms. In order to expand these terms, and hence our idea of the 
Artworld, I would like to turn to two definitions offered by John 
Rawls: 
I use the word "practice" • • • as a sort of technical term mean-
ing any form of activity specified by a system of rules which de-
fines offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and 
which gives the activity its structure. As examples one may think 
of games, rituals, trials and parliaments.57 
At a later date, Rawls has defined an institution in the following 
manner: 
Now by an institution I shall understand a public system of rules 
which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, 
powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain 
forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and they pro-
vide for certain penalties and defenses, and so on, when viola-
tions occur. As examples of institutions, or more generally 
social practices, we may think of games and rituals, trials and 
parliaments, markets and systems of property.58 
While Rawls formulated both of these definitions within the context of 
a theor] of justice, I think they provide a good framework with which 
to discuss the Artworld. 
In Rawls' definition he speaks of a "system of rules" which 
helps to structure the activity. In games, the system is easy to see 
and it is equally easy to recognize the system in trials and parlia-
ments. With ritual we can readily accept a system of rules -- ~~at 
they exist -- but I think we may find them harder to describe or to 
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name except in the instance of specific examples. Thus a person may 
not be able to describe "rules for rituals" but could describe the 
rules present in a Roman Catholic mass, a bar mitzvah, or a wedding 
ceremony. And I think another name for this system of rules might be 
"conventions." Thus we might say that the primary convention of a 
Roman Catholic mass is the understanding shared by the priest and the 
congregation that they are engaged in a certain kind of formal activi-
ty. 59 
I think that the system of rules in Rawls' definition may be 
taken as an equivalent for Dickie's conventions. However, the notion 
of rules in the Artworld seems rather harsh and alien, even when called 
conventions. Rules seem to connote a structure that is unchanging and 
inflexible and, as we have seen, the Artworld is evolutionary. Working 
from Rawls' definition of a practice, Thomas Morawetz60 has distin-
guished between several kinds of practices and I think these distinc-
tions may be an aid in clarifying the nature of the Artworld. He first 
describes a practice which is game-like in that it has constitutive 
rules which must be learned before the game is played and must fol-
lowed during the game. They are simple, unambiguous, cannot be justi-
=ied individually, and give to the participant an "internal" point of 
view. On the other hand, Morawetz contends that there are other prac-
tices, like law and language, which are different from games. He sug-
gests that becoming a practitioner of these is an acquisition of be-
vavior that is appropriate to the practice. Morawetz notes: 
To say that becoming a user may be a matter of acquiring a way of 
behaving is not to deny that a user of English will have an in-
ternal point of view. Being an English speaker involves more than 
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emitting appropriate sounds regularly (i.e., behaving as if one 
were following a rule); it is also a matter of being able to 
criticize misuse by others and to ask appropriate questions.61 
He also makes a further distinction: 
In brief, the internal point of view of the language user con-
sists not in knowing a definitve set of rules but in having the 
notion of a rule of language. To one who lacks the notion all 
languages have the character of noise. To one who has the notion 
of language, particular languages are examples of practices. 
Thus, a language user may be able to identify a totally unfamil-
iar language as language. 62 
This way, recognition of the practice as practice becomes important as 
well as a proper understanding of the practice. Morawetz also notes 
that rules for the second kind of practices are not a set of definitive 
and interlocking constitutive rules but rather are an approximate de-
scription of what is done in practice: 
The suggestion here is that in practices of the second kind 
• rules codify and structure the actual practice, but no set of 
rules is definitive or constitutive of the practice. In these 
practices, and not in games, the practice evolves, the rules 
change, through the participation of the participants themselves. 
While the rules of ches~ or baseball may evolve or change, they 
do so of necessity outside and not within particular instances of 
the game. The rules of practices of the second kind are in a 
sense malleable and change with usage.63 
It should be noted that Morawetz refers to the rules of language and 
law as an approximate description of what is commonly accepted in prac-
tice. This may seem to be a simple description of how those engaged 
in the practice behave, however, upon examination, I do not think this 
is what he had in mind. A rule-book is definitive in that it gives 
simple "yes/no" answers as to whether something is permissable or not. 
A dictionary or codification of law provides a more complex answer --
and also sometimes provides the basis for an argument to be advanced 
which would eventually change the rJles. If this were not true, lan-
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guage and law would be mechanical, inflexible and unchanging. It 
should also be ncted that changes in the r~les of language and law de-
velop slowly and are subject to the scrutiny of authorities in the 
field. Thus I think that we can say that the rules for language and 
law are not simple descriptions of common usage but rather complex de-
scriptions of what has become accepted usage. 
Morawetz bases the evolutionary character of rules of language and 
law on the infinite number of situations in which they are involved. 
Unlike games which have a finite number of situations, both language 
and law are involved in situations which are as varied as human nature. 
It is this variety which gives la."lguage and law an "open texture." He 
notes: 
[The second kind of practice] evolves because it embraces an un-
foreseeable range of situations in which its rules have employ-
ment for social ends. The rules must have open texture and allow 
indefinite application.64 
I believe ~~at the Artworld belongs to the second kind of prac-
tices which Morawetz has described. The primary convention of the Art-
world has in common wi~~ the primary conventions of language and law 
the defining nature of the practice. While we may say that the pri-
mary convention of ~~e Artworld is the creation and viewing of the 
autonomous artwork, we may also say that the primary conventions for 
language and law respectively are human communication and social order. 
This is what Morawetz has described as "employment for social ends" and 
is basically an unchanging convention in each of these practices. The 
primary conventions of all of these practices define the practices and 
are logically prior to the practices. If the primarJ convention was 
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changed at all, it would also change the practice. However, the se-
condary conventions of these practices are subject to change and have 
the open texture which Morawetz has described. As we have seen, the 
handling of the plastic elements and the theory surrounding the crea-
tion, presentation and viewing of the artwork have changed dramatically 
over the last hundred years. Spiral Jetty would be as incomprehensible 
to ~"l eighteenth century French artist as the word "anti-es.tablishment" 
would be to a speaker of Middle English or corporate law to the signers 
of the Magna Carta. In each case, the secondary conventions surround-
ing the practice have changed as the need for new applications have 
been formed within the society. I think that we can therefore include 
the Artworld within the group of practices which include language and 
law and note that their open texture comes from the evolutionary nature 
of their secondary conventions. 
With the above distinctions in mind, we can return to Rawls' def-
inition. In formulating this definition, he has also noted some con-
ditions which are important to the definition. He suggests that the 
system of rules must be known to the participants of the practice: 
In saying that an institution .•• is a public system of rules, 
I mean that everyone engaged in it knows what he would know if 
these rules and his participation in the activity they define 
were the result of an agreement. A person taking part in an in-
stitution knows what the rules demand of him and of the others.65 
Elsewhere he has noted that these rules must be teachable, that is, they 
must be able to be taught as a coherent body of information. 66 Yet 
Dickie has described the learning of the conventions as being "picked 
up in an unself-conscious way." Does the Artworld have conventions 
which are taught and are publicly known? I would answer "yes." In the 
153 
legal world, there are law schools for practitioners, publication of 
laws and theory surrounding them, and a certain amount of instruction 
(both formal and informal) for laymen. There are also equivalents in 
the Artworld. There are schools of art for practitioners from those 
which are self-contained (the School of the Art Institute of Chicago) 
to those which are part of larger educational structures (a Fine Arts 
Department of a university). There is even a major open to art stu-
dents which is known as art education. There are also publications 
within the Artworld from art history texts to theoretical studies by 
artists, art historians and philosophers. Exhibit catalogues also pro-
vide an ~~alysis of the works included in the exhibit, and magazines 
and journals are published which discuss current trends in the Art-
world as well as past movements and artists. And there is instruction 
provided for laymen in the form of art education in primary and se-
condary schools, continuing education programs and programming on the 
arts on both commercial television and PBS. Therefore, I would suggest 
that there is a coherent body of conventions which may be taught, 
which are public and which yield conventional behavior within the 
practice. Moreover, I would suggest that these conventions are not 
picked up haphazardly but are learned conventions. A child learning 
a language must first understand that language is a form of human 
communication, then grasp certain basic fundamental rules and gradually 
increase his expertise. While instruction at the fundamental stage is 
mostly informal in nature, the continuing education in language is 
normally more formal, i.e., classroom instruction in the language arts. 
~~ adult's use of language greatly reflects the sophistication of the 
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learning of language he has accomplished. While I hesitate to draw 
a direct parallel between learning the conventions of language and the 
Artworld, I would suggest that they are in some ways alike. One must 
first realize the existence of the primary convention, whether it is 
human communication or the creation and viewing of the autonomous work 
of art. Then the secondary conventions of the practice must be learned 
and the end proficiency in the practice is dependent upon how well the 
secondary conventions are learned. 
Rawls has also noted that the "rules of practices are logically 
prior to particular cases." He states: 
Now what is meant by saying that the practice is logically prior 
to particular cases is this: given any rule which specifies a 
form of action (a move) , a particular action which would be taken 
as falling ~~der this rule given that there is the practice would 
not be described as that sort of aetion unless there was the 
practice. 66 
As examples, Rawls cites actions which are described as belonging to 
the game of baseball. While it would be possible to swing a piece of 
wood in everyday life, it would only be possible to "strike out" with-
in the game of baseball. The term "strike out" takes its meaning from 
the practice in which it exists. Thus Rawls states: "unless there is 
the practice the terms referring to actions specified by it lack a 
sense."67 I think Rawls' assertion can be applied to not only actions 
•11ithin a practice but also to roles in the practice. A "batter," 
''shortstop," and "umpire" also have meaning within the game of baseball. 
In a like manner, "lawyer," "Supreme Court Justice," or "litigant" have 
their meaning within the practice of law, as do the terms "bring suit," 
"prosecute," and "overrule." The Artworld, as I have described it, 
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also has equivalents. "Critic," "curator," and "sculptor" are terms 
which find their meaning within the Artworld as do "openings," "ex-
hibitions," and "reviews." For example, a person.might view a work 
of art and give his opinion of it. I think this would parallel the 
situation in Rawls' example where a person swings a piece of wood. The 
person is not "reviewing" the artwork any more than the person with the 
piece of wood is "striking out." A review is written by someone with 
expertise and is meant to be published. The concept "review" belongs 
within the Artworld. Moreover, if the Artworld were not a practice, 
there would be no actions or roles describable as belonging to the 
practice. 
To return to Rawls' definition, he has stated that a system of 
rules defines "offices, roles, moves, penalties and so on" within the 
practice. I would suggest that proficiency within the practice, that 
is,varying degrees of expertise concerning the conventions, serves to 
delineate offices and roles. Within legal practice there are examples 
of offices (judge, prosecutor) and roles (defendant, jury). The posi-
tions which can be considered offices are those which demand a high 
degree of expertise in the field. Thus a judge is assumed to be ex-
pert and to use this highly developed knowledge to render his deci-
sions. Prosecutor and defense counsel are also expected to be know-
ledgeable and to use their knowledge for the benefit of their clients. 
On the other hand, defendants and jury are not expected to be experts. 
In most jury trials, both counsels present not only factual material 
but points of law and after ~~e summations, the judge instr~cts the 
jury in the points of law which they must consider to come to their 
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verdict. There are also positions within the practice of law which 
require various amounts of expertise. These positions can include 
court reporter, bailiff, clerk to the judge or secretary to the de-
fense counsel. Each of these has knowledge applicable to more specific 
areas of law. For example, a law secretary may have a much better 
~~owledge of legal terms than the layman, but may not have the know-
ledge of the law in general to present a case for trial. The mechanism 
of law is dependent upon all of these offices and roles, but some have 
more responsibility than others for the final disposition of the case. 
In a like way, we may describe offices and roles in ritual. Offices 
may include bishop, rabbi, minister; roles may include member of a 
congregation, engaged couple, godparent. In ritual it would seem 
that office holders also have more expertise and knowledge of the con-
ventions involved. However, with language it would seem more difficult 
to describe offices and roles. Obviously most people fit within the 
category of user of language. But one would expect a greater amount 
of expertise and facility with language from some speakers, i.e., 
teachers of language, linguists, or lexicographers. I would suggest 
that these experts occupy the offices within the practice of language, 
but that they are more difficult to identify because they are not 
voted into or appointed to a specific office that has a title. Yet, 
they certainly have influence in the practice of language. They also 
have certain credentials and an amount of experience within the field. 
If we take the notion of office in this broad sense, not just as an 
appointed position with a title, I think that we can say there are 
offices within language practice and that they are predicated upon an 
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expert knowledge and the quality of experience in the field. 
I think that the same general analysis may be said of the Art-
world. The office holders of the Artworld are those who publicly pre-
sent and analyze works of art. For the visual arts at this time, these 
people are museum curators, art critics, gallery owners, art historians 
and philosophers of art. As with the other practices discussed above, 
I think these offices are based on expertise and the quality of ex-
perience in the practice. For example, a museum curator does not just 
declare himself one. He gains sanction and authority from the Art-
world in much the same way a judge gains sanction and authority from 
the legal world. He studies and obtains knowledge of the field, very 
often receives accreditation at ~~e formal completion of his studies, 
works in a position of lesser responsibility for a time, and gradually, 
through the work he has accomplished and the reputation he has achieved, 
may be promoted to positions with greater responsibility. The point is, 
a member of the general public does not walk into a museum and appoint 
himself curator or director of the museum. A great amount of ex-
pertise is needed for the position. The same holds true for other of-
fices within the Artworld. What of the roles within the Artworld? I 
would suggest that the roles are occupied by museum goers, readers of 
art history and criticism and those who in a general way are learning 
about the visual arts. In many ways they are like the members of a 
congregation. Members of a congregation meet periodically to partici-
pate in a specific public ritual but also spend time on their own pur-
suit of other rituals which are related to communal activity. They 
r~cw enough theory about the practice to follow the precepts of the 
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practice and to distinguish between their congregation and another one. 
There also exists within the congregation those who are nominal members 
and those who are sustaining members. In other words, there is a great 
variance in the amount of actual participation by members, yet all 
members in some degree identify with the congregation. I would sug-
gest the same holds true for members of the Artworld. They are aware 
of the primary convention and have at least some knowledge of the se-
condary conventions; in other words, they to some degree identify with 
the Artworld and they are self-conscious about their participation in 
the practice. It should be noted that this is not a well-defined area. 
There is not a register of members of the Artworld and there is not a 
way of determining a basic level of Artworld literacy. However, I 
think that we can distinguish members from non-members by their recog-
nition of the primary convention, at least some knowledge of secondary 
conventions and the fact that they are self-conscious participants. 
It should also be noted that people who fill staff positions within the 
Artworld may be described as exactly that they are part of the 
mechanism which operates the Artworld and their actual membership is 
contingent upon their own participation in the broad concept of the 
Artworld, not within the confines of their specific jobs. 
So far, I have not mentioned the position of the artist within 
the Artworld. Clearly, the contemporary artist perceives the position 
of the artist as central to the Artworld, as essential. Without the 
creation of the work of art, there would be no Artworld. The creation 
of the artist is made to be displayed to the public. If we were to 
use a sports analogy, the position of the artist would be parallel to 
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t.~e playmaker. Within law the "playmaker" would be the litigant who 
has brought suite; within language, it would be the person who has 
"coined" a new word -- for example, Baumgarten and "aesthetics" -- or 
in some way caused a change in the language. In these examples, the 
common thread might be said to be the initiation of an action or the 
creation of an object which is central to the practice.69 It is this 
position that the artist possesses within the Artworld -- as initiator 
of the move. There are then three distinct areas of participation 
within the Artworld: as an office holder, as a member, and as an initi-
ator. These three areas correspond to what I have called presenter, 
audience and artist. All of these positions are dependent upon rec-
ognition of the primary convention of the Artworld and delineated by 
the degree of knowledge of the secondary conventions. 
This brings us to what Rawls has called "the rights and duties, 
powers and immunities" within the practice. I think this general 
notion of "moves" within the practice is what Dickie has called con-
ferral of status as candidate for appreciation. But while Dickie sees 
this as a totally egalitarian process -- any member of the ~tworld can 
confer candidacy -- I think that conferral is a much more formal pro-
cess and one that conforms to the idea of rights and duties of offices 
and positions. I believe the artwork is given status as a candidate 
for appreciation by virtue of its public presentation as candidate. 
It is given public presentation by the office holders in the Artworld. 
The critic's office may be described by its responsibility to inform 
and educate the members of the Artworld. He also confers status on the 
artwork by fulfilling the duties of his office, that is, by publishing 
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his decisions about the artwork. The curator also confers status by 
placing an object within the museum. The gallery owner does likewise. 
The art historian or theoretician confers status by discussion of the 
artwork in their publication. 
In each of these cases, the office holder offers justification 
as do office holders in language and law. In the case of the critic, 
justification is central to publication and is inherent to the office 
of critic. Justification can also be found in exhibit catalogues pub-
lished by museums, and occasionally by galleries. Art historians and 
theoreticians offer justification in the same way any scholar does, 
through a logical presentation of ~~e material. Justification, in all 
of these cases, is based upon a~ understanding of the secondary con-
ventions and their application to the artworks in question. 
The public aspect of the conferral of status is an important 
part of the process. As Rawls has noted, a person engaged in a prac-
tice must know what the rules demand of him and others. In other words, 
they must be public. Through the office holders of the Artworld, the 
conventions become public. And through these office holders, conferral 
of status also becomes a formal and public action. Conferral of 
status in Dickie's description is little more than a general nod in 
the direction of an object. He notes that the conferral is made on 
behalf of the Artworld, yet gives no clue as to how one can act on 
behalf of this institution without some sort of public announcement, 
without some way to communicate this most important function of the 
Artworld to its members. If the Artworld is indeed an institution, the 
public conferral of status seems to be a necessary element. 
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But what of the artwork which has not yet met the public? I 
would suggest that a work of art has already been given the status of 
candidate by the artist. The act of conferring status for the artist 
exists in the act of creation by the artist. The artist's finished 
product may fail his vision, but if he did not believe in his vision, 
then he would also negate the intention of creation. The fact that the 
artist calls himself artist and not some other title like plumber or 
welder points to his belief that he is creating the autonomous work 
of art. I think that we can say the artist confers status in a private 
manner, and that the presentation of the work to the Artworld is the 
reaffirmation of the conferral process. Thus, candidacy is conferred 
by public means by the office holders of the Artworld and by initially 
private mea~s by the artist. The other members of the Artworld, the 
viewers, do no confer status for or on behalf of the Artworld. They 
may indeed make personal judgments which are valid for them on a per-
sonal level. But to insist that they can confer status, randomly and· 
on their own accord, is tantamount to suggesting that any member of the 
worlds of language, law or ritual could likewise exercise such author-
ity. Thus we could have any English speaker declaring, on behalf of 
all English speakers, that "good" will subsequently mean "bad," or a 
motorist, acting on behalf of all u. S. motorists, declaring that the 
speed limit is now 90 m.p.h. The result in both cases would be chaos 
-- and a negation of the institutional nature of the practices in-
volved. 
I have argued thus far that the Artworld is a much more formal 
institution than Dickie has described. To my mind, the keystone of 
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this more formal institution is the autonomous work of art. As we 
have seen in the previous chapters, as the art product became the art 
object, its autonomy became more pronounced and the conventions sur-
rounding it became increasingly more descriptive of its autonomy. The 
initiation of aesthetic theory underlined the autonomy of the artwork, 
a work which was created to be viewed and appreciated. Our conception 
of art assumes the primary convention and functions within the second-
ary conventions. It is a phenomena which had its birth in the Renais-
sance and matured primarily in Western society, although its influence 
has been felt worldwide by this time. What of the "creative urge" we 
believe to be inherent in all of mankind? I would agree that it ex-
ists, from the caves of Altamira and Lascaux to Amish quilt makers. 
But I think our recognition of the whole range of these works stems 
from the Artworld which I have described. We in fact appreciate 
these objects because they have been called to our attention within 
the context of the Artworld. The concept which has united such dis-
parate objects is the museum context. To a great extent, our percep-
tion of the work of art has been formed by the museum context and by 
the attending secondary conventions. The subordination of the original 
utilitarian or ritualistic context to the museum context has made 
these works become autonomous works of art. Otherwise such works may 
have remained fragments of foreign cultures, interesting but not part 
of the whole range of artworks to which they now belong. The thread 
which binds all of these artworks together is not a concept li~e 
"beauty" or "expressiveness" -- it is the autonomy of the work of art. 
~he concept of an autonomous work of art belongs exclusively to the 
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which I have described. 
In some ways, the Artworld thus described may appear very nar-
row or restrictive. What about the natural creativity of children? Of 
the "Sunday painter"? Of the illustrator or the graphic designer? I 
do not think there is a simple answer to these questions but that the 
understanding of each case will help explicate the boundaries of the 
Artworld. 
The idea of children as creative visually is a fairly recent 
development and one that coincides with the idea of universal educa-
tion. It \1ould seem that as leisure time became available to an in-
creasingly large number of children, it was thought that drawing might 
be a valuable tool for the child and was often taught as part of the 
manual arts. The idea of a small child, crayon in hand, expressing 
his creativity probably has its roots in the progressive movement of 
education in this century. This attitude toward childhood creativity 
has been fostered by the teaching of art education in elementary and 
secondary schools. This is not to say that children are not creative, 
but rather that it is a recent phenomena and one that is sponsored, 
however indirectly, by the Artworld. The distinction between child 
artists and artists is not only one of age and maturity, but of pro--
fessional standing. The artist thinks of himself as a professional. 
This distinction also holds true for the Sunday painter. He will not 
describe himself as painter or artist but rather as one who paints as 
a leisure activity. He considers himself to have an amateur standing, 
and often has had little formal or "professional" training. I think 
both the child and the amateur painter belong to the Artworld, but 
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would tend to be classified as members rather than artists because 
they have amateur status. Children's art may be exhibited and ap-
preciated, but the expectations of the viewers are not the same as 
when viewing an artist's exhibit. The work is rarely reviewed, and 
when publisbed normally serves some other context. While the Sunday 
painter may exhibit, it is often in non-juried shows and again the 
viewer's expectations are different. The object of painting for the 
Sunday painter may also be a mixture of creating the autonomous work 
of art and entertainment. The same may be said of the child's art. 
This brings us to the illustrator, graphic designer and a group 
of other persons whose work closely parallels that done in the Art-
world. I would suggest that these persons and their work do not pro-
perly belong in the Artworld, although it is possible that they and 
their work may be brought into the Artworld. This import would be ac-
complished by the office holders of the Artworld. I think that there 
are other "worlds" in which these people function and that the pri-
mary convention of each of these is quite different from that of the 
Artworld. For example, I think that we may define an area called the 
commercial world which would include a very wide variety of people who 
are involved in print and electronic media and product design. The 
primary convention of the commercial world may be stated as the cre-
ation and promotion of commercial goods. The primary convention is 
not the creation and viewing of the autonomous artwork. However, both 
worlds share some of the seconda~z conventions, particularly the 
handling of ~~e plastic elements. The end product of both worlds also 
can resemble one another to a great extent. Thus the work of an il-
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lustrator may closely resemble the work of an artist and may be im-
ported to the Artworld where its previous context, that of illustra-
tion, is replaced by the museum context and where it becomes an auton-
omous artwork. The sa~e is true of the work of a graphic designer, 
product designer, commercial filmmaker, etc. It should also be noted 
that the commercial world often consciously uses visual characteristics 
of particular movements of the Artworld. An example of this would be 
be recent Chanel No. 5 television commercials which rely on the use of 
images related to Surrealism. In the same way, the Pop movement was 
based to a great extent upon methods, materials and images used in the 
commercial world. I think that while these two worlds exist indepen-
dently, they may at times intersect as illustrated i~ the following 
manner: 
However, it should be noted that the intersection occurs on the level 
of secondary conventions, not the primary convention. 
I think there are also two other worlds which sometimes in-
tersect the Artworld, namely those of entertainment and documentation. 
Each is primarily concerned with what the names indicate, i.e., en-
tertainment and documentation. With entertainment, the end product 
is less important than the process; with doc~~entation, the veracity 
of the end product is most important. A detailed description of these 
worlds and their intersection with the Artworld will be given in the 
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next chapter using photography as an example. But, at this point, I 
think it should be noted that these worlds exist, that at times they 
may intersect the Artworld, but that the primary convention of each 
world remains constant while the area of intersection is the secondary 
conventions. A disregard of the primary conventions, or a confusion of 
them, may obscure the perimeters of the Artworld. However, I think 
that these intersection points may provide much more interesting test 
cases than those posed totally from within the Artworld -- precisely 
because they are external to the practice. Duchamp's Fountain is an 
example of a challenge made totally within the Artworld; the challenge 
is based on conventions operant within the practice. Examples within 
film, photography, and video give examples of media that exist outside 
the Artworld as well as within it, and possess objects which share 
characteristics on the level of secondary conventions. 
It should also be noted that the Artworld is indeed a restrict-
ed area. Historically, it has been the preserve of an educated elite. 
The evolution of a mass society has only served to underscore the per-
imeters of the Artworld as an area containing people educated to the 
history and theories of the Fine Arts. This is not said as a judgment 
of the Artworld nor as a reference to the political aspects of the 
Artworld. There are indeed powerful cliques operating within the Art-
world, but the suggestion that the Artworld is an elitist pursuit is 
not based on the manipulations of a few people. It is based on the 
knowledge required to participate in the Artworld and the historical 
precedents described in the previous chapters. The Fine Arts have 
evolved as a practice separate from everyday concerns, as a practice 
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revolving around the autonomous artwork. In trying to present a 
theory which is as open-ended as possible, Dickie has presented his 
artworld also as open-ended and without definable boundaries. This has 
proven to be the CnL~ of the problem. I do not think that limiting the 
perimeters of the Artworld necessarily close the theory. It does not 
destroy the flexibility of the theory -- or the Artworld -- nor does it 
render them less open to change. However, it does allow a better 
analytic tool. 
There are two areas where a more definitive idea of the Artworld 
would have cleared up what I consider to be misconceptions on Dickie's 
part. The first is Dickie's notion that originality is an antecedent 
requirement for painting, and perhaps for other media. If this idea is 
examined in the light of primary and secondary conventions, as defined 
earlier, I think we can see that originality is not an antecedent re-
quirement for painting or any other media. Rather, it is a secondary 
convention which has evolved as the Artworld became a more formal in-
stitution. Evidently, Dickie's use of originality is used primarily to 
oppose the idea of a forgery: it is not used in the sense of novelty. 
I think this is basically a political and narrow sense of the word. 
Those to whom ~~is sense of originality would be most important are 
public and private collectors. It would be important to them not only 
on aesthetic grounds, but on grounds of their financial investment and 
prestige. Ultimately, the sense of originality brings into question 
the monetar] worth of the object and has little to do with its aesthet-
ic appreciation. Moreover, while ~his idea is applied most often to 
paintings of past masters, it has found a corresponding application in 
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other media. Both printmaking and photography have broadened the con-
cept by accepting signed and numbered editions of prints and authorized 
prints by people other than the original artist. For example, before 
her death, Imogen Cunningham set up a foundation to print her negatives. 
While these new prints, imprinted with the foundation's logo, do not 
fetch the price of vintage Cunningh~~ prints, they are nevertheless con-
sidered "collectable." On the other hand, prints may be obtained from 
the LibrarJ of Congress which are made from negatives by some of the 
best known photographers of the 1930's and 1940's. These are not con-
sidered collectable and have no value on the market. Thus it would 
seem that originality is derived not from an original negative but from 
some sort of authorization process. Also, the printing of Moonrise, 
Hernandez, New Mexico by Ansel Adams seems to be proceeding ad infini-
tum. In both cases, the older printmaking tradition of making a limit-
ed edition and then striking the plate seems to be undergoing a change 
at the hands of art photographers. I think this has enlarged the idea 
of originality and points to the fact that originality, especially in 
the narrow sense, is one of the secondary conventions. 
The other misconception is Dickie's description of the deriva-
tive sense of the work of art. I would suggest that the derivative 
sense is rarely if ever used from non-artifact to artifact, but is 
normally used from artifact to artifact. It is this way that objects 
enter the museum context. They have characteristics which resemble 
the paradigmatic work of art. The recognition of these characteristics 
enables the office holders to place the object in a museum -- or some 
other institutional situation -- where the similarities between the 
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artifact and its paradigm work becomes most notable. They become most 
notable under these circumstances because their utilitarian context 
has been subordinated to their aesthetic appreciation. The character-
istics which cause this comparison are located in the secondary con-
ventions, most often in the handling of the plastic elements. A good 
example of the derivative sense of the work of art is one that has 
been cited earlier-- the acceptance of new media (film, photography, 
video) into the Artworld. This is because each of these shared some 
secondary conventions with media that were already accepted within the 
Artworld. To ascribe the derivative sense mainly to driftwood cases 
and other flora and fauna is to mistake its importance in the Art-
world. It is the derivative sense which helps comparisons to be made 
between objects not originally created as artworks and paradigmatic 
artworks. It might also be noted that once such an object has been 
inducted into the Artworld, it becomes paradigmatic itself, thus ex-
tending the concept of work of art by allowing new comparisons to be 
made. 
I think that Dickie, while providing an important contribution 
by his theory's institutional nature, has also made important mistakes 
by not recognizing the formal structure of the Artworld. The Artworld 
is not an absolutely egalitarian practice nor can everj act of human 
creativity be neatly covered by the institutional theory. To do so 
would negate the very institutional nature of the theory Dickie has 
described. Rather, I think the Artworld can be described as a formal 
institution, as a social practice that is definable using Rawls' def-
~nition of an institution. The Artworld is peopled by-artists, pre-
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senters and audience, all of whom are governed by the conventions of 
the Artworld. Membership is limited to those who recognize the pri-
mary convention and who recognize the primary convention and who have 
some knowledge of the secondary conventions. Office holders include 
muse~~ curators and directors, critics, art historians and philosophers 
of art; these people obtain their offices through their degree of ex-
pertise and experience within the Artworld. The conferral of status 
is accomplished in a public sense by the office holders of the Art-
world and in a private sense by the artist. Any object may be in-
ducted into the Artworld through the process of conferral and once so 
inducted assumes the museum context, that is, is appreciated primarily 
as an autonomous work of art. Whatever utilitarian context the item 
may have had is subordinated to the museum context. I have also sug-
gested that there are other areas -- the worlds of documentation, 
commercialism and entertainment -- which sometimes overlap or inter-
sect the Artworld and that ~~ese points of intersection may provide 
good examples of the delineation between art and non-art. The next 
chapter will explore photography as a case study of the Artworld, 
one in which the conditions described above are fully operative and 
discernible. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PHOTOGRAPHY: A CASE STUDY 
Introduction 
In the past chapters we have examined an institutional theory of 
the Artworld. We have explored the Artworld as an institution, that 
is, a social practice and have noted membership, offices, and con-
ventions within the practice. The role of the conventions, both pri-
mary and secondary, are important factors -- as is the process of con-
ferral of status. In this chapter, I would like to use photography as 
a case study of the Artworld. Photography is a relatively new medium 
within the Art·~orld and as such may provide an important view of the 
evolutionary nature of the Artworld. Also, photography has caused many 
problems within the Artworld, problems which center upon the nature of 
photography, its place among the Fine Arts, and the conventions which 
govern photography. It is the contention of this chapter that the 
conventions which govern the Artworld do not always govern all photo-
graphic practice because photography does not function only within the 
Artworld but also functions in other worlds that have little to do with 
the Fine Arts. In order to delineate the conventions which govern the 
Artworld and the sum of photographic practice, we must examine those 
areas in which photography functions, i.e., the worlds of entertain-
ment, documentation, commercialism, and art. 
1-~ I
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A Case Study 
To examine the perimeters of photography as well as its induc-
tion into the Artworld, I would like to begin with the early decades 
of photographic history. Daguerre introduced his process in 1839, the 
early portion of the Victorian age when Romantic painting was much in 
vogue. Daguerreotypes were one-of-a-kind photographs produced on a 
silvered plate. They rapidly became popular for portraits and scenic 
views, partially because they were much less expensive than painted 
portraits and landscapes and partially because they were so realistic. 
By realistic, I am referring to the representational quality of the 
photography. The daguerreotype was capable of capturing even the 
smallest detail in a scene; as the optics improved, so did the capabil-
ity of reproduction of detail. With Talbot's paper process in 1841 and 
Archer's wet plate collodion process in 1851 new vistas became pos-
sible: multiple prints could be made from one negative, and two or 
more negatives could be combined. In addition, exposure times were 
reduced somewhat so that portraits became easier to pose. During this 
time, photography became identified with documentation. With photog-
raphy's ability to present a clear, sharp focus, it was thought that 
the artist's intervention between reality and its portrayal was not 
possible. The camera was a machine and ~herefore only portrayed what 
was actually present; the reproduction was automatic. The photographer 
did not create the photograph; it was made. 
However, after the first thirty years of photographic historJ 
had passed, some photographers began to wonder if more could not be 
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expected from their medium. C. Jabez Hughes wrote an article en-
titled "On Art-Photography" in 1861. In the article he argued for the 
expansion of photographic horizons: "Hitherto photography has been 
principally content with representing Truth. Can its sphere not be 
enlarged? And may it not aspire to delineate Beauty, too?" 1 Photog-
raphers responded to this and, perhaps with the mechanical aspects of 
photography prominently in their minds, turned not to the paradigms of 
Realism but rather to the canons of the Romantic movement. Allegorical 
pieces such as Rejlander's TWo Ways of Life (figure 16) and Henry Peach 
Robinson's Fading Away {figure 17) certainly did not fit into the image 
photography had as documentation. Julia Margaret Cameron also produced 
a number of allegorical photographs which were influenced by the Pre-
Raphaelites and G. F. Watts. She produced a great number of portraits 
which were quite different from the allegorical scenes. They were also 
quite different from the portraits of her contemporaries. She used 
very few props or scenery, used light in a much more dramatic way, and 
introduced a softer, slightly out of focus image. She stated her in-
tention with these portraits in the following way: 
When I have had these men before my camera, my whole soul had 
endeavored to do its duty toward them in recording faithfully the 
greatness of the inner as well as the features of the outer man. 
The photograph thus taken has been almost the embodiment of a 
.., 
prayer ... 
The interesting point here is Cameron's desire to photograph the great-
ness of the inner man, that is, something intangible, something not 
readily documented. Indeed, photography as documentation had nothing 
to do with this kind of photography. It was the beginning of a sepa-
rate kind of photography: art photography. More and more, art pho-
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Figure 16: Detail, The TWo Ways of Life, 0. G. Rejlander, 1857. 
Figure 17: Fading Away, H. P. Robinson, 1858. 
Figure 18: Thomas Carlyle, Julia Margaret 
Cameron, 1867. 
tography became thought of as a separate entity from the rest of 
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photographic practice. It became associated with what carne to be cal-
led "pictorial" effects dramatic lighting conditions; a soft focus 
normally achieved by the use of diffusion lenses; manipulation of the 
print which might include retouching, drawing on the negative or com-
bining several negatives; often the use of allegorical themes; and an 
expressive quality that reflected the creativity of the photographer. 
Art photography, largely through these kinds of manipulations, was 
viewed as expressive, that is, dominated by the mechanical nature of 
the camera but open to the creative processes of the artist. By the 
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turn of the century, although the use of allegorical themes had les-
sened considerably, the use of pictorial effects had become synonymous 
with art photography. 
In Cameron's day, some photographs might have been considered 
"artistic" but photography was not considered one of the Fine Arts. 
Attitudes began to change in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
but not without a vigorous campaign waged by both amateur and profes-
sional photographers. In 1891, the Vienna Camera Club held a juried 
salon and in 1893 the Linked Ring, a London society for pictorial pho-
tographers, presented their first salon. Alfred Stieglitz led the 
fight in this country mounting "An Exhibition of American Pictorial 
Photography Arranged by the 'Photo-Secession'" at the National Art 
Club in New York in 1902. Stieglitz also was featured in t~e "Chicago 
Photography Salon of 1900," one of the first museum shows of photog-
raphy in the United States. It became an accepted notion that the 
hanging and viewing of photographs could be equated with the Fine Arts 
salons. But it was art photography that was hung and titled in such a 
manner. Because art photography resembled some painting, and because 
it was hung in salon settings and titled, the shared secondary con-
ventions of art photography and painting became apparent and compari-
sons were made between the two. One of the basic claims for pictorial 
photography as a Fine Art was ~~e recognition of the separation be-
tween it and photography as documentation. A well ~nown critic of the 
time, Charles H. Caffin, underlined this separation: 
There are two distinct roads to photography -- the utilitarian and 
the aesthetic; the goal of the one being a record of facts, and 
the other an expression of beauty •.• Examples of utilitarian 
181 
photographs are those of machinery, of building and engineering 
works, of war-scenes and daily incidents used in illustrated 
papers, of a large majority of the views taken by tourists, and 
of the greater number of portraits ••• Lastly, there is the 
photograph whose motive is purely aesthetic: to be beautiful.3 
What Caffin has called "utilitarian" photography, I have called 
documentary, using "documentary" in a broad sense. These documentary 
photographs imply a factuality, a fidelity to the reality of the mo-
ment and the situation. Examples of using documentary in this broad 
sense would include Roger Fenton' coverage of the Crimean War or 
Matthew Brady's of the Civil War; Adam Clark Vroman and T. H. O'Sul-
!ivan's photographs of the American southwest; Charles ~4rville and 
Eugene Atget's shots of a changing Paris; and Eadweard M~ybridges' 
classic studies of motion. Jacob A. Riis and Lewis Hines used photog-
raphy as a scathing indictment of poverty and slum conditions in the 
United States. Police had begun using photography to identify crimi-
nals, governments to authenticate the death of political insurgents. 
Medicine and science also had begun using photography as a documentary 
tool. With further sophistication of printing processes, half-tone re-
productions of photographs were easily possible and news9apers and 
journals used photography as an integral part of reportage. So, we 
might say that photography existed and functioned within two separate 
and clearly defined worlds -- those of documentation and of the Fine 
Arts. The conventions of both were clearly understood by the public. 
The primary convention for art photography would be that the audience 
was aware of the distinct aesthetic aims of a particular photograph, 
that is, the art photograph was created to be viewed as an autonomous 
work of art. Secondary conventions might be described as "pictorial" 
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effects for art photography, i.e., the soft focus, the dramatic use of 
light, manipulation of the print and an expressive quality. Art pho-
tographs were usually found in a gallery or on the pages of an art 
publication. The primary convention of the documentary photograph was 
the audience•s awareness of its utilitarian aims. Secondary conventions 
would include sharp focus, natural lighting and a factual reportage. 
Documentary photographs were found in the pages of news publications 
or in the files of various agencies. 
However, this description leaves out Caffin's tourists. In 
1889, George Eastman introduced the Kodak #1 camera, a small hand-held 
camera that used film and which freed the user from the development 
and printing of his negatives. It became a common companion on tours, 
vacations and festive occasions. While there is definitely a part of 
the documentary process involved -- "we visited such and such a place" 
or "this is Aunt Mary on her eighty-first birthday" -- there is another 
element involved, that of entertainment. It is entertaining to view 
the snapshots and to show them to other people, and I think entertain-
ment often exceeds documentation under these conditions. For this 
reason, I would suggest that the snapshot be placed in what might be 
called the world of entertainment. I think the conventions of the 
snapshot were equally well understood as those of documentary and art 
photography. The primary convention was the understanding of the 
audience that the aim of the snapshot was enjoyment of a pleasant 
memor]. Secondary conventions might be stated as a complete disregard 
of photographic conventions. As long as there was an indication of an 
image, the snapshot was retained in the family album. 
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This leaves what Caffin has termed "the greater number of por-
traits." In other words, the commercial photographer. As Daguerre's 
process became widespread, commercial photographers used the process 
as itinerant photographers or in small storefront businesses. As the 
technology of photography improved, these commercial photographers 
used new processes for their portraits -- the ambrotype, the carte-de-
vista and tin-type, and finally the new film and bromide papers of the 
1920's. Joining the commercial portrait photographers was the com-
mercial product photographer, or advertising photographer. Again, due 
to half-tone printing, the advertiser no longer had to rely upon an 
engraving of the product, they could use a photograph. With the evo-
lution of the journal into magazines like Liberty, Fortune, Vogue and 
Life, advertising became an increasingly integral part of the publish-
ing process. Advertisers, in turn, relied more and more upon photog-
raphy to sell their products. Products and fashion became viable sub-
jects for photographic enterprise. What can we surmise about con-
ventions concerning commercial photography? First, the primary con-
vention views the audience as understanding that the aim of commercial 
photography is to please the client. The product looks good, the 
portrait is complimentary. Again, the documentary somewhat exists in 
the commercial world, but in a very limited position. As photographic 
processes improved, the ability to ":=etouch" a photograph also im-
proved. The sitter of a portrait increasingly expected to find lines 
in the face softened, if not removed. The client for a product like-
wise expected the product to look "better" than life. SecondarJ con-
ventions tended to be more of the documentary variety, although mini-
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mal manipulation of the print was also expected. Commercial photogra-
phy could be found where people paid to have the image made, as ad-
vertising in magazines or product catalogues or in family surroundings. 
I think it would be safe to say at this point that four dis-
tinctive worlds existed where photography functioned: the Artworld, the 
worlds of documentation, entertainment and commercialism. Perhaps if 
we examine an example of each, we can see this type of differentiation. 
All four of the following examples show facets of motherhood. 
Figure 19 was taken by Hines as documentation of slum conditions 
in New York. The photographer's interest is as much in the surround-
ings of the woman as in the woman herself or her relationships to the 
children. The activity of the people in the picture -- as perhaps con-
trasted with activities of wealthier families -- is also a focal point, 
not necessarily as a family activity but as a documented activity, a 
moment from life. 
Figure 20 is entitled The Heritage of Motherhood and is by one 
of the founding members of the Photo-Secession. It is not just a por-
trait of a woman alone in a barren and forbidding landscape. It is 
a statement about motherhood. One would expect to see children, a fam-
ily, instead of the rocky landscape and threatening skies, to see a 
welcoming attitude in the arms of the woman rather than the hands 
tightly knitted together. One would have these expectations because 
of the title and the title in this case acts as an index of meaning in 
the same way as painting titles. The interesting point with this 
photograph is that we have no sense of the documentary, indeed, we 
do not even know if this young woman is married or a mother. There is 
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Figure 19: Family Picking Nutmeats at Home, Lewis Hines, 1911. 
Figure 20: The Heritage of Motherhood, Gertrude Kasebier, ca. 1905. 
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Figure 21: Snapshot, anonymous photographer, n.d. 
Figure 22: Studio portrait, Farley Studio, n.d. 
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no sense of the immediate moment from life, and we expect no sense of 
documentation. This is also a good ex~~ple of the use of pictorial 
effects in its soft focus and use of light. It is quite different 
from Hines' photograph, which is very flatly lit and uses a much 
sharper focus. 
Figure 21 is a snapshot where the mother's head has been ac-
cidently cropped from the picture by the photographer -- the mother is 
standing behind the grandmother with grandson. TWo other relatives met 
the same fate. While this is not a "slice-of-life" documentation, it 
is obviously posed, it is documentation of people who were at a par-
ticular place at a particular time. But the concern of the photogra-
pher was to record this scene for remembrance and the pleasure it en-
voked. 
Figure 22 is essentially the same, only done in a much more 
formal setting with the assurance that the family would obtain a good 
likeness. Retouching was normally not done at the time when this 
photograph was taken. However, the photograph was taken at a com-
mercial photographer's studio and the client's satisfaction was the 
aim of the photograph. 
These four distinct areas remained pretty much the same for a 
number of years. Perhaps the first indication of change can be seen 
in the later work of Stieglitz and Paul Strand as they began to di-
vorce themselves from the pictorialists. But I think that the real 
challenge c~~e with activity in California photography in the late 
1920's. Several photographers, among them, Edward Weston and Imogen 
Cunningham, for the Group f/64, a group dedicated to "straight" pho-
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tography as an art form. Straight photography proposed an abandonment 
of pictorial effects in art photography in favor of the straight ap-
preach, that is, the kind of unn1anipulated photography which had been 
previously connected with docmnentary photography. Paul Strand had 
earlier verbalized the message of Group f/64: 
Photography, which is the first and only important contribution 
thus far, of science to the arts, finds its raison d'etre, like 
all media in a complete uniqueness of means. This is an absolute 
un~~alified objectivity. Unlike the other arts which are really 
anti-photographic, this objectivity is of the very essence of 
photography, its contribution and at the same time its limita-
tion • • . 4 
Strand believed that the uniqueness of art photography lay in its a-
bility to capture a much fuller spectrum of tonal values than possible 
in other media, and to do this without manipulation or "tricks of the 
process." Straight photography was very different from pictorial pho-
tography. First, the secondary conventions were changed dramatically. 
No longer were soft focus, dramatic lighting and situations or ex-
pressive ends dependent upon content considered the secondary con-
ventions of art photography. Straight photography utilized other con-
ventions, what the photographers felt were more "photographic" con-
ventions and those which had been associated with documentary photog-
raphy. Thus, these photographers used large format cameras and small 
apertures to obtain great definition and a more extended tonal range. 
Important secondary conventions of straight photography would include 
an extended tonal range, that is, the most possible steps of grey from 
black to white, and the portrayal of a sharp, finely focused object. 
Another aspect of this kind of art photography was the objectivity of 
the camera. Documentary photography had long utilized this aspect by 
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its ability to capture all the detail of a given situation in a com-
plete manner. However, it should be noted that the selection of the 
situation had always rested in the photographer's hands. In the case 
of straight photographers, the objectivity of the camera. allowed the 
photographer to turn his camera on any object, place or person that pre-
sented itself. That object, place or person was portrayed with a 
"realism" achieved only by the photographic process. Weston photograph-
ed such items· as common fruit and vegetables, shells and rocks, parts 
of the landscape and household objects. While this contributed to the 
democratization of content, the important aspect of straight photography 
was the emphasis on an unmanipulated prL~t in which the reflected light 
quality of an object was most important. Thus any object, even a plas-
• tic spoon, might be found interesting not as an object, but as a 
photographic representation. 
With the gradual acceptance of straight photography as art pho-
tography, several things happened. First, what had been considered art 
photography, that is, pictorial photography, was viewed as ~~ art move-
ment whose time was over. It was a style that became limited to a 
past development in the particular medium of photography. A parallel 
example of ~~is kind of change in the Artworld would be the change in 
the style of painting from Romantic to Realistic or from Impressionis-
tic to Post-Impressionistic. In the same way, straight photography 
supplanted pictorial photography as the basic style of art photography. 
Second, while the primary convention of art photography remained the 
same, the secondary conventions changed dramatically. We might think 
of the introduction of Impressionism as a direct parallel example of 
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such a dramatic shift in secondary conventions. But I do not think 
this is so: while some secondary conventions did change, they were still 
conventions of the painterly Artworld. The secondary conventions of 
straight photography had been brought in from outside the Artworld, 
from documentation, where they had a contextual meaning all their own. 
As a result, the distinctions between documentary and art photography 
disintegrated for the Artworld. The documentary photographer became 
indistinguishable from the art photographer because the secondary con-
ventions had become indistinguishable -- and because the Artworld ac-
cepted the new conventions. The "manifestos" of straight photography 
were published in a number of catalogues and photography publications. 
For many critics and curators, the early secondary conventions of art 
photography became transformed and passed the barrier between art and 
documentary photography. No longer were the old conventions, those of 
pictorial photography, the accepted conventions for art photography. 
The change from pictorial conventions to straight conventions was pre-
cisely the shift which changed the way that people looked at photog-
raphy. In using the full capacity of the camera photographically and 
objectively a new photographic credo was created. Thus, in the minds 
of many critics and curators there no longer existed two separate 
kinds of photography -- only Photography. 
A good example might be Eugene Atget, a photographer who docu-
mented Paris from 1898 until shortly before his death in 1927. After 
an unsuccessful career in the theatre and a short stint as a painting 
student, Atget turned his attention to photography, becoming in es-
sence the first freelance photographer. He pinned a sign over his door 
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saying "Documents for Artists" and proceeded to photograph Paris, 
selling his prints to artists, for post cards, for books about Paris, 
or to various collections of Paris museums. Man Ray, an artist in-
volved in exploring the photographic medium was one of the first to 
recognize Atget's work as more than "mere" documentation, but it was 
Berenice Abbot who fought to bring Atget's work to public notice. She 
was not successful in his lifetime, but her continued efforts pro-
duced both shows and books of his work. In 1968 the Museum of Modern 
Art acquired the 1,300 negatives and several thousand prints which 
Abbot had preserved. Other museums, notable the photographic division 
of the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, are now scrambling to 
"re-collect" prints Atget sold around the turn of the century as docu-
ments of Parisian monuments. Atget, originally viewed as just another 
documentary photographer, was brought into the Artworld. It is in-
teresting to note that some controversy has arisen recently when new 
prints from Atget's negatives were produced. John Szarkowski and 
Maria Morris of MOMA have been working with the whole body of Atget's 
work, not just the more "artistic" negatives embodied in Abbot's col-
lection. They have found what they feel is a new approach to the 
large body of work. They feel that they have found an artistic matura-
tion in Atget's work that reflects a shift of emphasis from documenta-
tion to artistry. How much of this shift is Atget's and how much is 
due to the changing conventions of photography, and therefore what 
Szarkowski and Morris are looking for, is a moot point:if the conven-
tions had not changed, any discussion of Atget's work as art would have 
been impossible. 
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Figure 23: Aerial view of mud flats, St. Brieuc, France, U.S. Air Force, 
1944. 
Figure 24: Artichoke, halved, Edward Weston, 1930. 
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Another example which shows the change from documentary to art 
photography is figure 23, which is an aerial shot of France taken dur-
ing World War II for reconnaissance purposes. Beaumont Newhall, a 
noted historian of photography, comments: 
Most aerial photographs are dull enough records. But when the 
ground possesses a rich pattern, we can often select from photo-
graphs taken purely for scientific purposes some which will ap-
peal strongly to our esthetic imagination. Many of the aerial re-
connaissance photographs are of intrinsic beauty. They were taken 
by pilots high above enemy territory flying straight and level on 
a predetermined course while three automatic cameras made ex-
posures at intervals of a few seconds •.. Each single print • 
is not an independent picture, but merely one unit of a series 
from which interpreters could extract military information. The 
pictorial quality which we see is a by-product ••• Scientific 
photographs taken through the past hundred years are basically 
similar; it is our acceptance of them as esthetic revelations 
which is ~ew.s 
In other words, because of the museum context and the similarity of 
secondary conventions, we may now view the most mechanically produced 
shots as art photography. When we view an aerial view of mud flats 
in a museum, we are ~o longer viewing it as factual data but rather 
as an abstract representation, a beautiful pattern. We might even as-
sociate it with work like Weston's Artichoke, halved (see figure 24). 
This is a good example of the derivative sense of the work of art: 
when placed together in the same context, both the mud flats and 
Weston's print share many of the secondary conventions. The viewpoint 
has changed and the viewer's expectations have changed because of the 
muse~~ context. Information is no longer the goal, aesthetic interest 
is. 
The logical conclusion of this attitude can be seen in the ex-
hibit Evidence, shown throughout the country between 1977 and 1980. 
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The show featured photography that had originally been produced as 
documentation for police departments, product testing services and the 
like. The published account of the exhibit is as follows: 
Surprise, which appears to be the common base of both creative be-
havior and our response to what is called comedy, is often resur-
rected out of the familiar by relating the familiar which we have 
taken for granted to a~ unfamiliar context; it is this context, 
the circumstantial, which so often blinds all but the "child" in 
us each, which is sometimes the sole impulse that allows us to 
see the evident: "the emperor is naked."6 
Thus, the point of the show was to demonstrate the shift in context 
from documentary to art using photography. ~ne exhibit included such 
pictures as one of a man with a bag over his head and a hand holding a 
torch trying to burn ~~e bag and one print which included several hos-
pital beds and medical implements in the middle of a field with several 
people dressed as nurses sitting on a parkbench nearby. Either of 
these photographs, if viewed from the Artworld, had a definite surreal 
quality to them. Yet, the original context was the opposite of the 
surreal it was supposed to the reality of a testing situation. 
Alan Artner, art critic for the Chicago Tribune, reviewed the exhibit 
and commented: 
..• context is everything. It provides the vocabulary. In cor-
porations and government agencies, the words are task-oriented. 
One does not think of terms like "surreal," "poetic," or "ab-
stract." But at a museum they naturally come to mind, laying a 
conceptual base from which comparisons are made. 7 
The concept of the museum context could not be better stated that this 
brief comment by Artner. Regardless of the original purpose, the new 
context of the work shown in this show places it in the Artworld. The 
greater the resemblance of secondary conventions, the easier it be-
comes to induct the work into the Artworld using the derivative sense 
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of the work of art. 
But what of the other side of this process -- documentary pho-
tography? Is all documentary photography necessarily art photography? 
I believe the answer is "no." Documentary photography has still main-
tained its primary convention, i.e., that it is to be used as a docu-
ment. Medical researchers may be impressed by the beauty of a bac-
teria magnified by a microscope, but the photography of that bacteria 
is primarily intended to give researchers information. The utilitarian 
purpose of documentary photography remains its primart purpose. I 
would suggest that this is one of the cases where the worlds of docu-
mentation and art intersect. Each remain a separate entity but have 
areas that intersect. The question arises at this point whether any 
art photography could be used as documentation. I think the answer is 
"yes." Julia Margaret cameron's portraits of Victorian English writers 
and painters certainly function as coc~~ents of the age. 
I have suggested that there are also worlds of entertainment and 
commercial photography which exist separately from the world of art 
photography. I think that these worlds also have areas of intersection 
with the Artworld. In 1967 there was a group show at MOMA of work done 
by Diane Arbus, Garry Winogrand and Lee Friedlander. This is heralded 
as the public birth of the "snapshot" school of art photography. It 
is difficult to describe this movement as anything but anti-photograph-
ic, especially when one considers that the secondary conventions sur-
rounding art photography at the time were those of straight photography. 
The secondart conventions of this new kind of art photography, i.e., the 
snapshot school, relate very closely to what I have described as the 
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secondary conventions of entertainment photography -- anything is ac-
ceptable as long as there is some sort of image. Winogrand's and 
Friedlander's work was uncomposed, out of focus, grainy and accidental. 
As with the previous succession of style, the new snapshot school bor-
rowed many of the secondary conventions of a world external to the 
Artworld without changing the primary convention of either. Tourists 
still take snapshots of the changing of the guard at Buckingham Castle 
and families still take pictures of birthday parties, graduations or 
weddings; art photographers still work to have their work hung in the 
museum or shown at a gallery. In this case too, the secondary con-
ventions of the previous style or movement in art photography were dis-
regarded. Another result of the change in secondary conventions is 
that we find more snapshots from yesteryear being presented in the 
museum. Thus, I think that we can draw the same conclusions for art 
photography and entertainment photography as we did for art photography 
and documentary photography: the two worlds overlap but portions of 
each remain separate entities. 
However, it should be noted at this point that the entertainment 
photographer is not automatically doing art photography. The photog-
rapher who takes pictures of the backyard birthday party must be a mem-
ber of the Artworld, be aware of the conventions of art photography and 
then confer status of candidate for appreciation on his photographs to 
have his work belong in the Artworld. Unless these conditions are met, 
or unless an office holder of the Artworld confers status upon the 
work, the pictures remain in the world of entertainment. 
The final world that I have described is the world of commer-
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cial photography. The intersection between art and commercial photog-
raphy is perhaps the most subtle in some ways -- or perhaps a bit hard-
er to describe because the secondary conventions are so close, and have 
been so for a long time. For example, a magazine ad for a bathtub may 
utilize a photography that can only be described as surreal and looks 
very much like something Jerry Ulesman might have made. On the other 
hand, the work of an avowed commercial photographer like Avedon may be 
found hanging in the museum. Also, many photographers have worked in 
bo~~ areas; Weston and Edward Steichen are good examples of this. How-
ever, I would maintain that while the two worlds overlap at places, 
there are two distinct worlds with two distinct sets of primary con-
ventions. The attitude of many commercial photographers reflects this 
kind of division: they often speak of doing "their own work" which 
they view as art photography and quite different from the work they do 
for clients. 
And what of the critics and curators who evidently have been a 
part of this evolution of art photography? For the most part, they 
seem to have ignored the way documentary, commercial and entertainment 
photography have been inducted into the Artworld and therefore seem to 
have a rather myopic view of photography. An example of this is Susan 
Sontag's On Photography, which is probably the most widely read volume 
of criticism on photography. Yet, it is based on the premise that 
there is only one kind of photography, art photography, and that it is 
embedded firmly in the Artworld. 
On Photography is a collection of essays in which Sontag pur-
sues the various wisps of photographic reality -- as she perceives 
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them -- through the history, development and aesthetic of the photo-
graphic image. While there are major themes which recur in the es-
says, the essay form and Sontag's literary approach make it difficult 
to neatly categorize these themes. For our purposes, I thir~ an ex-
amination of one of the themes, the relationship between art and pho-
tography, will suffice. 
Sontag's basic attitude toward photography soon becomes ap-
parent -- she believes it to be hazardous for the health of contempor-
ary mankind, especially in xs passive effect on the participatory 
nature of mankind. To her, photography is what Marshall McLuhan would 
call a "cool" medium, that is, one without passion or involvement. 
She sees photography as the medium modernists have used to "cool" all 
of the arts into a non-participatory 9tance. For instance, she says: 
Aesthetic distance seems built into the very experience of look-
ing at photographs, if not right away then certainly with the pas-
sage of time. Time eventually positions most photographs, even 
the most amateurish, at the level of art.8 
In this case, Sontag is not using "aesthetic distance" in the usual 
philosophic usage. To her, "distance" means what aesthetic theory 
would normally describe as "overdistancing," that is, a non-involvement 
with the experience. In this passage, she is referring to the ap-
pearance in the museum of what were originally documentary, commercial 
and entertainment photographs. She seems to indicate that the mere 
passage of time has elevated these photographs to a place within the 
museum. She takes no note of what Newhall has described earlier, that 
is, a new way of looking at these photographs on the part of museum 
curators and members of the Artworld. Furthermore, she extends this 
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"aesthetic distance" or non-involvement on the part of the viewer to 
photographs not only within the museum context but to all photographs, 
whether they are in the family album or on the front page of the morn-
ing newspaper. She attributes what I have described earlier as the 
derivative sense of the work of art in a blanket fashion over all 
photography, regardless of its context. Thus, in a description of the 
photograph of Che Guevara's dead body which was used by wire services 
all over the world, she states: 
[The photograph] not only summed up the bitter realities of con-
temporary Latin American history but had some inadvertent re-
semblance ••• to Mantegna's "The Dead Christ" and Rembrandt's 
"The Anatomy Lesson of Professor Tulp." What is compelling about 
the photograph partly derives from what it shares, as a composi-
tion, with these paintings. 9 
She ascribes this built-in "aesthetic distance" to all photography. To 
Sontag, this distance also indicates a radical leveling of content in 
photographs where a picture of a starving child is equal to that of a 
garbage can. She arrives at this conclusion because she feels photog-
raphy is practically lacking all style. By "style," she means what I 
have described as secondary conventions. To Sontag, all that remains 
in the phtcgraph is its content: 
. . the formal qualities of style -- the central issue in paint-
ing -- are, at most, of secondary importance in photography, 
while what a photograph is of is always of primary importance. 10 
I think this sentence indicates Sontag's insistence upon art photogra-
phy as the only kind of photography. Her refusal to acknowledge any 
secondary conventions of photography, regardless of what kind of pho-
tography is discussed indicates this narrow perspective. As a result, 
she defines the content of photography as the only convention worth 
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discussing. I can think of no other visual art media where the content 
is the defining characteristic. I think Sontag has set up an impossible 
situation in making her judgments from the sole vantage point of the 
Artworld, yet refusing to discuss the secondary conventions of photog-
raphy and subordinating them to content. She believes that photography 
is the major tool of the modernist assault on the Artworld yet does not 
concede that this entire matter is internal to the Artworld. She states: 
The museum's naturalization of photography as art is the conclusive 
victory of the century-long campaign waged by modernist taste on 
behalf of an open-ended definition of art, photography offering a 
much more suitable terrain than painting for this effort. For the 
line between amateur and professional, primitive and sophisticated 
is not just harder to draw with photography than it is with paint-
ing -- it has little meaning.ll 
She continues: 
That all the different kinds of photography form one continuous and 
interdependent tradition is the once startling, now obvious-seem-
ing assumption which underlies contemporary photographic taste and 
authorizes the indefinite expansion of that taste.l2 
Thus, I think Sontag has made a basic error in insisting that there is 
only one kind of photography, art photography, and in viewing photog-
raphy from only one perspective, that of the Artworld. This provincial-
ism provides a very narrow foundation for the rest of her observations 
on photography. Lotte Jacobi, a well respected eighty-five year old 
photographer, shows more insight into the problems of photography when 
she states: 
Photography is like any of what you call arts. Not every painting 
is meant as a piece of art. You paint houses, you paint signs, 
you £~int God knows what. It's all painting --but it's not all 
art. 
A recent article by OWen Edwards, photographic critic, amplifies 
Jacobi's statement and also comments on the way specific images from 
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documentary photography are inducted into the Artworld, and thus to 
art photography. His article is a review of two exhibitions, one of 
photographs of space exploration at Grey Gallery in New York and the 
other of NASA photographs at George Eastman House in Rochester. He 
raises the question of whether indiscriminate machine-made photographs 
taken without even circumstantially artistic intention can indeed be 
viewed as works of art. He states that machines, or systems of ma-
chines, necessarily involve the human creative spirit and act as 
proxies for mankind. As for artistic intention, he answers in this 
way: 
Not everything can be art, but much can, and nowhere are the 
boundaries more all-embracing than in photography. Many of the 
photographs now revered by museum curators were made with little 
if any regard for art. Anthropology, advertising, propaganda, 
paid portraiture, science, historical preservation, journalism 
and o~~er non-artistic pursuits have made artists of Gardner, 
Nadar, Atget, Beato, Bellocq, and many many others. Each age 
redefines art for itsel£.14 
What Ed·'flards has called ''redefining art" I have called the induction of 
objects into the Artworld. Unlike Sontag, this view recognizes an 
Artworld, an institution which affects the context in which the object 
is viewed. The change in context changes the way an object is viewed, 
substituting an aesthetic meaning for the previous utilitarian one. 
This change in context must be a conscious one; one that is ~ased on 
the conventions of the Artworld and also on the recognition of the 
utilitarian conventions within which the photograph was originally 
taken. 
In summarizing this chapter, I think that the most important 
point is the existence of four areas in which photography functions, 
202 
each with a different primary convention. While the secondary con-
ventions of each may at times overlap, the primary conventions have 
remained constant. It is the constancy of the primary convention of 
each and the flux of the secondary conventions which have caused con-
fusion to photographers and members of the Artworld alike. The con-
fusion has been prolonged because, unlike painting, there is no large 
body of critical work which takes into consideration the differences 
between these four worlds and the areas of their intersection. Many 
critics and curators, like Sontag, have simply assumed the Artworld as 
the only context within which photography functions. This assumption 
does nothing to clarify photography's role within the Artwor1d, the 
expanding perimeters of the Artworld, or the places where the Artworld 
intersects other worlds. 
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CHAPTER VII 
IMPLIC~TIONS OF A THEORY OF THE ARTWORLD 
Introduction 
In this chapter I would like to examine the implications of the 
institutional theory described in previous chapters for art education. 
To do this, I would like to describe the position of art education with-
in the str~cture of formal education and the problems that I see as 
inherent in the system. I would also like to suggest that an alterna-
tive to the traditional type of art education may exist. However, due 
to the large amount of material needed to discuss these ideas in de-
tail, I will limit my comments to somewhat broad generalizations rather 
than specifics of implementation or curriculum. It should be noted that 
I will use three distinct terms in talking about instruction in the 
visual arts -- art education, aesthetic education and visual education. 
While full definitions will be given later in the text, the general 
use of t~ese terms is as follows. I will use the first to describe the 
general system of instruction in the arts as it now exists, the second 
to describe instruction in the appreciation of the Fine Arts, and the 
third to describe a broad type instruction which is not primarily based 
in the Fine Arts. 
Art Education 
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The place of art education within the system of schooling in the 
United States is on the periphery of educational practice. This is due 
in large part to the perception of the general populace that art educa-
tion is inexorably tied to the Fine Arts {the Artworld) and that the 
Artworld is removed from the practical endeavors of everyday life. Ef-
forts to justify the inclusion of art education in a more central po-
sition have resulted in the corruption of the ties between art educa-
tion and the Artworld. 
Art education in the United States has had neither a long nor 
broad history; it didn't make its appearance as part of the general cur-
riculum until well into the twentieth century. Before that time, the 
general course of instruction in the arts ran the gamut from nonexist-
ent to a tool for education in the trades to a way of obtaining cul-
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tural refinement. When included in the curriculum of schools before 
the turn of the century, it most often featured drawing geometric fig-
ures or other representational forms as an aid to training the per-
ceptual ability of students. There was a close alliance between the 
industrial or vocational arts and art education at this point. A form 
of art education also existed in "finishing" schools in the form of 
needlepoint, china painting and genre drawing. The purpose of this 
kind of instruction was the additional Culture and refinement the arts 
might give to young ladies. In both of these cases, emphasis was 
placed on copying simple objects from life or artworks already in ex-
istence. The connection between these types of instruction and the 
Artworld were tenuous at best. 
In the 1920's and 1930's, art education separated from the in-
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dustrial arts and emerged as a study of its own. This was due in 
large part to the impetus of John Dewey and the Progressive movement. 
Dewey was instrumental in promulgating the idea of creative expression 
in the child to the school system in the United States. Dewey's 
aesthetic theory, articulated in Art As Experience, 1 argued that the 
aesthetic was part of every experience and was not separate from every-
day activity. He placed emphasis on the "process" of art, both in the 
original creation of the experience by the artist and in the recreation 
of the experience by the viewer. I think, to Dewey, art was expected 
to be in the service of experience, an aid to growth in the individual. 
The application of Dewey's theories to the classroom by art educators 
-- not necessarily as Dewey would have wished -- resulted in various 
approaches, from the "laissez-faire" where the child was free to ex-
periment in any direction to "project-building" where art projects 
were used to demonstrate facts from other disciplines. In both of 
these cases, aesthetic education as a formal study of the objects, his-
tory and theory of the Artworld was not thought to be needed. In the 
laissez-faire approach, aesthetic education was considered an in-
hibiting factor in that the child might be intimidated by viewing the 
products of professional artists. It was thought the child would 
either discontinue his own efforts or suspend his spontaneity and 
originality in an effort to copy. In the case of the art project ap-
proach, the emphasis was placed on the accuracy of the project and not 
on aesthetic qualities. Thus, the production of soap carving of Corin-
thian column, models of medieval castles, or drawings of the first 
Thanksgiving had little relation to the Artworld. 
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Art education as it developed over the decades came to be under-
stood as a vehicle for the creativity of the child and often took the 
form of the two approaches described above. The justification of an 
arts curriculum was based on the idea of creativity as an inherent 
human characteristic. While the expression of this creativity is 
normally thought to be the function of the Artworld, the emphasis of 
most art education programs and art educators has been placed on a much 
broader idea of creativity. For example, Viktor Lowenfeld has noted a 
distinction between art education and the Artworld: 
Art education primarily deals with the effect which art processes 
have on the individual, while the so-called fine arts are more 
concerned with the resulting products. It is then quite logical 
to say that art education is more interested in the effect of a 
greater and more harmonious organization of the elements of art 
on the individual and his development, while aesthetic growth in 
the fine arts generally refers to the harmonious organization of 
the elements of art themselves. 2 
Lowenfeld goes on to argue that the creativity fostered by art educa-
tion stands as one of the most valuable tools of a free society in 
that creativity produces individuality and a broader base within the 
individual for problem solving. This kind of justification, allowing 
for individual differences among theorists, is one of the most prevalent 
among art educators. At the heart of this attitude is the assumption 
that the processes of the Artworld are valuable to the growth of the 
child but the context in which these processes exist is extraneous. 
Kenneth Lansing, a well known art educator, has noted this dichotomy: 
If art educators justi=y their subject by stressing the value of 
the art process, they must admit that one of their objectives is 
the production of artists. After all, a person is not engaged in 
an art process unless he produces art; and if he produces art, he 
is an artist. 
By the same token, art instructors cannot logically justify 
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their subject simply by pointing to the value of the art product. 
They must admit that they aim to develop connoisseurs. The 
reason for this is that the full value of an art object cannot 
be realized if people are incapable of making critical judgments 
about form and content. 3 
While Lansing's view is not universally held in the art education com-
munity, it does point to the problem. In attempting to justify art 
education programs within the schools, art educators have tried to find 
a broadly based and practical argument for the continued existence of 
these programs. The "creativity factor" usually argued provides the 
practicality and demoncratic framework needed for such justification 
while an argument based on the training of artists and connoisseurs 
seems to underline the elitist conception of the Artworld when placed 
in the context of mass education. I think that this has been the cen-
tral problem in art education and is somewhat of a "catch-22" situation. 
Art education is certainly derived from the Artworld and is often per-
ceived by a mass audience as part of an elitist pursuit, as something 
within the schools that has little bearing on everyday life. To ar~~e 
its ever]day applications, art educators have had to appeal to the Art-
world to demonstrate the universality of the creative spirit in man, 
yet could not use the Artworld as a central part of study because of 
its elitist connotations. In other words, art educators have had to 
extract some of the processes of the Artworld and distill these prac-
tices to a common level of acceptability. 
This means that many of the secondary conventions of the Art-
world remain largely unknown to students in art education programs or, 
in some cases, these conventions may be distorted to fit the dichotomy. 
For example, creative genius or talent has been one of the major se-
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condary conventions of the Artworld since the ~~nnerist period. The 
very idea of a "masterpiece" carries the connotation of a rare ability, 
a rare talent. The general procedure in the Artworld for the artist 
of study, preparation, and gradual public recognition is also an in-
dication of the important part talent plays in the Artworld. Yet, art 
education to a great extent ignores this aspect in favor of a more 
democratic approach. The approach of art education becomes "although 
not everyone has talent, everyone can be creative." I am not arguing 
against this approach, but rather pointing to the kind of dichotomy 
that exists within art education. 
I think that other major conventions of the Artworld have been 
ignored as well. Too often, whether it be an analysis of the handling 
of the plastic elements or art history or theoretical perspectives en-
gendered by a movement, there is not adequate discussion to make these 
conventions understood or related to what the student knows. I would 
suspect that a portion of this is due to the conception that the con-
ventions are esoteric and have little to do with other subject areas 
studied. Another part is the lack of knowledge of these conventions by 
teachers, especially on the elementary level. 
This last point, the lack of ~nowledge of the conventions on the 
part of classroom teachers is significant because it points again to 
the separation of the Artworld from everyday concerns. This can be 
seen in the training of student teachers in elementary education pro-
grams. At most, these students are given six hours of art education 
theory and methods in the course of their studies. This is probably 
equivalent to six hours of Greek in preparation to teaching Greek --
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precisely because both "art" and Greek are equally alien to the every-
day experiences of most students who are preparing for teacher educa-
tion. There is no possibility to teach enough of the basics of either 
art or Greek in six hours of academic experience on the college level 
to prepare future teachers to teach either art or Greek. The previous 
statement presupposes minimal experience with art education -- and the 
Artworld -- on the part of student teachers. Statistics show that 
about 10% of high school students nationwide enroll in an introductory 
art class. 4 On the elementary level, few schools employ art teachers 
and rely upon the classroom teacher for any instruction in the arts. 
Basically, this means that college students who are preparing to be 
elementary teachers may have had little previous experience with art 
education and the quality of tha~ training is open to question. This 
results in either a dual agenda in the art education classes where 
secondary conventions as well as methods and materials are taught or 
emphasis is placed on methods through project oriented presentations. 
In either case, the result is a superficial exploration of the arts 
especially for those who will be expected to teach art in their own 
classrooms. If this seems to be a circular situation, it is. The 
solution would seem to be more hours required for art education in 
elementary teacher education programs; yet the fact is that few hours 
can be added to programs which are already over-crowded to meet state 
certification requirements. This is especially true for a subject 
area that is perceived as not central to the curriculum. 
Another problem exists on the secondary level. In this case, 
there are very few general survey courses of the arts. Instead, em-
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phasis is placed upon studio courses. This means that training is 
given which is appropriate to practitioners in the Artworld. While the 
handling of plastic elements is basic to these courses, the history and 
theory of the Artworld may be given little attention. In this sense, 
the training can become a rather narrow study within one or two media 
instead of an introduction to all of the conventions of the Artworld 
as well as methods and materials used in the Artworld. A parallel ex-
ample might be teaching the sonnet form without any reference to poets 
who used it or the Magna Carta without any reference to conditions in 
England in 1215. The contextual settings in these examples which lead 
to a greater understanding would be lacking. In the same way, the 
contextual setting of the Artworld may be found lacking in many se-
condary art education programs. 
In both elementary and secondary levels of art education the 
dichotomy between the exclusive aspects of the Artworld and the need 
for a democratic art experience for children have tended to create a 
highly distilled program. The need to justify these programs on the 
basis of their practicality has lead to a divorce of art education from 
the rich texture of the conventions of the Artworld, thus widening the 
gap between the Artworld and the general public. A resolution of the 
dichotomy between the Artworld and art education might be a systematic 
instruction in all of the conventions of the Artworld at both elementa-
ry and secondary levels. This instruction might also be designed to 
educate students as members cf the Artworld rather than practitioners. 
This is not to say that studio experience would be absent ~rom such a 
program, but rather that it would not be predominate in programs as it 
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is presently. 
Visual Education 
Another approach to the dichotomy between art education and the 
Artworld might be to remove the Artworld as the sole basis of art educa-
tion. Reference has been made in recent years to the "mass arts," 
that is, popular forms of entertainment or those of a commercial nature. 
These include movies, commercial television, print media in the form 
of magazines, and some mass produced products. What differentiates 
these "arts" from the artworks of the Artworld is their primarily u-
tilitarian context rather than aesthetic context. In other words, 
their primary conventions are different than that of the Artworld. 
However, as we have seen, these worlds share some secondary conventions 
with the Artworld and at times intersect the Artworld. In this way, 
a particular medium like film can function both in the Artworld and in 
the worlds of entertainment, commercialism, and documentation. Those 
fiL~s which function in the Artworld are classified as art films and 
are described by an hauteur theory. Films like Persona or 8~ repre-
sent the art film. On the other hand, the large percentage of com-
mercial releases represent both the commercial and entertainment worlds. 
Films like Raiders of the Lost Ark, Halloween, and The French Lieuten-
ant's Woman represent the commercial film. These films have a body of 
criticism which reflects some of the secondary conventions of the art 
film, for example, the handling of the visual elements, the actors' 
performance, and the director's ability to form a unified product. But 
there is an additional element, that of the utilitarian context. In 
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this way, the reviews of a movie like Raiders of the Lost Ark include 
the entertainment value of the film. This is not to say that com-
mercial films cannot be appreciated on an aesthetic level; they can, 
but aesthetic appreciation is only one facet of appreciation and not 
the primary one. 
It should be noted that the classificatory sense of a work of 
art, which Dickie has described and which is operant in the Artworld, 
is not operant in the worlds of entertainment, commercialism or docu-
mentation. There is an immediate evaluative sense to these products 
which is based on their utilitarian context. In no sense does the 
question of a product being a product arise. A movie is a movie, a 
television program is a television program, an advertisement is an ad-
vertisement, a spoon is a spoon. But the evaluation of the product as 
good or bad does come into question. This type of evaluation is based 
to a great extent upon the utilitarian context of the product. In 
this way, the entertainment value of Raiders of the Lost Ark becomes 
an. integral part of its evaluation. In the same way, the entertain-
ment value of a television series becomes an important part of its 
evaluation because commercial television is thought to be an entertain-
ment medium. An advertisement is evaluated not only on its visual 
imagery but on its ability to sell the product. The kind of evaluation 
usually involved in these products may be described as a combination 
of aesthetic and utilitarian factors, using "aesthetic" to describe the 
way in which the visual elements of a product are used. For example, 
a spoon may be examined in the light of its aesthetic and utilitarian 
factors. It should be aesthetically pleasing, that is, be visually 
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well designed; at the same time, it should be functional, that is, 
easy to use, easy to handle, and able to contain a liquid. Both the 
spoon's form and function are equally important factors and both weigh 
equally in the spoon's evaluation. 
In some cases, the balance between form and function are not 
maintained and the utilitarian context becomes the only criteria for 
judging the value of a product. For example, the function of a tele-
vision commercial is to sell the product. Functional requirements 
like the length of commercial time, the necessity of seeing the product, 
and the need for viewer identification are all important factors which 
contribute to the commercial. However, some advertisers have sub-
ordinated the form of the commercial to the functional requirements. 
The result is the type of commercial which is remembered for its poor 
form, that is, a strident or negative presentation which is not pleas-
ing. The justification for commercials of this type is based on the 
flli,ctional factor -- product recognition and retention. The same may 
be said of print advertisements, commercial television programming, 
movies, or mass produced products. The balance between the form and 
function has been disrupted. 
It would seem that a course of study based on an analysis of both 
form and function in the media described above and in mass produced ob-
jects would provide a basis for visual literacy. By visual literacy 
I mean a learned response to the visual elements which surround us 
daily. An evaluation of these media and products would be appropriate 
L, light of their nature and because ~, analytical approach must in-
clude such evaluation. It should be noted that this type of study 
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would have to be systematic, to begin at the elementary level and to 
continue through the secondary grades. It should also be noted that 
the mere addition of video, filmmaking, advertising, graphic and prod-
uct design to an art curriculum would fulfill the conditions I have in 
mind. Rather, my suggestion would be that these studies would be ap-
proached from the context of the worlds of entertainment, commercialism 
and documentation. One major benefit of such a program may be found in 
its relationship to everyday life. The Artworld may be viewed as re-
mote and inaccessible to many students. However, the products of 
these other worlds surround these students and are present in their 
everyday life. Moreover, a study of this type might conceivably lead 
back into the Artworld because the conventions of these worlds and the 
Artworld are shared in some ways. The student would have a foundation 
upon which to explore the Artworld, not as an alien territory but one 
that has characteristics in common with everyday life. 
With either art education or visual education programs, the 
major problem remains: the lack of qualified and knowledgeable teachers, 
particularly on the elementary level. For a visual education program, 
a familiarity with the worlds of commercialism and entertainment do 
not guarantee good instruction. The teacher must be aware of the con-
ventions that are operant, and must be able to explain them. The train-
ing of teachers who are capable of this kind of teaching is not easy. 
Increased requirement for certification, or for in-service training, 
must be based on what is perceived as practical grounds. A visual ed-
ucation program might be justified on the basis that it could create 
educated consumers, but I am not sure that this would be considered a 
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totally practical justification. 
In the final analysis, as long as the Artworld remains separate 
from everyday life, art education will face a basic dichotomy in its 
approach and function. On the other hand, a visual education progr~~ 
would be based upon the quotidian aspects of the student's life. 
Either approach that I have suggested -- a reorganized art education 
program with greater stress on all of the secondary conventions or a 
visual education program -- would be difficult to implement. The 
justification of either program ultimately rests on the importance of 
understanding of the visual elements which man creates. 
Notes: 
1 John Dewey, Art As Experience (New York: Capricorn Books, 
1958). 
2 Viktor Lowenfeld, Creative and Mental Growth (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 393. 
3 Kenneth M. Lansing, Art, Artists, and Art Education (New York: 
HcGraw-Hill Book Co., n.d.), p. 268. 
4 Glenys G. Unruh and William M. Alexander, Innovations in 
Secondary Education, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
Inc., 1974), p. 79. 
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